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Preface 
The COVID 19 pandemic is a tectonic shock for almost all countries and societies on earth. 
The economic and socio-political consequences are not yet foreseeable, nor are the long-
term psychological effects at the individual level. Within their societies, religious actors 
take on functions of contingency management and often also of social welfare. At the 
same time, they are often transnationally networked. Their structural, cultural and institu-
tional characteristics vary among societies, which is why modernisation developments are 
not easily transferable. Nevertheless, characteristics can be identified that favour a con-
structive approach to pandemic management. The following study explores this question 
by examining actors and communities whose activities and statements had a de-escalating 
or escalating effect. What recommendations for politics and religious actors can be de-
rived from the analysis? 
 
I would like to sincerely thank the authors, Dr Alexander Yendell (Leipzig Univer-
sity), Prof Dr Oliver Hidalgo (University of Münster) and Carolin Hillenbrand (Cluster of 
Excellence Religion and Politics at the University of Münster), for this excellent collabora-
tion and their commitment to this research project. My thanks also go to my colleagues in 
the Research Programme “Culture and Foreign Policy”, Sarah Widmaier and Anja Schön, 
who supported the project by providing conceptual and editorial guidance.   
 
Religious actors have strong orientation functions within societies and can thus make 
an important contribution to crisis management and peacekeeping. This study is the 
fourth to be published by the ifa research programme on the topic of the peace potential of 
religions. The three previous studies analysed the peace potential of Abrahamic religions, 
Asian religious actors and free churches in Latin America and the USA.  
 
As part of ifa’s Research Programme "Culture and Foreign Policy", experts examine 
current issues in foreign cultural and educational policy and formulate recommendations 
for action for foreign cultural policy actors. International cultural relations must be sys-
tematically studied in order to develop viable future strategies for transnational cultural 
exchange. 
 
Kind regards,   
Odila Triebel 
Head of the Dialogue and Research Unit “Culture and Foreign Policy”  
ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)
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Summary 
The subject of religion and the behaviour of religious actors in the COVID-19 crisis appear 
at first glance to constitute either just marginal issues or factors which tend to be negative. 
On the other hand, there is far less public discussion on the key role played by religious 
communities as civil society partners of governments or the WHO, as agencies providing 
charitable and pastoral assistance, and as a resource for hope and contingency manage-
ment so as to successfully cope with the pandemic. This study analyses the ambivalent 
role of actors in the COVID-19 pandemic within the framework of a theory-based empiri-
cal analysis, presents the most important developments, learning effects and problem ar-
eas yet to be addressed and finally, based on this, draws up policy recommendations for 
action.  
Executive Summary 
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Executive Summary 
The subject of religion and the behaviour of religious actors in the COVID-19 crisis appear 
at first glance to constitute either just marginal issues or factors which tend to be negative. 
Without doubt, many people remember that religious services, especially at the beginning 
of this global infection, often made the headlines as ‘super spreader events’, whether it 
was the Shincheonji Church of Jesus in Daegu, South Korea, the evangelical churches in the 
USA or Brazil, the Islamic missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat in Delhi and Kuala Lum-
pur, or the Baptist communities in Frankfurt/Main, Germany. On the other hand, there is 
far less public discussion on the key role played by religious communities as civil society 
partners of governments or the WHO, as agencies providing charitable and pastoral assis-
tance, and as a resource for hope and contingency management so as to successfully cope 
with the pandemic. 
 
This study analyses the ambivalent role of actors in the COVID-19 pandemic within 
the framework of a theory-based empirical analysis, presents the most important develop-
ments, learning effects and problem areas yet to be addressed and finally, based on this, 
draws up policy recommendations for action. 
 
Objective and Research Question 
The objective of this study is to provide an empirical overview of the role, opinions and 
practices of faith actors during the COVID-19 crisis, in order to evaluate them in a con-
structively critical manner and to derive recommendations for goal-oriented cooperation 
between political and religious actors, from the experiences gained so far. The guiding 
question is how an interplay between political and religious actors can succeed in achiev-
ing the best possible management of the Corona pandemic. The results of the study are in-
tended to be broadly applied to different country and religious contexts. For this reason, 
the study has been carried out on a more general level. It provides a well-founded over-
view; selected examples are used to recommend concrete steps. 
 
Methods and Data 
A mix of qualitative and quantitative methods was used to answer the question. In De-
cember 2020 and January 2021, the authors of this study organised two expert workshops 
together with the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (‘ifa’) which were attended by repre-
sentatives from religious communities, multi-religious networks, faith-based organisa-
tions (FBOs), research institutes and political foundations. In addition, they carried out 
several guideline-based interviews with further experts. Moreover, they used their own 
data which originated from a comprehensive quantitative online survey. 
Executive Summary 
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As its conceptual foundation, the study draws on a systems-theoretical analysis of the 
problem as well as explanatory approaches to conspiracy theories, authoritarianism and 
religion. Religion is understood as a multi-level phenomenon which is regarded on three 
central levels of analysis: i) the macro-level, ii) meso-level, and iii) micro-level. Using the 
theoretical preliminary considerations, criteria are derived for ‘Best Practices’ (= religious 
actors as part of the solution: crisis management) and ‘Worst Practices’ (= religious actors 
as part of the problem: crisis reinforcement). They are listed in the following table. 
 
Criteria 
a) Best Practice b) Worst Practice 
Macro-level: religious actors… 
- work constructively with the WHO to achieve 
joint objectives  
- support state actors in their questionable 
COVID-19 policy 
- work constructively with state actors to achieve 
joint objectives  
- take part in resistance against a reasonable 
state COVID-19 policy  
- as part of civil society, promote control of the 
pandemic and mitigation of negative impacts  
- are unable to carry out their responsibilities 
and functions under the conditions of re-
strictive political systems 
 - contribute to the exacerbation of religious 
tensions and conflicts 
 
Meso-level: religious communities and (inter-)religious/faith-based organisations… 
- take part in measures to provide medical educa-
tion and control the spread of the virus, follow 
hygiene concepts, disseminate correct infor-
mation and counter conspiracy theories 
- rise above proven scientific findings, spread 
conspiracy narratives and violate COVID-19 
regulations  
- provide pastoral and charitable assistance, even 
under changed conditions, and contribute to the 
development of viable concepts for the future 
- are unable to act, neglect their social/spir-
itual functions and fail to provide a pro-
gramme of ethical and visionary orientation 
- attempt to alleviate the suffering experienced by 
the entire population due to COVID-19, incl. dis-
advantaged groups and religious minorities 
(→ inclusive & multi-religious approach) 
- are concerned only with their own religious 
group, discriminate against other religions 
and religious minorities and provoke con-
flictual tensions 
 
Micro-level: the faith of religious individuals... 
- helps them to deal with the crisis situation, inse-
curity and stress (“coping with contingency”) and 
release positive emotions (e.g. hope) 
- is no help when dealing with the crisis, but 
instead increases negative emotions (e.g. 
fear, helplessness, loneliness) 
Executive Summary 
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- protects them against (COVID-19) conspiracy 
theories as ‘substitute religions’ and lets them 
link their faith to proven scientific findings 
- makes them susceptible to (COVID-19) con-
spiracy theories, interpretations of the pan-
demic as God’s punishment and to devalua-
tion of other groups of people/religions 
- promotes a willingness to help and solidarity 
with others as well as a willingness to comply 
with the necessary COVID-19 regulations  
- motivates them to violate COVID-19 regula-
tions and reduces their willingness to help 
and their solidarity above and beyond their 
own religious in-group 
 
Empirical Findings 
While the ‘Best Cases’ examined were similar in tendency and substance, the ‘Worst 
Cases’ are more complex and heterogeneous, and raise numerous different issues. It be-
came clear that especially in times of crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic constructive 
collaboration between representatives from politics, science and religion is a significant 
issue. In contrast, it proved to be particularly problematic when (powerful) religious ac-
tors refused to implement necessary COVID-19 policies. The situation was further aggra-
vated when religious and political actors came together to resist scientific expertise. 
 
Successive learning effects and adaptation processes were observed among most reli-
gious actors. At the beginning of the crisis, many religious communities clearly found it 
difficult to assess the challenges of the COVID-19 virus and understand their own role in 
this infection. Exceptions were mainly noted among those who could draw on their expe-
rience gained from past health crises such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, Ebola virus disease and 
others. Over time, however, the faithful and the representatives of most religious commu-
nities, whether Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Hindus, Buddhists or other religious groups, 
recognised the signs of the times and provided valuable contributions to the successful 
containment of the virus.  
 
Only the radical, fundamentalist branches of various denominations, which are often 
fundamentally opposed to scientific knowledge and methods and tend to place religious 
authority above all other areas such as science and politics, proved to represent a perma-
nent risk factor. First and foremost they lacked differentiated theological perspectives to 
create a balance between dogmas of faith and scientific findings, reason and emotion.  
 
Compared to these groups, multi-religious initiatives in particular distinguished 
themselves as positive trailblazers for controlling the global pandemic (e.g. Religions for 
Peace (RfP), the International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development (PaRD), the 
Executive Summary 
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Joint Learning Initiative on Local Faith Communities (JLI) and others). Instead of being iso-
lated and unconnected, many religious organisations and actors found (new) ways of col-
laborating. Supported by digitalisation and new social media, they were able to visibly 
present themselves and network better than in past crises. 
 
Another fundamental insight is that the idea of inclusion or its antipode – the funda-
mental problem of discrimination against religious minorities – has once again become 
strikingly more important in the context of the COVID-19 crisis; not because the COVID-
19 pandemic has served as a genuine cause for discriminatory behaviour towards reli-
gious individuals and groups, but because the crisis has become a catalyst and amplifier 
of problems which already exist in this sector. Even in normal times, an authoritarian self-
image of one's own faith, which is based on exclusive claims to the truth and often com-
bined with a self-declared special status and demarcation from other religious communi-
ties is fraught with risks, and this negative potential increases even more in times of crisis. 
Conversely, multi-religious discourse, mutual rapprochement, but also (if necessary) me-
diation between the various groups of actors is the conditio sine qua non of [the indispen-
sable condition for] a goal-oriented COVID-19 policy. As a result, any conflicts which may 
already exist between religions are not further exacerbated, but defused. 
 
What must be regarded as possibly the most important finding of this study is that the 
fields of work of religious groups on the one hand and representatives of national and in-
ternational politics and science on the other are complementary. The dialogue which poli-
ticians and scientists engage in with religious actors, which can be very time-consuming 
and complex, promises a balance between cognitive and emotional forces. It is precisely 
this harmony between knowledge and feelings which is so valuable for successful imple-
mentation of anti-COVID-19 measures which curtail individual and societal freedoms and 
can bring people to their physical and mental limits. 
 
Religious attitudes and resources can prove to be appropriate instruments, at least in 
their tendency to provide adequate intellectual and supportive orientation on this difficult 
path. Up to a certain degree, they are predestined to function as a bulwark against the 
(sometimes religion-like) conspiracy theories, not least because such theories must be ad-
dressed in a primarily emotional, emphatic and sociopsychological manner rather than a 
purely matter-of-fact, rational one. Theoretically, religions already play a significant role 
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Policy Recommendations for Action 
Based on the analyses carried out and the expert opinions which have been acquired, the 
study concludes by making recommendations for action with regard to involving reli-
gious actors as constructively as possible during such global health crises as the COVID-
19 pandemic. Three central fields of action have been identified to achieve the objective of 
joint crisis management, possible challenges regarding its implementation are stated and 
solutions to these challenges are provided. Some ‘checklists’ summarise corresponding 
suggestions for political actors (e.g. politicians, decision-makers, governments) and for re-
ligious actors (e.g. religious leaders, religious communities, FBOs). Depending on the con-
text and application, these suggestions must be fleshed out and adapted. The following 
diagram presents an overview of the main findings. 
 
Fields of Action 
1. Involvement, dialogue & net-
working 
2. Religious actors’ tasks & com-
petencies in times of crises as well 
as the prerequisites & resources 
required for these 
3. Information processes,  
conspiracy theories and  
vaccination hesitancy 
Challenges 
1) Identification & selection of 
religious actors 
2) Qualities of relationships 
3) Actual implementation of 
agreements in the multi-level 
structure 
1) Financing & the provision of 
resources 
2) Dangers of religious commit-
ment 
1) ‘Infodemics’ and parallel me-
dia worlds 
2) Nexus of religion & conspir-
acy theories as well as vac-
cination hesitancy 
Checklists for political and religious actors for managing global (health) crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic 
and mitigating their negative impacts 
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Conclusion and Outlook 
In conclusion, this study makes it clear that religions and religious actors play a significant 
role, especially in times of crises or pandemics: religion matters. Religious actors can make 
a major contribution in the fight against the pandemic and handling its consequences, but 
they can also exacerbate the crisis. Thus they should always be taken into consideration by 
state and international actors and involved in the management of a crisis. 
 
The empirical analysis carried out on the role of religious actors during the COVID-19 
pandemic also shows that there is need for further research. This is an exciting and com-
plex subject area, from which important insights for further, probably unavoidable 
(health) crises can be gained. At the time this study was drawn up, research on the 
COVID-19 pandemic, focussing specifically on the religious phenomenon, had only just 
begun. This report can, therefore, serve as a basis and an incentive for further research, es-
pecially for more in-depth, country- and region-based studies or case studies of individual 
religious communities. 
1. Introduction 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Nobody is safe unless all are safe. This is the moral of the unfolding story of the virus.” 
(RfP 2020a) 
 
1.1 An outline of the problem: religious actors in the COVID-19 pandemic and 
their significance for foreign cultural and educational policies 
When numerous active members of the largest global interreligious network Religions for 
Peace (RfP)1 gathered online on 1 April 2020 for the virtual “Global Interfaith Moment of 
Hope & Solidarity in the Time of COVID-19” meeting and the religious representatives con-
nected from all over the world solemnly committed themselves to “prayer, action, hope, 
solidarity and comfort” (Bender 2020), many strongly secular people may have regarded 
this as an expression of latent helplessness. One could ask, what can religious actors2 
achieve in such a dramatic situation as the COVID-19 crisis? At a time in which all hope 
appears to be concentrated on scientists, doctors and physicians, activity is expected from 
politicians, health authorities, social welfare associations and nursing staff in particular, 
and neither solidarity nor the risk of infection makes a difference between religious believ-
ers and non-believers? And in which, last but not least, it is important to prevent religious 
services from becoming super spreader events when they attempt to provide orientation 
and comfort by bringing congregations together to pray?  
 
Even a second, already somewhat reflective glance which remembers both the tradi-
tionally strong presence of religious communities in the social, nursing and welfare sector 
as well as the enormous experience which religious communities have in the fight against 
infectious diseases such as AIDS, malaria or Ebola threatens to get entangled in a strongly 
Eurocentric perspective. For is the role of religious actors, which is undisputedly valuable 
in this respect, not required first and foremost outside Europe, where in many cases there 
is no well-functioning government, public or health authority to deal with these important 
tasks? And has the global COVID-19 pandemic, which to date has affected the industrial 
nations of the North and West just as much as the poor countries of the South, not been a 
completely new challenge right from the outset? It is quite possibly the first global health 
crisis since the Spanish flu, whose catastrophic effects in the shadow of World War I re-
sulted in 50 million deaths worldwide and were only really understood in retrospect. At 
 
1 https://www.rfp.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
2 For an explanation of what is meant in this study by “religious actors” or who is included in this term, 
see Chap. 1.3. 
1. Introduction 
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least, the danger presented by both virus strains may well be of a similar magnitude, de-
spite the lack of comparability between the basic death rates and the medical and hygiene 
standards then and now (Faust et al. 2020). 
 
The fact that religious communities linked in interreligious or interdenominational 
networks such as RfP or Act Alliance3 have come together to “pray and act” (Bender 2020) 
against COVID-19 could thus easily be demoted to a marginal note, at least in strongly 
secularised Europe, insofar as, in this context, doubts have not arisen from the outset as to 
the function and competence of religious actors. Furthermore, one of the fundamental mo-
tives for carrying out this study is the recognition that such responses would blatantly un-
derestimate the actual relevance, potential and resources which religious communities 
have at their disposal to successfully fight the SARS-CoV-2 virus. At the same time, how-
ever, one must not lose sight of the fact that religious actors can also have great signifi-
cance from a negative point of view. That is to say, where efforts to achieve goal-oriented 
and effective involvement of religious communities with regard to measures implemented 
to control, reduce and, at best, prevent infection fail, one must expect a particularly violent 
course of the COVID-19 crisis. This study attempts to clarify why this is so. 
 
It is no coincidence that the above-mentioned statements are characterised by the same 
extremely striking ambivalence which, in the final instance, permeates all the responses to 
the question posed by the study regarding the role played by religious actors in the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, in their statement dated 19 March 2020, Religions for 
Peace (2020a) pointed out that it only took COVID-19 to uncover the “fragile state of man-
kind” which has come about despite or perhaps even because of the “seemingly scientific 
and material progress” which humanity has experienced. The virus, which has been able 
to spread so quickly especially because of the ‘depth’ of humankind's global “interrelated-
ness” , is therefore not only an “existential test” which calls upon all religious actors to 
perceive their “sense of responsibility”, but also a “huge opportunity” to rethink the 
“greed”, “moral deterioration” and “lack of fairness and solidarity” which the community 
of world religions considers to form the basis of current global interrelationships. The 
statement finishes with the sentence which was quoted as an epitaph at the beginning of 
this study and which is intended to encourage humanity to commit to its hitherto ne-
glected "unity of purpose": “Nobody is safe unless all are safe.” In their “joint statement” 
issued less than one week later on 25 March 2020, Religions for Peace and Act Alliance (2020) 
also came to the conclusion that: 
 
 
3 https://actalliance.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
1. Introduction 
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“Medical experts around the world, from the World Health Organization to emergency 
room doctors insist on the wisdom of avoiding physical contact and avoiding public 
spaces. We understand how deeply this reality pains so many of us believers] who 
need, sometimes desperately, to be in our places of worship, and to serve our commu-
nities’ spiritual and humanitarian needs. In fact, at few moments in history has human-
ity needed the sustenance of shared worship as much as it does now. But again, we 
must remember that medical experts advise against public gatherings, which includes 
worship services.” 
 
 The statements quoted above all express, or at the least hint at, the overall ambiva-
lence regarding the role of religious communities in the COVID-19 pandemic which can 
be condensed into the following three fundamental tensions: 
▪ the critical, socio-ethically motivated distance of religious actors from the tech-
nical progress unleashed by the globalised economic and financial systems, 
whose achievements and insights must nevertheless be taken into consideration 
in the fight against the virus; 
▪ the emphasis on one’s own, universal perspective, which is set in contrast to the 
real selfishness, injustices and social divisions between people so as to make nei-
ther God nor nature, but solely mankind responsible for overcoming this precar-
ious situation; 
▪ the insistence on the energy of religious faith, which provides comfort and orien-
tation, including its independence from all worldly pressures while, at the same 
time, accepting the fact that public worship during the COVID-19 pandemic can 
hardly be recommended. 
Both statements suggest that religious communities can, on the one hand, develop 
and/or acquire the strength and resources required to successfully combat the pandemic 
while, on the other hand, also possessing (negative) potential which may run contrary to 
precisely this objective. In this context, it is not only evident that religious actors find it 
particularly difficult to forego human contact but also provides a powerful illustration 
(thus underlining the extreme seriousness of the situation ) that, despite all misgivings, 
they are making a clear commitment to something which clearly contradicts their true 
convictions. This outlined ambivalence, however,  is most apparent insofar as the word-
ings quoted above remain open, at least subjectively, to the dangerous (and, for a success-
ful anti-COVID-19 policy, for several reasons counterproductive) opinion that the pan-
demic is God’s ‘punishment’ (see Chap. 3.3) for mankind’s sinful behaviour. 
 
1. Introduction 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy The Role of Religious Actors in the COVID-19 Pandemic  16 
At the same time, it is precisely this ambivalence towards COVID-19 displayed by the 
religions, which most certainly should not be underestimated, which draws attention to 
what are probably the greatest strengths religious faith can offer to achieve a fundamental 
improvement in the situation. To this end, the focus should be less on the manifold scien-
tific and medical or legal and political challenges of the COVID-19 crisis and more on how 
it can be overcome in social and, in particular, psychological terms. What is de facto ‘re-
vealed’ in the statements by Religions for Peace and Act Alliance which were decoded earlier 
is the skill, long since developed and cultivated by religious communities, of construc-
tively dealing with the underlying ambivalences and ambiguities which are symptomatic 
of a crisis situation. From a sociological and psychological point of view, religions and re-
ligious communities, irrespective of their specific orientation, are most definitely suited to 
making a significant contribution to dealing individually and collectively with uncertainty 
as well as things which are rationally and scientifically inexplicable. Even under secular 
conditions, religions thus represent a central resource in coping “contingency” (Lübbe 
1998; Luhmann 1982, 2002; see Pickel 2017), i.e. with the openness and uncertainty of hu-
man life experience as well as the unsolvable paradoxes experienced and observed 
therein. If religions, therefore, place the pandemic in a larger context of meaning, then 
from the point of view of non-believers they may have missed the (medical) core of the 
problem; on the other hand, they help believers to cope with the severity of this challenge 
and personally rise to it. 
 
Although in their fundamentalist and authoritarian-dogmatic forms religions them-
selves are clearly prone to suppressing ambiguity and diversity and not tolerating alterna-
tive opinions and convictions (Roy 2011), yet in the course of their long history, the 
(world) religions4 have, however, certainly been quite capable of tolerating contradictions 
between individual beliefs, religious conviction and empirical-scientific knowledge, or be-
tween theory and practice. Despite popular prejudice, Islam can be attested a particular 
historical affinity with and tolerance of ambiguity as well as in its handling of plurality. In 
the scientistic climate of the largely binary coded scientific world of (supposed) 'right' and 
 
4 Without, at this point, being able to decisively address the complex problem of defining what makes a 
(world) religion, this study focuses on the religious communities which, based on the number of their 
members and how they have spread transregionally, are generally regarded as the five world religions: 
Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Judaism (cf. Ebeling 2010; Tworuschka and Tworuschka 
2017). A narrower concept, which is limited to the three universal religions of Christianity, Islam and 
Buddhism, for example, has been negated in view of the relevance of the Jewish and Hindu religious 
communities to the question, while a broader terminology which – following Max Weber’s sociology of 
religion (2011) – also includes Confucianism and Daoism (cf. von Glasenapp 2005; Wehr 2002) or the 
Baha’i religion (Hutter 2016) among the world religions, has been avoided for pragmatic reasons of re-
search. 
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17         ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy The Role of Religious Actors in the COVID-19 Pandemic 
'wrong' it is precisely this ability to engage constructively with knowledge-related uncer-
tainties, ambiguities, open questions and missing answers as well as the resulting diffi-
culty in assessing risks which seems to have been lost to a certain extent (Bauer 2018). 
 
Especially in the COVID-19 crisis, however, such a (religious) ability to tolerate ambi-
guity and to deal with contingency would be even more important, since science and poli-
tics in this context have produced a series of very ambiguous, to some extent even highly 
contradictory statements and findings (including statistics which can be interpreted diver-
gently). This has caused massive uncertainty among quite a few people. Thus, during the 
course of the pandemic, very different, even contradictory perspectives were circulated – 
not only by conspiracy theorists, but also by serious scientists – regarding the actual dan-
ger of the virus, the mortality rate and excessive mortality, the reasons for contamination 
and paths of the infection, the necessary special protection for risk groups, tolerable inci-
dence rate and the significance of the R value, the necessary scope of lockdown measures, 
the use of (fabric or FFP2) masks, the period required to develop a safe vaccine, the possi-
bility of achieving herd immunity, etc. In itself, this would not be a particularly unusual 
process for scientists researching a new field which provides no real precedents or empiri-
cal values (as were previously only available in Asia in the best case). However, in an ex-
ceptional situation such as the COVID-19 crisis, including the temporary suspension of 
fundamental rights during its course, the restriction or prohibition of numerous contacts 
and encounters and, not least, the existential fears and psychological burdens associated 
with this, there is only a certain amount of patience for trial and error. 
 
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the (socio)psychologically challenging lack 
of clarity inherent in the situation has been further exacerbated by the so-called ‘preven-
tion paradox’ (Rose 1981). What the British epidemiologist Geoffrey Rose described at the 
beginning of the 1980s, using coronary heart disease as an example, namely that the vast 
majority of individuals with only a low risk of serious illness in the short- or medium-
term very rarely perceive extensive preventive measures with a long-term overall benefit 
for society as a direct improvement of their own health, applies also for the SARS-CoV-2 
virus (Martius 2020): even if prevention shows measurable success, people often lose the 
feeling for existing danger and have doubts about the initial necessity of the measures 
taken. A further variation of the prevention paradox would be successful immunisation 
which, as incidence rates sink, also reduces the public’s awareness that they are actually 
dealing with a highly dangerous infectious disease. Consequently, in such a social climate 
the (unreal) feeling can spread easily that the sporadic side effects of vaccinations are 
worse than the disease actually being fought. At this point, then, fundamental tolerance of 
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ambiguity and the ability to cope with contingency are required, both of which can be 
promoted through the positive influence of religion and religious communities. 
 
Apart from providing intellectual and moral orientation as well as comfort and psy-
chological help in a both physically and mentally extremely distressing situation such as 
the COVID-19 pandemic, religion and religious communities can, from a political point of 
view, generally be regarded as very effective agencies for communication, interaction and 
providing information. Thus, especially in times of crisis, religious networks are im-
portant allies for preventing a communication breakdown or possibly panic and despera-
tion. They can, instead, organise and even guarantee the distribution of important news 
and messages. Social media alone are often not able to do this, because they are more 
likely to result in a more fragmented public and the barely controllable circulation of un-
certain or even fake news. In contrast, religious actors are greatly trusted and have gener-
ally unquestioned authority among the population, particularly in countries outside Eu-
rope. The social networks, charities and communication structures which they maintain 
make them exceptionally suitable for making an essential contribution to a coordinated 
but complex strategy in the fight against infectious diseases, including management of the 
social consequences these cause. Outside of urban areas, in some African, Asian, Middle 
Eastern and Latin American countries they may even be the only actors who have the abil-
ity to reach the population living there. But even in Europe, it has become clear, e.g. dur-
ing the European refugee crisis, that state institutions profit from the support and experi-
ence of religious networks, especially in such exceptional situations – or even that they de-
pend on them (e.g. Pickel and Hidalgo 2019). 
 
All this makes religious actors, in general, valuable cooperative partners of national 
and international organisations and public authorities in the fields of policy and global 
governance such as economic and intercultural cooperation, poverty, education and envi-
ronmental policy, or even peace and security policy (e.g. Haynes 2007, 2011, 2016; 
Werkner and Hidalgo 2014). This is a role which becomes even more important in a global 
pandemic. However, for such a cooperation to function also or especially in a difficult cri-
sis situation, it is vital that the corresponding necessary structures and communication 
channels are established in advance, not only because there might not be any time to do so 
during the crisis itself, but also because doing so often creates an initial mutual trust 




19         ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy The Role of Religious Actors in the COVID-19 Pandemic 
Already in ‘normal’ times, religious actors are regarded as the target groups and part-
ners of foreign policy initiatives as well as cultural and educational activities. In addition 
to the direct purpose of such undertakings, developing and implementing projects and 
cultivating permanent contacts in cooperation with these actors has the medium- to long-
term benefit of being able to fall back on established structures during international crises. 
Such structures could be a key factor in the success of goal-oriented medical and political 
measures; if they are not in place, the chance of failure becomes much more probable. At 
the same time, the course of the global COVID-19 crisis to date as well as the ambivalent 
role religious actors have played and will continue to play in it provide valuable findings 
as to which mistakes must be avoided in future, which hurdles must be anticipated and 
which difficulties must be overcome in the context of a collaboration between and with re-
ligious actors. The COVID-19 pandemic once again proves that the best learning opportu-
nities are provided by actual crises. 
 
1.2 Objective and structure of the study 
The main objective of this study is to provide an empirical overview of the role, opinions 
and practices of religious actors during the COVID-19 crisis, in order to evaluate them in a 
constructively critical manner and to derive recommendations for goal-oriented coopera-
tion between political and religious actors, from the experiences gained so far. 
 
The study and its findings are intended to be broadly applied to different country and 
religious contexts; for this reason, the study has been carried out on a more general level, 
i.e. it offers a well-founded overview without being able to go into great depth on numer-
ous issues. Selected examples are used for concretisations. More in-depth analyses of indi-
vidual countries or religious communities or detailed case studies are, however, beyond 
the restricted scope of this study and could become the subject of subsequent research 
projects. The Authors would explicitly like to note that the religious actors and specific 
country contexts considered here should not be understood as unified entities; they are in 
themselves very plural and diverse. Thus the general view taken in this study is by no 
means intended to pave the way for generalisations; instead it is meant to serve as a start-
ing point and framework for more in-depth, specific analyses of individual religious com-
munities, nations or organisations. 
 
The guiding question is how an interplay between political and religious actors can 
succeed in achieving the best possible management of the Corona pandemic. To address 
this question, after giving some conceptual, theoretical and methodological preliminary 
remarks (Chap. 1.3), the Authors identify three central, partly interdependent analysis lev-
els (macro-, meso- and micro-level) (Chap. 2.1), outline the underlying theoretical and 
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conceptual approaches (Chap. 2.2 and 2.3) and develop criteria for 'Best' and 'Worst Prac-
tices' (Chap. 2.4). These criteria are then used in the empirical section to categorise signifi-
cant examples from various countries and regions along the three levels of analysis 
(Chap. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). This creates an overall perspective which, on the one hand, reflects 
and recognises the resources, positive potentials and capacities for problem solving of-
fered by religious actors to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic. On the other hand, it iden-
tifies the contrasting issues and neuralgic points where the communications and actions of 
religious actors themselves became a problem and were an obstacle to successfully over-
coming the crisis. In the summary of the findings and insights thus gained (Chap. 3.4), an 
attempt is made to systematise the relevant examples, which can be condensed into the 
preliminary contours and categories of a theoretical reflection. 
 
On this theoretical and empirical basis, the study then formulates policy recommenda-
tions for (foreign and cultural) policy actors on the one hand and religious actors on the 
other. When doing so, an ideal constructive collaboration with religious actors in a crisis 
situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic is outlined, taking into account possible hurdles 
and challenges, but also recommended solutions (Chap. 4). The line of argumentation is 
rounded off with a conclusion and an outlook on the need for further research which re-
sults from this study (Chap. 5). 
 
1.3 Conceptual, theoretical and methodological preliminary remarks 
This study is meant to offer a broad overview of the positions, attitudes and practices of 
‘religious actors’ on the macro-, meso- and micro-level (see Chap. 2.1) who, in terms of 
their self-perception and/or the perception of others, exhibit a content-related or formal, 
structural or organisational, identity-theoretical or financial connection to ‘religion’. In 
line with international standard terminology or categorisation (see e.g. ACT Alliance et al. 
2020; UNHCR 2014; WHO, not yet published) the term ‘religious actors’ is used to de-
scribe individual believers, religious leaders at different levels, religious communities as 
well as Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs). The latter refers to (non-governmental) organisa-
tions based on faith, which usually concentrate on peace-building, developmental or hu-
manitarian activities (e.g. Islamic Relief5, Bread for the World6, Misereor7, World Vision Interna-
tional8, Caritas Internationalis9, etc.). 
 
 
5 https://www.islamic-relief.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
6 https://bread.org/ [accessed on 2021-05-04]. 
7 https://www.misereor.de/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
8 https://www.wvi.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
9 https://www.caritas.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
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In general, this study refrains from making a sharp distinction between a substantial 
and functional concept of religion or other conceivable distinctions (Pollack 2017). The 
main reason for this is that the study examines in more detail the phenomenon of conspir-
acy theories (see Chap. 2.3 and 3.3), a research subject which first and foremost exhibits 
analogies to the phenomenon of ‘religion’ (Blume 2020), however at the same time dis-
tances itself from a too broadly functional concept of religion, since this would inevitably 
have gone beyond its scope. The advantage of such a flexible terminological approach is 
immediately obvious: it takes a closer look at all religious actors – both the traditional as 
well as the non-traditional ones and the leading representatives and lay people situated at 
the local, regional, national and transnational levels – without extending the scope of this 
research to esoteric, spiritual and ideological groups whose affiliation with a religion is at 
least controversial. This also suggests that constructive collaboration with this spectrum of 
religious actors is not only possible in the COVID-19 crisis, but – at least up to a certain 
point – also necessary. 
 
Both qualitative as well as quantitative methods (e.g. interviews with experts, group 
discussions, a quantitative online survey, statistical regression models) were applied to 
answer the research question and carry out the collection and evaluation of empirical 
data. Numerous sources have been consulted: apart from their own investigations, the 
Authors have used in particular the online resource repository10 of the Berkley Center for 
Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University Washington (which includes a 
commented collection of links and information on religion and COVID-19) as well as the 
information platform of the Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities (JLI)11. 
Furthermore, they have carried out several guideline-based online interviews with experts 
 
10 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FLxwvN6ICTxWWYOwRiv9sBLgf7v0vstsSzV7_o_1-B8/edit [ac-
cessed on 2021-02-27]. 
11 https://jliflc.com/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
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(among others, Katherine Marshall12, Sally Smith13, Stefan Sengstmann14, Olivia Wil-
kinson15, Philipp Öhlmann and Ekkardt Sonntag16). In addition, they organised two expert 
workshops in cooperation with the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa) in December 2020 
and January 2021 which were attended by representatives from religious communities, 
multi-religious networks, FBOs, research institutes and political foundations. The corre-
sponding findings have been included in particular in the empirical analysis in Chap. 3 
and represent an essential basis for the recommendations for action which are derived 
from them and set out in Chap. 4. Questionnaires were also used for this purpose which 
the participants of the workshops answered in writing prior to the online events. If refer-
ence is made in the section on empirical analysis to specific statements and examples 
given by the experts, then they are quoted anonymously using “EXP1”, “EXP2”, etc. 
 
Furthermore, the Authors of this study are in close contact with and, to some extent, 
integrated in the network of experts which is currently advising the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) with regard to the integration of religious actors during the COVID-19 pan-





12 Katherine Marshall is a senior fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 
where she directs work on religion and global development. She is also a professor of the practice of de-
velopment, conflict, and religion at the Walsh School of Foreign Service. Besides, she is co-founder and 
Executive Director of the World Faith Development Dialogue (WFDD) and Vice President of the G20 In-
terfaith Association. 
13 Sally Smith is an independent consultant to the WHO and the Anglican Alliance on global health, de-
velopment, religion, community engagement and HIV issues. Before that, she worked for UNAIDS (Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS) for 14 years. She is also a Visiting Lecturer in the School of 
Medicine Leeds Institute of Health Sciences at the University of Leeds. 
14 Stefan Sengstmann is the Director of the Technical Advisory Group at World Vision Germany. 
15 Olivia Wilkinson is the Director of Research at the Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Commu-
nities (JLI). 
16 Philipp Öhlmann (head of the team) and Ekkardt Sonntag (researcher) are both members of the Re-
search Programme on “Religious Communities and Sustainable Development” at the Humboldt Univer-
sity (HU) of Berlin. Among other things, they are carrying out a study on the perspectives of religious 
leaders on COVID-19 within the scope of the project: “Driving forces of the transformation: religious 
communities as initiators of sustainable development”, financed by the German Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung / BMZ). 
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The findings and empirical analyses, in particular at the micro-level in Chap. 3.3, also 
come from primary data which has been collected by Carolin Hillenbrand at the Cluster of 
Excellence “Religion and Politics” at the WWU Münster in cooperation with Alexander 
Yendell at the Leipzig Research Centre Global Dynamics since July 2020. This is a compre-
hensive quantitative online study which examines the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on people’s social, political and religious attitudes and behaviour in Germany (Hillen-
brand 2020). 
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2. Theoretical Concepts 
The study draws on the conceptualisation of three central levels of analysis (Chap. 2.1), a 
basic systems-theoretical approach (Chap. 2.2) as well as theoretical approaches for con-
spiracy theories, authoritarianism and religion (Chap. 2.3) to theoretically derive the crite-
ria for ‘Best’ and ‘Worst Practices’ within the context of the role of religious actors during 
the pandemic (Chap. 2.4). 
 
2.1 Religion as a multi-level phenomenon: the macro-, meso- and micro-level 
A global study of the role of religious actors during the COVID-19 pandemic is a very 
complex undertaking. To systematise the reactions of religious actors and structure the 
study, the Authors applied the standard differentiation of three levels of analysis as used 
in the social sciences and empirical research on religion: the macro-, meso- and micro-
level (Barman 2017; Dobbelaere 2004; Herzog et al. 2020). “Religion” is understood as a 
multi-level construct: religious actors act on different levels, whereby it must be noted that 
although it is analytically useful to differentiate between them, in reality they are intercon-
nected and the boundaries are blurred (Herzog et al. 2020). This study examines the role 
of religious actors in the COVID-19 pandemic using these three levels; on the one hand, to 
illustrate the complexity of and links between many actors. On the other hand, the analyti-
cal separation of different levels achieves a necessary degree of complexity reduction for 
the purpose of working out structures and patterns. Fig. 1 illustrates these three levels of 
analysis, which are hereinafter specified in more detail with regard to the religious sector. 
 
Macro-level 
At the macro-level, social, cultural, economic and political contexts are taken into account. 
Generally, this level refers to the (national) state as the unit of analysis. Thus, large social 
institutions and (sub-)systems depending on the degree of functional differentiation and 
modernisation of the societies, are typically located and analysed at this level. This in-
cludes, for example, the political system, the health, economic or legal system, but also re-
ligion as a subsystem in a country and its relations with the state (Herzog et al. 2020; 
Tyrell 2006).  
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Meso-level 
Organisations, groups and networks are typically located at the meso-level. Derived from 
the subsystems at the macro-level, these include, for example, political parties and unions, 
hospitals and doctors’ surgeries, firms and corporations, courts and the police; for the reli-
gious sector they include the religious communities. These various organizations are in 
exchange with one another, follow their own logics and binary codes based on systems 
theory considerations (see Chap. 2.2), and must negotiate for themselves how they deal 
with the COVID-19 pandemic as an organisation in exchange with and perhaps also in 
competition with other organisations. These organisations are not restricted by national 
borders, especially with regard to religious communities; on the contrary, they can trans-
cend these and structure themselves transnationally or act internationally.17 Examples of 
central actors in the religious sector include multi- or interreligious18 organisations (Reli-
gions for Peace, KAICIID19, etc.) as well as faith-based organisations (FBOs) (Islamic Relief, 
Bread for the World, Caritas Internationalis, etc.) (Herzog et al. 2020; UNAIDS 2009). 
 
Micro-level 
Finally, at the micro-level, the focus is on the individuals who make up the organisations 
(meso-level) and ultimately also the subsystems (macro-level). Individuals have varying 
mental and economic preconditions, social situations, attitudes, convictions and ideolo-
gies, including religious ones. Individuals are influenced by the macro- and meso-levels; 
however, through their actions and their varying social roles there is also communication 
of individuals towards the other levels, especially when they join together in institutions 
and organisations, for example with regard to similar patterns of attitudes, cultural and 
religious backgrounds as well as political convictions (Herzog et al. 2020). 
 
17 In this study, the Authors do not differentiate the transnational level as yet another independent level 
of analysis, because on that level (with regard to the religious sector) organisations, networks and com-
munities of the world regions can be located, which already form the subject of research at the meso-
level (e.g. interreligious organisations, FBOs, etc.). In order to avoid strong overlaps, they are mainly 
considered and analysed within the framework of the meso-level. 
18 For the purpose of this study, the terms "multi-religious" and "interreligious" are used synonymously: 
It primarily refers to the cooperation between different religious actors. Further differentiation (as is 
usually made within the context of religious practices such as inter- or multi-religious prayer) is unneces-
sary in the within the scope of this study. (see e.g. Abu-Nimer and Smith 2016; D'Costa 2017). 
19 https://www.kaiciid.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
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Fig. 1: Religion as a multi-level phenomenon 
Source: Own research following Dobbelaere (2004); Herzog et al. (2020); Tyrell (2006). 
 
2.2 Religion and the diagnosis of the COVID-19 crisis in the web of social (sub-) 
systems 
As already stated at the beginning of the outline of the problem in Chapter 1.1, the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which has impacted virtually the entire planet in terms of its effects 
and cost, the victims it has claimed and the preventive measures it has prompted, can and 
must be regarded as a health, socio-economic and political crisis of our global society, pos-
sibly even as the first such crisis to be immediately recognised and fought to such a di-
mension.20 There is no doubt that the consequences of this global crisis have resulted in re-
gionally very diverse characteristics, challenges and fields of conflict; however, this can 
only be briefly touched on within the scope of this study. Since the principle focus of the 
study is a general overview including individual cases which are comparable to a large 
extent and from which at least rather generalisable insights and lessons can be derived 
(see Chap. 1.2), the theoretical section starts by providing at least a rough global diagnosis 
of the situation of religious actors in the COVID-19 crisis. This should help to place the 
 
20 In 1918, the first criterion was missing for the Spanish flu; for climate change the second one. 
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ambivalent role of religious communities and organisations as actors and those affected 
by the crisis in a larger context, so that the criteria used for ‘Best’ and ‘Worst Practice’ can 
then be understood intersubjectively. 
 
A systems-theoretical analysis21 of the undertaking described above, which compares 
the situation before the crisis with the most important changes during the crisis, can be used 
for this purpose. This approach will illustrate why religious actors, both in their self-per-
ception and in an unbiased observation, are predestined for an ambivalent role during the 
crisis, which can both contribute significantly to containment of COVID-19 infections and 
alleviation of the suffering caused by the disease as well as to exacerbating this situation. 
The Authors deliberately refrain from depicting the finer points, details and internal prob-
lem areas of the systems theory (e.g. the complexity of the structural link between subsys-
tems or that the prioritisation of social subsystems, which can be observed precisely at the 
beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, contradicts the basic diagnosis of its horizontal or lat-
eral functional differentiation, which is typical of the modern era; see Stichweh 2020). At 





Fig. 2: Systems theory-based crisis analysis: the normal case and the initial event 
 
21 The following illustration was significantly inspired by two online lectures held by Rudolf Stichweh on 
12 November 2020 on the topic of “The COVID-19 pandemic and the sociological differentiation theory”, 
which was the kick-off for the lecture series on “Science and the Public in the COVID-19 Crisis” at the 
Center for Philosophy of Science (Zentrum für Wissenschaftstheorie) at the WWU Münster in the winter 
semester 2020/21, as well as on 23 February 2021 on the topic of “The COVID-19 pandemic, functional 
differentiation of society and the system of religion”, which opened the online lecture series on “Conse-
quences of the COVID-19 pandemic for religion, religiosity and religious communities” of the Section for 
the Sociology of Religion at the German Sociological Association (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie / 
DGS). However, when evaluating the role of religion in the pandemic, the Authors deviate significantly 
from Stichweh’s reflections. 
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In this connection, Figure 2 first illustrates the (systems-theoretical) ‘normal case’, 
which applies in particular for Western democracies, while leaving out numerous other 
social subsystems, especially the economy, education or art. Politics is clearly at the centre 
of society, because it also generates collectively binding decisions for all other social sub-
systems, which it can thus control to a certain degree. This forces those subsystems to ad-
just accordingly. Internal and external communications between all subsystems are organ-
ised by the (mass) media. In this ‘normal’ constellation, the legal system is structurally 
coupled with the centre of politics. On the one hand, it provides the instruments for the 
binding decisions which politics makes, while on the other hand it also sets limits to poli-
tics through the independence of procedural rules and, above all, by setting constitutional 
norms which political power may not exceed. In comparison, science represents a system 
which remains relatively independent (key word: freedom to research and teach) even if it 
provides politics with advice and support in several fields and, in return, is provided with 
a legal framework within which it operates. In this relationship, the health sector merely 
represents one subsystem among many. In addition, empirical data shows that it is in-
creasingly influenced by economic considerations and, as a largely privatised sphere, has 
established itself at best as a subordinate ‘policy field’. In this scenario, religion enjoys a 
kind of special role: as already implied in the outline of the problem in Chapter 1.1, it has 
the overall social function – possibly as a ‘civil religion’ (Luhmann 2004) – of processing 
the social, intellectual and existential uncertainties which continue to arise in a complex 
modern society based on the division of labour (key word: coping with contingency). Reli-
gion thus provides a form of orientation with regard to meaning and values, even for 
those who are not ‘believers’ in the theological sense and, at best, are influenced by a reli-
giously impregnated ‘culture’. Not least the difficult and (at any rate for the time being) 
unavoidable confrontation with mortality – one's own as well as that of family members, 
friends and living beings per se – ensures that while the topic of religion is changing, con-
trary to earlier prognoses in the sociology of religion it is not disappearing. 
 
On the other hand, as Fig. 3 shows, the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic – at 
least in democratic societies – is characterised by the fact that now suddenly it is not poli-
tics, but rather the previously more subordinate subsystem of health and (intensive) medi-
cine, hygiene and the prevention of disease which is moving to the centre of society. This 
subsystem now characterises the system which is forcing all the other subsystems to im-
plement what are, in part, extreme adaptations (e.g. the economy and science to produce 
masks, vaccines, further medical materials, to develop secure test procedures, etc.). Thus, 
in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, the principle of “every life counts”, which was by no 
means practised before with such consistency, has resulted in the health system being 
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able, at least temporarily, to set itself up as a (double) benchmark for the concept of “sys-
temic relevance”. With regard to the lockdown introduced (in the course of the exponen-
tially accelerating infection) in most countries, this characterised not only the social ac-
tions which were deemed essential for ensuring the recording of infected persons and the 
care of those infected, but also those who, despite all the health risks, were defined by the 
responsible decision-makers as socially vital and thus excluded from the measures. In 
many cases, politics, which saw itself driven by the new dominance of the health system, 
reacted by implementing extreme over-regulation and, in some cases, doubtful PR strate-
gies. The latter justified drastic measures on the basis of an insinuated certainty regarding 
the danger of COVID-19 which, even today, is not supported by medical knowledge and 
research, which continues to be contradictory. As a result, the (mass) media only fulfilled 
its (overarching) function of organising communication and providing well-balanced me-
dia coverage to a limited extent. During this phase, it presented itself as a system which 
had unresistingly subordinated itself to the temporary hegemony of the health system. 
Within the scope of the pandemic the (classic) media system has, at least to some extent, 
been superseded by digitalisation. Due to its ability to replace a physical presence with a 
virtual one and under the pressure of the planned containment of COVID-19 infections 
the latter has quickly developed into the basic communicative currency of all social sub-
systems. Such subsystems (e.g. the economic, educational and artistic systems, and also 
professional sports, science, law, the media and, last but not least, politics) have been sub-
jected as far as possible (and perhaps even permanently) to the logic of physical distance, 
which promotes digitalisation and corresponds with the top priority of protecting health. 
Especially in the subsystem of media and social communication, this has tended to result 
in a problematic increase in fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, which make the 
factual exchange of information more difficult. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Systems theory crisis analysis: the global COVID-19 pandemic 
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Apart from that, the new social role of politics, which is dedicating itself, its resources 
and funds completely to the top priority of health (as well as its ‘sidekick’, digitalisation) 
described above, is causing growing tension – which should only be noted here as an 
aside – with the legal system, which has overturned/been forced to overturn numerous 
hastily adopted regulations for health protection, some of which did not have sufficient 
legal basis or for which there was no factual requirement. 
 
What is much more important for this study, however, is the fact that the system of 
science in Fig. 3 now suddenly finds itself in a position which is noticeably similar to that 
of the system of religion in the initial event, while the latter appears to have disappeared 
completely. This is because, during the COVID-19 crisis, many people (or at least signifi-
cantly more than was previously the case) have focused their hopes of finding construc-
tive ways to deal with this situation of uncertainty, mortality and the more or less direct 
threat to their own lives on scientific research and its potential to find a medical cure, ra-
ther than pinning these hopes on religion. Today, especially in the secularised European 
democracies, religion is frequently regarded as lacking the ability and competence to 
make a valuable contribution in the fight against an exceptional health situation such as 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, crisis conditions are resulting in the growing popularity 
of conspiracy theories similar to religion22 . This essentially well-known phenomenon, al-
ready common in 'normal’ times, promises many people intellectual orientation and a 
psychologically stabilising way of dealing with existential uncertainties and ambiguities 
as well as an optimism23 based on this (Butter 2018). During the COVID-19 crisis it has 
spread much more quickly than before, at least in part due to the prevailing mode of com-
munications, which is even more digitalised and promotes selective perception (Nocun 
and Lamberty 2020). It also makes sense that in an extremely exceptional case such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic conspiracy theories which, like religious faith, are based not on con-
scious manipulation but on real, subjective convictions, are enormously attractive, espe-
cially in light of gaps in knowledge, uncertainties, fears and perceived threats which are 
sometimes sensationalist. It appears that especially those people who were previously al-
ready extremely sceptical towards conventional medicine and biomedical science are now 
drawing their hope and orientation from the rampant conspiracy theories surrounding 
COVID-19. These two phenomena or subsystems – science and conspiracy theories – are 
 
22 See Chap. 2.3. 
23 However, it should not be overlooked that the subjectively convincing detection of (supposed) con-
spiracies always holds a theoretical key as to how one could work towards an alternative, better situa-
tion. 
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therefore competing in the crisis to determine how contingency management of this ex-
ceptional situation, which is urgently required for socio-psychological reasons, will pro-
ceed. 
 
The advantage of such a systems-theoretical analysis, which admittedly remains 
somewhat exaggerated and rudimentary, is obvious. It is not only capable of adequately 
capturing the overall social situation to some extent but also provides a fundamental diag-
nosis of the crisis which does not apportion blame or denounce individual misconduct. It 
merely identifies the systemic forces, logical connections and social dynamics which are 
suitable for explaining the presence of the COVID-19 pandemic in a manner which, in the 
Authors’ opinion, is both realistically as well as argumentatively balanced. In any case this 
allows several different conclusions to be drawn for the topic of religion, which is key in 
this context. All of these conclusions should prove expedient for the intended review and 
evaluation of the role of religious actors in the COVID-19 crisis as well as for the deriva-
tion of the criteria which are necessary for this. 
 
First, the theory expressed by Rudolf Stichweh himself (2020) – whose considerations 
have provided key indications for the overall diagnosis presented here24 – in an article at 
the beginning of the crisis is self-evident, namely, that the system of religion could be the 
“biggest loser” in the pandemic because of the risk of infection during traditional religious 
services and the lack of competence in interpreting the events in a manner that makes 
sense and promises orientation.25 In the meantime, although Stichweh sees religious com-
munities and the religious practices they cultivate as having developed a more noticeable 
resistance and 'long-term guarantee', the specific problem which the crisis implies for reli-
gious actors should not, however, be forgotten as a result. 
 
The antithesis to Stichweh’s originally very pessimistic view of (world) religions, 
which tends to take a certainly too Eurocentric view, is that it is precisely existential un-
certainty and contingency which have increased as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic 
 
24 See Note 21. 
25 In this regard Stichweh (2020) states: “The close social consolidation of the faithful, supported by the 
physical presence of everyone involved, which is characteristic of many forms of religiosity, has already 
proven to be a particularly virulent hot spot in a number of cases. What is probably even more signifi-
cant is that religious variants of interpretation of the crisis triggered by the virus are apparently not 
available anywhere, yet they plan a relevant role. As far as our reaction to the COVID-19 crisis is deter-
mined by the specifically modern ‘cult of individuality’, this is at any rate a form of quasi-religiosity 
against which traditional, transcendence-oriented religiosity finds it difficult to fight. And it can no 
longer play the game of interpreting what has happened as a punishment for wrongdoing. This tradi-
tional resource that gives meaning to life was already used up after the earthquake in Lisbon and cost 
the Jesuit order dearly at the time.” 
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and will operate in favour of religion in the medium and long term (e.g. Foshaugen 2020). 
Such a point of view could be based on the so-called “existential security thesis” devel-
oped by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2011), who investigated the global attractive-
ness of religion (as well as, in contrast, the progress of secularisation under the precondi-
tion of social security), particularly along the line of ‘uncertainty’. Accordingly, the trans-
fer of expectations of hope and orientation to science and/or conspiracy theories, which 
was occasionally ascertainable in the COVID-19 crisis, would, at best, be an ephemeral 
manifestation. To what extent, however, religious actors would have to become much 
more open to new and digital forms of religious services than in the past is another matter 
and not part of the present study. 
 
On the other hand, what is possibly most important for this study is the competitive 
situation indicated in Fig. 3, which is the result of systems-theoretical analysis between re-
ligions and religious actors on the one hand and conspiracy theories and theorists on the 
other as the two central non-scientific agencies for contingency management. In this regard, 
the thesis of Karl Popper (1992) must be called to mind: that modern conspiracy theories 
are first and foremost the result of secular processes and therefore show structural analo-
gies to certain forms of religious faith, especially superstition. In this sense, conspiracy 
myths can be regarded as both substitute religions as well as an antagonistic reaction to 
more differentiated religious convictions and attitudes. Furthermore, this type of ambiva-
lence suggests that not only do religious faith and conspiracy theories exclude each other, 
but they can also reinforce each other, especially in times of political, social or health crises 
when faith in representatives and the elite has been fundamentally shaken. 
 
Due to the separability of faith and knowledge which has meanwhile taken root in 
most religions, but especially because of the historical experience of dealing constructively 
with contradictions which have resulted from this, it may nevertheless be assumed for the 
time being that traditional world religions and the religious communities which have 
emerged from them, or their representatives and believers, are clearly more likely and 
more often to be in a complementary relationship with the state of scientific research than 
the representatives of conspiracy narratives. This is primarily because a religious faith can 
perceive itself as such as well as abstract itself from a scientific theory. In contrast, in a 
conspiracy theory both of these factors inevitably merge and, normally, representatives 
‘believe’ in particular in the scientific validity of the conspiracy myth (Blume 2020). 
 
Overall, these three religious-based conclusions which have been described suggest 
that religions in (democratic) societies afflicted by COVID-19 at best continue to play (or 
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again play) the role which they have already played in the ‘normal case’ of systems-theo-
retical analysis. Religious actors are, therefore, not only possible, but at least up to a cer-
tain degree also logical partners for governments using domestic and foreign policies to 
fight the COVID-19 crisis nationally and transnationally with the help of biomedical sci-
ence, despite some tension which continues to exist, e.g. between religion and science, and 
which has already been discussed in our analysis (see Chap. 1.1). 
 
Nevertheless, in this connection it cannot be denied that the crisis also holds chal-
lenges, especially for religious actors, which may make them part of the problem rather 
than part of the solution. For example, this would be the case if they could not or would 
not accept that religious services could become super spreader events, or that in this pan-
demic the believers of a certain religion are just as endangered as those of a different faith 
or unbelievers. It would also be counterproductive if religions were to begin blaming oth-
ers for the infection, to perceive the pandemic as God’s punishment, etc., or to create or 
spread conspiracy myths as a result of attitudes which are esoteric or sceptical of science. 
Religious interpretations of the meaning of the pandemic which, despite the currently so 
complicated and nerve-wracking phase, insist that “nature …] reclaims what is hers]” 
(quoted from Pezzoli-Olgiati and Hartenstein 2021: 9) furthermore demonstrate yet again 
how ambivalent the religious perspective can be. The pandemic has shown that much 
which was previously declared by most representatives of politics and the business com-
munity to be completely unrealistic can suddenly become possible and inevitable. This ex-
perience may well provide valuable impulses for a more determined fight against envi-
ronmental destruction in future. However, taking such a fatalistic position represents a 
very heavy burden in the successful fight against the COVID-19 crisis and the possibility 
of surviving it as unharmed as possible, both physically and psychologically. 
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2.3 Conspiracy theories, authoritarianism and religion 
The systems-theoretical analysis in Chapter 2.2 has already provided a phenomenological 
explanation as to why conspiracy theories26 can be expected to experience a boom during 
a pandemic such as the COVID-19 crisis. In this regard, it must be feared that the crisis 
will be aggravated because the accompanying distribution of fake news, the political atti-
tudes connected with this as well as the, in some cases, contemptuous aspects of each con-
spiracy theory are not only politically polarising and endanger democracy, but also harm 
the successful fight against the virus. 
 
Here, too, religion plays an ambivalent role, because although religious faiths have the 
potential to protect against misanthropy and scapegoating and enable constructive man-
agement of ambiguity and uncertainty, they can also serve, however, as a vehicle for split-
ting things into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘friend’ and ‘foe’ and thus support a world view which is 
typical for conspiracy theories. It thus not only became clear during the COVID-19 crisis 
that many people had turned to conspiracy narratives in an attempt to understand the 
physically and mentally extremely burdensome events of the pandemic and that these 
theories have spread rapidly through social media, where they became consolidated in fil-
ter bubbles,27 but also that the different forms of religiosity exerted an influence on this 
(Hillenbrand 2021; Hillenbrand and Pollack 2021, not yet published).  
 
A brief theoretical recourse at this point to the theory of the authoritarian personality 
will be helpful in understanding what is behind the conspiracy mentality and the effect of 
the topic of religion in this connection. The conspiracy mentality has a significant affinity 
with this and is, therefore, also regarded as an element of an authoritarian syndrome in 
the current Leipzig Authoritarianism Study (Decker et al. 2020). Following Adorno (1950), 
the authoritarian personality is characterised by unconscious inner conflicts which result 
 
26 Regarding the term "conspiracy theories", the Authors follow Butter and Knight (2020) and assume 
that conspiracy theories generally make secret groups and/or evil, hidden forces responsible for the ap-
pearance of (large) events. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, there are many different conspiracy 
narratives, e.g. that Bill Gates launched the virus so as to take over the world with the help of compul-
sory vaccinations and microchip implants, or that the virus is a biological weapon from China 
(https://www.br.de/nachrichten/wissen/gates-zwangsimpfung-und-die-biowaffe-aus-china-possoch-
klaert,RyIupHo) [accessed on 2021-02-28]. An idea is also in circulation that an attempt by the interna-
tional financial elite to save capitalism by means of a “great reset”, i.e. an (ecological) restructuring of 
the global system, lies behind the COVID-19 pandemic, and that for this purpose the virus has either 
been spread or stylised into a danger by means of media manipulation (Astheimer 2020). 
27 For an overview, see e.g. https://www.spektrum.de/news/verschwoerungstheorien-zu-COVID-
19/1722088 [accessed on 2021-02-27]; https://www.stuttgarter-nachrichten.de/inhalt.michael-butter-
im-interview-das-steckt-wirklich-hinter-den-corona-verschwoerungstheorien.fbc93d40-c511-45c4-a4b0-
94fff8634058.html) [accessed on 2021-02-27]. 
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from authoritarian constraints, especially in the family, but also from other socialisation 
factors (Adorno 1950; Horkheimer 1936). The fundamental idea behind the theoretical 
considerations was that political attitudes, ethnocentrism and antisemitism are not just ra-
tionally explainable attitudes, but that behind them a psychological turmoil comes to light 
which does not have its origin in real (group) conflicts.28 The authoritarian personality, 
which feels weak inside, does not therefore use its aggression to rebel against factual con-
straints and suppression which it used to face in real life, but instead against weaker per-
sonalities and strangers which, in turn, is meant to stabilise its fragile self-esteem. The pro-
jection, i.e. the transmission of negative characteristics to scapegoats, is thus an integral 
element of such an authoritarianism.  
 
Apart from this projection, Decker et al. (2020) also see the reinterpretation of reality 
as an essential aspect in the conspiracy mentality as an element of an authoritarian syn-
drome. Reality is adapted here to one’s own mental needs in order to achieve control. Ego-
istic behaviour which shows no solidarity is often one of the consequences of this. Finally, 
a further symptom of the ‘I’ weakness of authoritarian personalities which lean towards 
conspiracy theories is that they divide the world into ‘good’ and ‘bad’.  
 
Decisive for the relevance of the religious theme in this context is Adorno's differentia-
tion between varying types of religiosity to further explain the authoritarian personality. 
On the one hand, he states that superstition goes hand-in-hand with the dichotomisation 
or division into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and this in turn with ethnocentrism and antisemitism. 
On the other hand, he differentiates a type of religiosity which is religious out of social 
convention and more interested in social prestige. This type corresponds in general to the 
extrinsically religious type identified by Allport and Ross (1967), which is also susceptible 
to ethnocentrism and antisemitism. In contrast, other religious people identify strongly 
with the content and moral codes of their religion and, for example, view the command-
ment to ‘love thy neighbour’ as being closely linked to tolerance and acceptance of other 
religions. This type corresponds to the intrinsically motivated religious (ibid). On the basis 
of an analysis of a public opinion poll, Huber and Yendell (2019) determined that such a 
typology functions in connection with right-wing extremism.29 Yendell (2020) acknowl-
edged that, in Germany, the frequency of prayer and church activities as well as the level 
of religiosity, among other things, go hand-in-hand with positive attitudes to Muslims, 
 
28 Adorno’s considerations in this respect go back to the narcissism of small differences in Sigmund 
Freud’s essay on Civilisation and Its Discontents (1930), in which he determined that it is often those na-
tions which are actually very similar which become enemies with one another. 
29 Specifically, the authors demonstrated a statistical correlation between religious superstition and 
right-wing extremist attitudes using East Germany as an example. On the other hand, church activities 
had a negative correlation with right-wing extremist attitudes. 
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Hindus and Jews. However, religious exclusivist attitudes have a negative effect. There is 
a high probability that those who believe their religion is the only true one will derogate, 
for example, Muslims (Pickel and Yendell 2016; Pollack et al. 2014). In turn, this exclusivist 
attitude fits the conspiracy mentality, which correlates with the rejection of cultural diver-
sity, dissatisfaction with democracy and right-wing extremism (Decker et al. 2018; Pickel 
et al. 2020). In the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study, statistical connections were also deter-
mined between authoritarianism and a conspiracy mentality, both of which are, in turn, 
indicators which influence the belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories (Schließler et al. 
2020). 
 
Thus, against the background of the considerations described, the question arises to 
what extent conspiracy narratives play a role with regard to religious actors during the 
pandemic and whether a nexus to the rejection of COVID-19 regulations may even exist. 
The role of religiosity is particularly relevant here for this study. When does religiosity 
have a negative effect? When is it linked to the conspiracy mentality, to non-compliance 
with COVID-19 regulations, a lack of willingness to help or the derogation of other (reli-
gious) groups? When, on the other hand, does religiosity ‘immunise’ against the conspir-
acy mentality and derogation of others, leading to greater solidarity? The extent to which 
religious attitudes and convictions in the COVID-19 crisis may possibly contribute to the 
management of existing uncertainties and fears (key word: contingency experiences) or 
whether, in contrast, they increase negative emotions such as fear and the feeling of uncer-
tainty must also be examined. 
 
Overall, the results of previous empirical studies on the role of religion for the conspir-
acy mentality remain ambivalent (see e.g. Goreis and Voracek 2019; Hillenbrand 2021; Hil-
lenbrand and Pollack 2021, not yet published; Imhoff and Bruder 2014; Schließler et al. 
2020; Seidel et al. 2018). On the one hand, a belief in God or a transcendental (religious) 
power can protect people against a belief in a conspiracy ideology as an “substitute reli-
gion”. Conspiracy ideologies often function as a “quasi-religious belief” (Tezcan 2020) 
which is, however, primarily negative, i.e. it arises without any of the positive visions of 
deliverance which religions generally entail. On the other hand, there are also structural 
analogies between conspiracy theories and religions, such as the belief in things which 
cannot be empirically verified or the functions of a reduced complexity and creation of a 
social identity or a strong ‘we group’. To shed more light on these ambivalent connec-
tions, this study regards the abstract construct of “religion” as a multi-dimensional phe-
nomenon on different levels and attempts to take a differentiated view of diverse religious 
forms, contents and practices and to examine which of them tend to stimulate a conspir-
acy mentality and which immunise against it (see Chap. 3.3). 
2. Theoretical Concept 
37         ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy The Role of Religious Actors in the COVID-19 Pandemic 
2.4 Criteria for Best and Worst Practices 
The role of religious actors during the COVID-19 pandemic is a controversial topic which 
has, at least to some extent, permeated the media as a polarised and polarising discussion. 
On the one side are the advocates for an unhindered religiosity, who often place religion 
above other sectors such as science and health, also in the fight against the virus, and who 
consider any kind of restriction of religious practices to be a breach of religious freedom. 
On the other side are those with great reservations against religion per se, who believe 
that it should have nothing to say or contribute during the pandemic and should, instead, 
subordinate itself or even be completely silent (Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and 
World Affairs et al. s. l.; Berres and Le Ker 2020; Brüggemann and Lenz 2020). 
 
This study takes a constructively critical and differentiated approach to these aspects, 
which attempts to adequately reflect the balancing act religious actors face: a balancing act 
between complying, on the one hand, with the necessary measures to fight the virus and 
the corresponding restrictions and, on the other hand, continuing religious activities, visi-
bility of religion and performance of their tasks. Adjustments are a key element here. The 
study starts from the assumption and fundamental conviction that religious actors, as an 
integral element of (civil) societies worldwide, can and should make a positive contribu-
tion, especially in times of a pandemic. The question posed is not ‘whether’ but ‘how’ or 
under what conditions this could be done for the benefit of everyone. Central criteria for 
‘best’ and ‘worst practices’ are identified which have been categorised in accordance with 
the three differentiated levels of analysis (see Chap. 2.1) as well as the theoretical prelimi-
nary considerations in Chap. 2.2 and 2.3 and grouped exactly along the line of the funda-
mental question: when were or are religious actors part of the solution (‘best practices’) or 
part of the problem (‘worst practices’) when dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic? Those 
criteria act as a rough grid or red threat for the subsequent empirical analysis in Chapter 
3. They were already the basis for the discussions with experts at the workshops held by 
the Authors and thus serve as an overall orientation for the fields in which information 
relevant for this study was researched and systematically evaluated. 
 
It must be noted here, however, that the criteria are initially kept very general to do 
justice to the objective of this study, i.e. to enable an overview of the role of religious ac-
tors which is very comprehensive and broadly applicable to different religions and coun-
tries. Depending on the context, the criteria must then be adjusted, specified and spelled 
out accordingly. Several concrete examples of this are presented in the third subchapter of 
the empirical analysis. 
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Generally, the criteria mentioned below are based at all three levels on the overall, 
higher objective of saving lives, containing the virus, overcoming the pandemic and allevi-
ating its negative effects (WHO 2020a). To this end, specific directives and guidelines on 
the behaviour of religious actors during the COVID-19 pandemic have already been is-
sued by various institutions as well as FBOs and religious communities themselves, such 
as the WHO (2020a), the International Network of Engaged Buddhists (INEB 2020), Islamic Re-
lief (2020), the Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities (JLI 2020) or the inter-
national KAICIID Dialogue Centre (2020). These often very comprehensive guidelines 
have been drawn in turn from numerous resources: both from official guidelines (e.g. 
from the WHO, UNICEF and IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies)) as well as from faith-specific guidelines issued by religious communities and 
(inter-)religious organisations. Source material as well as ‘lessons learned’ and ‘best prac-
tice’ examples from past crises (e.g. Ebola, HIV/AIDS, malaria) were also taken into con-
sideration. A comprehensive overview of these published guidelines and declarations can 
be found on the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers (NRTP) website.30 
 
Based on the review and systematisation of these official, widely recognised guide-
lines and documents as well as on the problem analyses carried out in Chapters 2.2 and 
2.3, the following central criteria for 'best practices' and 'worst practices' at the macro-, 
meso- and micro-level are identified. 
 
Macro-level: 
Criteria for ‘Best Practices’ at the macro-level 
1. Religious actors work constructively with the WHO to achieve joint objectives such 
as to fight the pandemic and alleviate its negative consequences (successful/sensible 
COVID-19 policy). 
2. Religious actors work constructively with the state to achieve joint objectives such as 
to fight the pandemic and alleviate its negative consequences (successful/sensible 
COVID-19 policy). 
3. As part of civil society, religious actors advocate the fight against the pandemic and 
alleviation of its negative consequences – also against a (questionable) state COVID-





covid-19/ [accessed on 2021-01-19]. 
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Criteria for ‘Worst Practices’ at the macro-level 
1. Religious actors support state actors in a questionable COVID-19 policy which con-
tributes to the spread of the virus. 
2. Religious actors resist a sensible state COVID-19 policy to control the spread of the 
virus. 
3. Religious actors are paralysed and can no longer carry out their responsibilities and 
functions under the conditions of restrictive, authoritarian political systems. 
4. Religious actors contribute to the exacerbation of religious tensions and conflicts. 
 
Meso-level: 
Criteria for ‘Best Practices’ at the meso-level 
1. Religious communities and (inter-)religious/faith-based organisations take the situa-
tion seriously, engage in measures to control the spread of the virus, and develop 
and follow specific hygiene concepts. They recognise scientific expertise and distrib-
ute correct information which contributes to medical education and counteracts fake 
news as well as conspiracy narratives. 
2. Religious communities and (inter-)religious/faith-based organisations perform their 
important tasks for individuals and society even or especially under these changed 
conditions. These relate to, on the one hand, people’s spiritual and pastoral needs 
and, on the other, specific social and charitable assistance. Furthermore, they make 
theological or visionary contributions to the development of viable concepts and ori-
entations for the future. 
3. It is important to religious communities and (inter-)religious/faith-based organisa-
tions that they care not only for members of their own religious group, but in addi-
tion that they alleviate suffering in the entire population caused by COVID-19, in-
cluding disadvantaged groups and religious minorities. In the best case, the commit-
ment of religious communities should be inclusive and multi-religious. 
 
Criteria for ‘Worst Practices’ at the meso-level 
1. Religious communities and (inter-)religious/faith-based organisations do not take 
the situation seriously; instead, in their claims for faith and truth they place them-
selves above proven scientific findings, spread conspiracy narratives themselves and 
violate the necessary measures. Thus they cause religious super spreader events, for 
example by holding (large) religious services without applying successful hygiene 
concepts. 
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2. Religious communities and (inter-)religious/faith-based organisations become quiet, 
paralysed and unable to act so that they can no longer carry out their social and pas-
toral functions and fail to provide ethical and visionary orientation. 
3. Religious communities and (inter-)religious/faith-based organisations care only for 
their own religious group, whereas they discriminate against other religions and re-
ligious minorities, contributing to an exacerbation of religious conflicts and tensions. 
 
Micro-level: 
Criteria for ‘Best Practices’ at the micro-level 
1. People’s faith helps them to deal with the crisis situation (key word: “contingency 
management”). They develop religious coping strategies which help them to deal 
with uncertainties, burdens and stress and to feel positive emotions (e.g. hope, opti-
mism, energy). 
2. An individual’s faith protects them against (COVID-19) conspiracy theories as ‘sub-
stitute religions’. Instead, they link their faith to scientifically verified findings. 
3. Religious individuals obey the COVID-19 regulations required to manage the crisis 
and show a willingness to help and solidarity during the pandemic. Their solidarity 
also applies to those of a different faith or unbelievers. 
 
Criteria for ‘Worst Practices’ at the micro-level 
1. People’s faith does not help them to deal better with the crisis situation; instead, they 
develop stronger negative emotions (e.g. fear, helplessness, loneliness). 
2. Religious individuals are susceptible to (COVID-19) conspiracy theories, interpret 
the pandemic, for example, as God’s punishment in the light of human sinfulness 
and devaluate other groups of people (e.g. members of other religions). 
3. Religious individuals do not obey the COVID-19 regulations necessary to overcome 
the crisis and do not display any willingness to help or solidarity (or only with their 
own in-group, but not beyond that). 
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3. Religious Actors as Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? – Best and 
Worst Practices 
In the third chapter the empirical analysis for this study is carried out. The role of reli-
gious actors during the COVID-19 pandemic is examined using the three levels of analysis 
(macro-meso-micro) and empirical examples are provided for both ‘best practices’ (reli-
gious actors as part of the solution: crisis management) and ‘worst practices’ (religious ac-
tors as part of the problem: crisis reinforcement). 
 
3.1 Macro-level 
To achieve a better macro-level understanding of the criteria for ‘best’ and ‘worst prac-
tices’ as presented in Chapter 2.4, contrary to the meso- and micro-levels some explana-
tions must first be anticipated. This is necessary because these criteria can only be under-
stood in conjunction with the respective actions of state actors, i.e. they can change along 
the line of the respective context of a specific state COVID-19 policy.  
 
In principle, the assessment of the role of religious actors in the COVID-19 crisis at the 
macro-level depends on whether or not the behaviour of religious groups supports or has 
supported] national and international attempts to successfully control the spread of infec-
tion rates, treatment and care of the sick as well as alleviation of the socio-economic and 
psychological side effects. At the macro-level, this does not so much mean that religious 
communities provide such support using their own aid resources,31 but whether they act 
as cooperative partners of states and international organisations and, if necessary, as me-
diators of state decisions and initiatives. At best, relevant commissions in which religious 
communities can/could present their concerns and interests are/were set up for this pur-
pose, allowing religious aspects to also be taken into account along with health, legal, so-
cial and economic aspects when deciding on anti-COVID-19 measures. 
 
This fundamental criterion for constructive cooperation between the state and reli-
gious actors to manage the crisis must not be viewed separately from several context vari-
ables which significantly influence a corresponding assessment. This first includes an esti-
mation of the extent to which the behaviour of religious actors in the crisis is commensu-
rate with scientific expertise and medical necessity as well as, under certain circumstances, 
the democratic or constitutional legitimacy of the measures taken. It is not a question of 
compliant obedience to state policy, but rather of the specific nature of a state COVID-19 
policy in each individual case, i.e. whether, for example, such a policy is oriented to the 
 
31 Instead, this aspect is dealt with in Chap. 3.2 at the meso-level.  
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recommendations of the World Health Organisation WHO or not. Whether religious com-
munities can earn their merits at all as cooperative partners of the state in the sense of suc-
cessfully combating the crisis, or whether they achieve the latter more as (civil society) 
agencies which possibly compensate for omissions, mistakes and errors of state policy, at 
least to a certain extent, depends on this. Under these circumstances, a position which op-
poses the state COVID-19 policy could possibly function as a positive indication for a ‘best 
practice’, especially if governments deny the problems of COVID-19, distribute fake news, 
fuel doubts about verified scientific findings, pull out of inter- and transnational struc-
tures and regulations, take part in conspiracy theories and/or suspect that foreign powers 
are behind the ‘coronavirus lie’, respectively interpret the spread of the virus as a targeted 
attack by external enemies. The same applies if a government ignores constitutional regu-
lations when taking action or violates the principles of proportionality or equality. Due to 
the complexity of the interrelationships, any estimation in this respect can, in the end, only 
be carried out for individual cases. 
 
Furthermore, when evaluating the role of religious actors at the macro-level, the extent 
to which the type of collaboration (or also non-collaboration) with a state or an interna-
tional organisation contributes to intensifying existing social and political conflicts or, vice 
versa, to supporting a permanent cooperation between civil society and religious actors 
must be taken into consideration. Given that cooperation between a religious community 
and a certain government would be likely to discriminate other religious communities, 
this could possibly be counterproductive for social peace in a multi-religious society. 
Thus, for a ‘best practice’ at the macro-level, it is decisive in many cases that not only spe-
cific religious communities be integrated into the anti-COVID-19 policy, but that as far as 
possible all local religious communities participate, not just to expand the reach of the 
measures taken, but also to prevent existing interreligious conflicts and to avoid new ones 
from being fuelled.  
 
Further aspects which are taken into account in Chapter 3.1 when evaluating the be-
haviour of religious actors in the COVID-19 crisis from the macro perspective, at least 
marginally, must be understood as concrete steps, confirmations of or even legitimate ex-
ceptions to the fundamental cooperative relationships between state and religious actors. 
This affects, for example, the question regarding the extent to which, when deciding on 
COVID-19 measures, state governments take the well-being of all social groups into ac-
count as far as possible, provide for compensation payments in the event of dispropor-
tionate hardship and ensure that their communications reach the broad population. De-
pending on the degree to which government actions in this respect succeed or fail, they 
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will be more or less dependent on support from religious communities. Where religious 
communities (can) voice their opinions on such issues critically, this can also be inter-
preted as an independent sign for a ‘best practice’, because it suggests that the state gov-
ernment permits a constructive-critical discourse on the COVID-19 measures which is car-
ried out in the mass media and on social networks. In this case, the role of religious actors 
could enable some conclusions regarding the stability of democratic structures and the 
rule of law. 
 
Apart from the context variables just mentioned, which are meant to encourage a very 
differentiated overall perspective, activities of religious actors which are intended to foil 
nationally applicable COVID-19 regulations anchored in the constitution and the refusal 
of such actors to participate in international and interreligious collaboration must be cate-
gorised as fundamental ‘worst practice’ at the macro-level. Here, too, a convincing evalua-
tion can only be carried out in individual cases, and the criteria listed above only serve as 
a heuristic tool to make the assessments in Chapter 3.1 more comprehensible. 
 
Best practices 
To explore the positive role of religious actors in the COVID-19 crisis, a few ‘best prac-
tices’ are described at the macro-level. They are representative of a problem-sensitive, so-
lution-oriented and, last but not least, sustainable collaboration between religious and 
state actors in the COVID-19 crisis. The contribution of religious actors in containing the 
virus and alleviating the negative consequences of the pandemic should not be underesti-
mated.  
 
1. Religious actors collaborating with the WHO for a successful COVID-19 policy 
The first relevant aspect considered below is the cooperation between the World Health 
Organisation WHO and diverse religious actors, which evolved after initial difficulties 
during the first crisis months and then continued to develop further. Thus, the WHO 
(2020a) published specific interim recommendations for religious communities, religious 
leaders and faith-based organisations (FBOs) on 7 April 2020, fully aware that religious ac-
tors play a “major role” in saving lives and alleviating the suffering of the sick and in-
fected during the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, the WHO acknowledged religious 
communities as a “primary source of support, comfort, guidance, and direct health care 
and social service”. It also assumed, however, that these communities were the actors 
which the WHO urgently had to integrate in its strategy, because religious services had to 
date proven to be predestined venues for super spreader events. 
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It is a fact that, particularly in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, religious 
gatherings were comparatively often at least a contributing factor for the rapid spread of 
the SARS-CoV-2 virus in many countries. Meetings of the Shincheonji Church of Jesus in 
Daegu/South Korea in mid-February 2020, a religious mass event of the Sunni Islam mis-
sionary movement Tablighi Jamaat in Delhi/India, which started at the beginning of March 
2020 and lasted several weeks, a five-day evangelical service in France as well as several 
other religious events in particular made negative headlines and acquired a reputation of 
having been the epicentres of the global spread of the coronavirus (e.g. Brüggemann and 
Lenz 2020). Accordingly, the guidelines recommended by the WHO at the beginning of 
April promoted an appropriate reaction to the crisis situation and admonished religious 
actors to promote the exchange of evidence-based information on COVID-19, avoid large 
group gatherings, carry out rituals, ceremonies and faith-based activities virtually as far as 
possible, and generally make any decisions on religious services, educational events, pil-
grimages and social meetings based on a solid risk assessment which, in addition, should 
also comply with guidance from national and local authorities. At the same time, the 
WHO recognised the great potential of religious communities to advance from being a 
problem to being an important solution, provided religious actors used the trust which 
they enjoy in many groups to spread important information on the COVID-19 virus, in-
cluding the practices used to contain it. In return, however, they should also avoid fear 
and panic as well as the stigmatisation and discrimination of those infected. The WHO 
also explicitly emphasised that the standard of human rights was to be maintained in all 
of the measures to be carried out in the fight against the pandemic and, especially in this 
very difficult phase, great value was to be placed on ecumenical and multi-religious col-
laboration so as to solve the crisis together peacefully, ensuring that it did not transform 
into hate and violence. To this end, it was essential that correct information was passed on 
to the religious communities and misinformation and conspiracy myths were counter-
acted.  
 
In the further course of the global COVID-19 crisis, the WHO also identified religious 
actors as important addressees of and cooperative partners for its strategies. To provide 
positive support for the processes it launched, the WHO convened advisory boards com-
posed of faith-based and secular organisations, religious leaders and representatives from 
religious communities to work together to find answers to the challenges posed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the WHO formed work groups with experts as well as 
various civil society and especially religious actors within the framework of the Communi-
ties of Practice (COP) initiative introduced at the end of 2020 to decide on mutual commu-
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nication strategies, encourage research and educational projects, and create a general, offi-
cial “Framework for Engagement” to define the fundamental principles and responsibili-
ties of a partnership between the WHO, national governments and religious actors during 
health crises (WHO, not yet published). Furthermore, the WHO organises regular webi-
nars and dialogue events on currently relevant topics, e.g. vaccinations and immunisation 
strategies, whereby religious actors can ask their questions and raise their concerns, to 
which health experts reply.32 
 
2. Religious actors collaborating with the state for a successful COVID-19 policy 
Numerous indices (although conclusive studies and evaluations have not yet been pub-
lished) indicate that the recognition of scientific expertise as well as the circulation and 
distribution of correct information based on scientific evidence worked especially well 
during the COVID-19 crisis when religious actors were integrated into the strategy for 
fighting the pandemic at an early stage and participated in a positive exchange with other 
actors, e.g. from politics, science and the health system. The countries in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica in particular had learned a lot from the Ebola crisis and called in religious communi-
ties much earlier this time, which turned out to be extremely successful. To some extent, 
such an exchange even led to written agreements which can stand the test of time. The in-
tended involvement of religious communities in the fight against COVID-19, especially in 
several African and Asian countries, even proved to be significantly easier than was the 
case, e.g. for other health crisis with a sexual-moral component such as HIV/AIDS. It was, 
for example, easier to make it clear to most religious actors that the COVID-19 virus really 
can affect anyone, irrespective of the possible ‘sinfulness’ of their (sexual-)moral behav-
iour (EXP2; EXP6). 
 
In some countries (such as Kenya, Afghanistan, the Ukraine) specific interfaith councils 
have emerged as institutionalised dialogue and advisory forums with regard to collabora-
tions between state and religious actors or – where they already exist – proven to be suc-
cessful. In Kenya33, the government was thus not only able to quickly develop guidelines 
for fighting the virus which also affected practice of believing in God, but was also able to 
implement them comparatively quickly. In the Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Council of 
Churches and Religious Organisations set up there was involved in the negotiations for 
the anti-pandemic measures finally agreed upon. This made it easier to reach all the reli-
gious actors in the country and encourage them to view themselves as all being on the 
 
32 The Authors of this study are partly integrated in these developments. 
33 https://www.kbc.co.ke/inter-faith-council-on-national-response-to-COVID-19-inaugurated/ [accessed 
on 2021-02-28]. 
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same team. This method of approach also helped the individual religious communities, 
whose members were internally torn between those who denied the danger and those 
who advocated strict countermeasures, to constructively engage in the discourse from a 
‘neutral’ interreligious position, which subsequently reduced tensions within the course of 
intra-religious communication. Although such a council also formally exists in Russia, it 
has not produced any positive results comparable to those in the Ukraine (EXP4; EXP6). 
 
On the other hand, Italy, which at an early stage was already very severely afflicted by 
exponentially increasing infection and death rates in connection with COVID-19, is a fur-
ther positive example that collaboration between religious, political and scientific actors is 
beneficial in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. When the Italian government de-
cided in quick succession on measures at the beginning of March which, among other 
things, restricted the freedom of movement of its citizens so as to finally gain control over 
the practically exploding case figures, religious gatherings and the freedom of public wor-
ship were also strongly regulated and temporarily even completely suspended. In this ini-
tial phase, the phase of lockdown, the government neglected to involve the religious au-
thorities in its decision-making process. It neither asked for advice nor did it arrange for a 
real dialogue between both sides. Last but not least it was through the mediation of the 
“DiReSoM”34 research group that in the further course of the crisis this changed into a 
positive situation (Lo Giacco 2020). The group published a position paper for a “Proposal 
for a safe resumption of religious celebrations in Italy”, which then became the basis for a 
video conference between the Italian Ministry of the Interior, the leaders of sixteen differ-
ent religious groups and two professors as mediators. After this meeting, just a few days 
later, minutes were signed which defined the conditions for the safe implementation of re-
ligious practices. It must especially be noted that religious communities which had not 
previously concluded any bilateral agreements with the Italian state were also involved in 
this situation.35 This was particularly true for the Islamic community. Thus, the pandemic 
brought with it a new development, a new impulse for the relationships between the Ital-
ian state and the Christian and non-Christian religious communities, which were largely 
blocked in the previously very hierarchical, bilateral model (EXP7). 
 
34 https://diresom.net/2020/05/07/diresom-papers-1-ebook-law-religion-and-COVID-19-emergency/ 
[accessed on 2021-02-28]. 
35 In the Italian constitutional law concerning religions, which is essentially based on the concordat be-
tween the state and the Catholic Church of 1984 and provided for the abolition of the Catholic state reli-
gion, the legal equality of all religious communities, optional religious education and the self-financing of 
the church(es) through tax-privileged donations, the state – similar to Germany – subsequently con-
cluded state treaties with the recognised religious communities which define the details in mutual coop-
erative dealings. With regard to how the Italian state dealt with religious minorities, see also Martino 
(2014). 
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Most of the governments in the Middle East acted just as decisively. On 20 March 
2020, after holding several discussions, Saudi Arabia closed the Great Mosque of Mecca as 
well as the Al-Masjid al-Nabawi Mosque in Medina to the public and continued to do so 
throughout the entire month of Ramadan.36 Thus, in 2020, the Hajj pilgrimage which be-
gan on 28 July was attended by 1,000 selected pilgrims, of whom two-thirds were foreign-
ers living in the kingdom and one-third consisted of security and medical personnel. The 
previous year, approx. 2.5 million people took part in this pilgrimage. Those who at-
tended in 2020 could apply for a place via an online portal. The government covered all of 
the costs for room and board. The prerequisite was that all pilgrims had to be in Saudi 
Arabia at the time the lockdown began, between 20 and 50 years old (i.e. they were not 
members of the risk group) and showed no signs of the disease.37 Those admitted were 
also obliged to follow strict protocols, including staying in quarantine for several days 
both before and after the Hajj.38 Religious leaders both in Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait 
decisively supported the course taken by their governments and called on faithful Mus-
lims to refrain from attending regular (Friday) prayer in the mosques until further notice 
was given. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) even imposed a na-
tional ban on prayer meetings in mosques, including Friday prayers.39 In Pakistan, Presi-
dent Arif Alvi managed to negotiate a consensus (Ijmā) with the country’s leading Islamic 
scholars (the ulema) which consisted of 20 detailed precautions to be observed during the 
curfew period within the scope of festive Islamic religious gatherings.40 Previously, many 
imams in Pakistan had been strongly opposed to any compliance with COVID-19 
measures (see Chap. 3.2) and although subsequently many visible defects remained and 
regulations were disregarded in practice, the agreement was, as such, a step in the right 
direction. Finally, in Iran – after some initial hesitation and an outbreak of the disease (see 
Chap. 3.2) – the Imam Reza Shrine, the Fatima Masumeh Shrine, the Shah Abdol Azim 
Shrine and the Jamkaran Mosque were all temporarily closed.41 Friday prayers were also 




idUSKBN2222VY?il=0 [accessed on 2021-02-26]. 
37 https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2020-07/pilgerfahrt-nach-mekka-haddsch-corona-
krise-abstandsregeln-fs [accessed on 2021-02-25]. 
38 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/25/hajj-2020-what-you-need-to-know-about-this-years-
pilgrimage [accessed on 2021-02-24]. 
39 https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/turkeys-diyanet-bans-prayer-gatherings-friday-prayers-at-
mosques-due-to-coronavirus/news [accessed on 2021-02-25]. 
40 https://www.dawn.com/news/1550265 [accessed on 2021-02-24]. 
41 https://www.siasat.com/COVID-19-iran-closes-holy-shrines-death-toll-hits-853-1857365/ [accessed 
on 2021-02-26]. 
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global COVID-19 crisis. There, too, members of the Shia majority complied with the 
measures without grumbling which, given the theocratic traits of the mullah regime in 
Iran, is no more a surprise than in Sunni Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabism is the state reli-
gion.  
 
3. Religious actors as part of a civil society against a questionable state COVID-19  
policy 
Furthermore, the ‘best’ or ‘worst’ practice of religious groups, as described above, must 
always be based in the respective political context. Although it is a general problem when 
religious actors ignore COVID-19 regulations anchored in the constitution and refuse to 
participate in the collaboration with state authorities, in order to make a relevant assess-
ment of the behaviour of religious actors on the macro-level it is, however, quite decisive 
what kind of (coronavirus) policy a government actually launches. If, therefore, a govern-
ment such as that of the Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro accuses the media, for example, 
of hysterical ‘scare tactics’ with regard to COVID-19 and torpedoes the measures taken by 
local and regional authorities, while at the same time claiming the primacy of the econ-
omy over all health considerations,42 this should not earn the support of religious commu-
nities. This was, however, exactly what happened in Brazil. Many evangelicals and Pente-
costals supported President Bolsonaro when he excluded churches and church services 
from the COVID-19 lockdown.43 In the kind of explosive situation which Brazil thus expe-
rienced, particularly in April and May 2020, more autonomous, responsible behaviour on 
the part of religious groups which goes beyond all official regulations would be desirable. 
The country's Catholic church displayed just such behaviour during the Easter period, 
calling upon its members to take part in a virtual march for life and online masses,44 even 
though Bolsonaro was fighting with all the means at hand to keep the churches open. The 
Brazilian case thus proves that religious groups are not subjects of the state but, in the case 
of a failed COVID-19 policy, at best prove themselves capable of demonstrating a special 
form of civil courage.45 The latter is/would be even more in demand if governments react 
to the crisis with measures which encroach on human rights and democratic regulations 
 
42 https://www.rnd.de/politik/corona-krise-in-brasilien-prasident-bolsonaro-beschuldigt-medien-der-
panikmache-SYCR7TITPTFUXA7SBLTOQIAFVE.html [accessed on 2021-02-28]. 
43 https://www.dw.com/en/brazil-evangelicals-preach-COVID-19/a-53024007 [accessed on 2021-02-28]. 
44 https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2020-06/brazil-coronavirus-bishops-march-for-
life.html [accessed on 2021-02-28]. With regard to relieving anxieties which have occurred in connection 
with current immunisation strategies in Brazil, the Catholic church is continuing this positive civil society 
commitment in Brazil (https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2021/01/29/COVID-vaccina-
tion-disinformation-brazil-catholic-church-239848) [accessed on 2021-02-28]. 
45 For more information on the positions of the Catholic church in Brazil in the COVID-19 pandemic, see 
also Sena da Silveira (2020]. 
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to an unreasonable extent (as could be observed, for example, in Hungary; see below) or 
even if governments launch fake news and falsify statistics, such as was the case in Tur-
key, for example, so as not to endanger the tourist business (Hahn 2020). 
 
Perhaps less drastically than in Brazil, but still in a striking manner, the behaviour of 
religious communities in several African countries can also be cited as ‘best practice’ at the 
macro-level. After the meanwhile deceased President of Tanzania, John Magufuli,46 offi-
cially declared the end of the COVID-19 crisis in June 202047 – insisting that his country 
had supposedly experienced no further cases of COVID-19 since May 2020 – and recom-
mended that his citizens pray rather than implement hygiene regulations, the Christian 
churches did not follow him in his interpretation and, instead, internally enforced adher-
ence to hygiene measures. Only recently, in January 2021, the Tanzanian bishops also 
warned of a “new wave of infection”, which Magufuli also played down (Schmid 2021). In 
Nigeria, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference also proved its civil courage in the fight against 
the virus, demanding guidelines which went significantly beyond the government’s rec-
ommendations. In Ghana48, the 1st Counselor of the West Africa Area Presidency of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints, Elder Edward Dube, urgently called upon the 
members of his church as well as on all Ghanaians to adhere to government protocols in 
the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. In Egypt, the Al-Azhar University did the same 
thing. At the end of March 2020, the world’s leading university for Islamic learning, lo-
cated in Cairo, explicitly admonished the citizens of Egypt to stay at home and avoid pub-
lic gatherings, even in mosques.49 
 
Overall, it is thus decisive for a ‘best practice’ at the macro-level that religious groups 
be brought or invited to fundamentally support the COVID-19 measures decided upon by 
national governments, supranational alliances and international organisations such as the 
WHO so as to work together to successfully combat the spread of the virus. It has also be-
come clear that a fundamental criterion for ‘best practice’ at the macro-level is that, at best, 
 
46 In connection with the death of Magufulis on 17 March 2021, the international media speculated 
whether the president's death had not been caused by heart failure, as was officially announced, but 
instead by COVID-19 (https://www.srf.ch/news/international/an-COVID-gestorben-tansanias-bulldozer-
ist-tot) [accessed on 2021-03-28]. 
47 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52966016 [accessed on 2021-02-28]). The government of 
Tanzania, however, rejected this outright.  
48 https://www.modernghana.com/news/1006275/adhere-to-government-protocols-on-COVID-19-
relig.html [accessed on 2021-02-25]. 
49 https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/82941/Al-Azhar-fatwa-center-urges-citizens-to-stay-at-home 
[accessed on 2021-02-25].  
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different religious communities in national, inter- and transnational as well as multi-reli-
gious contexts work together to support global crisis management in peaceful coexistence. 
 
Worst practices  
It was determined above that 'best practice’ for the role of religious actors in the COVID-
19 pandemic at the macro-level is measured either by their willingness to cooperate or by 
civil society criticism of the relevant state action. This willingness depends on factual ne-
cessity, proportionality, rule of law and democratic compatibility of the state measures 
taken. Conversely, a ‘worst practice’ at the same level can be defined almost as a mirror 
image. Here, too, the assessment of the behaviour of religious actors logically depends on 
what quality has previously been attributed to the (official) COVID-19 policy of a specific 
state-political actor. The variance of the case studies will nevertheless clearly increase in 
this subsection. 
 
1. Religious actors as supporters of a questionable state COVID-19 policy 
One noticeable ‘worst case’ scenario is discernible in the context of the United States of 
America. Although worldwide, but also in the USA itself, numerous religious events have 
already been identified to date as (potential) super spreaders of the virus (among others, a 
mass in Arkansas), (then) US President Donald Trump described churches, synagogues, 
mosques and other churches in May 2020 as such essential and vital facilities that they 
should be excluded from the COVID-19 measures. Contrary to the lockdowns which had 
been implemented by numerous governors at the federal state level since March 2020, 
Trump consequently exerted pressure via the national public health agency CDC (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention) to promptly issue guidelines for an immediate reo-
pening of the churches.50 Based on this, the churches were reopened in June, but this was 
not carefully planned and highly risky (Spang 2020). During this phase, numerous evan-
gelical churches expressed a lack of understanding for applicable COVID-19 measures 
and behaved accordingly, sometimes even displaying this opinion demonstratively in the 
form of an unmistakable fatalism. They felt vindicated by the position which the US Presi-
dent had taken. Further super spreader events in US churches were the result, e.g. in 
Keysville/Virginia, when the Emmanuel Bible Church celebrated a three-day revival service 
on the weekend of 20 September 2020, during which numerous participants were infected 
with the SARS-CoV-2 virus, as a result of which several died in the following weeks.51 At 
 
50 https://www.dw.com/de/trump-will-%C3%B6ffnung-von-kirchen-erzwingen/a-53542071 [accessed on 
2021-02-26]. 
51 https://www.fr.de/panorama/corona-in-den-usa-gottesdienst-wird-zum-superspreader-event-
90074590.html [accessed on 2021-02-25]. 
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about the same time in the autumn, several churches in Massachusetts also turned out to 
be super spreaders (Lisinski 2020). In Canada, the same was true for the Blenheim Church 
at the end of October 2020 (La Grassa 2020). 
 
What is noticeable on the entire American continent is that in many cases it was the 
masses, services and meetings of the evangelical churches in North America and the Pen-
tecostal churches and charismatic movements which are currently growing very fast, es-
pecially in South America, which mutated into super spreader events. Generally it must 
be assumed that the risk of transmitting germs and viruses is significantly higher in small, 
badly aired churches, where a large number of people52 gather to spend relatively long pe-
riods of time together, even if an attempt is made to comply with social distancing and hy-
giene regulations. In the evangelical as well as charismatic Pentecostal churches in North 
and South America, there is the added factor that many of the congregations practise a 
form of piety according to which God alone decides whether someone becomes ill or not. 
A certain indifference towards plausible cautionary measures thus seems to be inevitable. 
Furthermore, in this religious environment in particular there are often pronounced apoc-
alyptic tendencies, according to which the coronavirus is interpreted as a sign that the end 
of the world is now allegedly beginning. At the same time, church members have little 
faith in the secular world, which most believe to be decadent. Evangelicals appear to be 
especially susceptible to conspiracy myths. Finally, congregational life in the evangelical, 
Pentecostal church context holds a status as the “centre of social life” which is hardly im-
aginable, particularly in modern-day Europe. It is thus even more difficult for these com-
munities to forgo the “singing and praise” which is of “fundamental importance for emo-
tional piety” (Zoch 2020). 
 
If, therefore, one considers the current case figures collected by the Johns Hopkins 
University (as per 28 February 2021),53 it is immediately noticeable that the USA, the coun-
try in which evangelicalism is most widespread, has by far the highest number of people 
infected with the coronavirus (28.4 million) and people who have died from it (over 
500,000). This is a correlation which, as the examples of China and India54 show, cannot be 
explained merely by the high population in the United States. Further research would, 
 
52 Contrary to other denominations, the rate of religious service participants in Pentecostal congrega-
tions in North and South America is over 70 % in some places.  
53 https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html [accessed on 2021-02-28].  
54 Although India, with over 11 million infected and approx. 156,000 deaths from COVID-19, ranks sec-
ond and third, respectively, in the world, its population is four times as high as that of the USA, so that in 
comparison this is clearly put into perspective. China, with its very strict policy of containing the COVID-
19 virus, fundamentally falls into another category, as do almost all Asian countries.  
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however, definitely be required to be able to prove a statistically significant co-responsi-
bility of the evangelical churches in this respect since there is still a lack of comprehensive, 
empirically comparable studies. (Among other things, because the COVID-19 pandemic is 
still going strong at the time of writing this study.) In addition, correlations must never be 
confused with causalities. Nevertheless, there are some other indices which could make it 
more plausible that evangelicalism is a relevant factor at the macro-level. 
 
This is suggested above all by looking at the South American continent, where mem-
bership of Pentecostal congregations, as mentioned above, has been rapidly increasing for 
quite some time. Columbia, Argentina, 55  Chile, Peru or Ecuador, for example, have a dis-
proportionately high number of people infected or killed by COVID-19 despite the fact 
that their average populations are much lower than in other countries. Brazil (where 15 % 
of the population are now Pentecostals) is the country with the third highest number of 
COVID-19 infections worldwide56 after the USA and India and before Russia, the United 
Kingdom, France, Spain and Italy. It was also the case in Brazil that statements made by 
leading local evangelicals during the first peak phase of the pandemic appeared counter-
productive for an effective containment of the COVID-19 virus.57 The head of the Universal 
Church of God’s Power, Valdemiro Santiago, for example, called the virus “God’s punish-
ment”, while the founder of the Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, Edir Macedo, stated that 
the pandemic was “the devil’s work” but, however, was powerless against those who, be-
cause of their strong faith, had no fear of these devilish forces. Silas Malafaia, head of the 
Assembly of God Victory in Christ Church and regarded by many as the spiritual teacher of 
President Jair Bolsonaro, expressed this differently. Like Bolsonaro, Malafaia regarded the 
(temporary) lockdown of the economy as causing damage which was far worse than that 
caused by COVID-19. It was to be feared that declining economic growth would trigger 
social unrest which would, in turn, claim many more deaths than the virus.  
 
Thus, the main problem in Brazil was that the politically one-sided course pursued by 
President Bolsonaro was in line with the views of the evangelical forces and both sides 
mutually supported one another. However, this should not give the impression that the 
‘worst cases’ at the macro-level are merely the domain of evangelicals. Instead, it must 
once again be brought to mind that the evangelical and Pentecostal groups are each very 
 
55 https://www.evangelisch-in-westfalen.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Aktuelles/2015/09_september/15-
08-28_Forum_La_Plata_Koehrsen.pdf [accessed on 2021-02-24].  
56 Regarding the number of deaths from COVID-19, Brazil, at over 250,000, even ranks second in a global 
comparison.  
57 For the following statements, see https://www.dw.com/en/brazil-evangelicals-preach-COVID-19/a-
53024007 [accessed on 2021-02-25]. 
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heterogeneous, so that the examples given may not be generalised. Instead, in-depth anal-
yses must be differentiated in more detail and individual case studies and further context 
factors must be examined more specifically. For example, initial empirical analyses of the 
African continent have shown that the African Initiated Churches represented part of the so-
lution rather than part of the problem and contributed toward alleviating the crisis. Some 
charismatic religious (Pentecostal) movements also went through a learning process, 
adapting their initially problematic teachings and behaviour patterns to be increasingly 
more compliant with COVID-19 regulations (Frahm-Arp 2021; Frost and Öhlmann 2021). 
 
2. Religious actors resist a sensible state COVID-19 policy 
It was repeatedly apparent during the COVID-19 pandemic that the interests of religious 
actors could conflict with those of the state with regard to necessary COVID-19 policies. In 
some cases, this resulted in resistance on the part of the religious actors. In the Philippines, 
for example, several leading regional representatives of the Catholic church, such as the 
Apostolic Vicar of Manila, Broderick Pabillo, spoke out in favour of open churches and 
against restrictions in public life during one of the peak phases of the pandemic in May 
2020, arguing that religion had given people comfort already in earlier natural catastro-
phes.58 
 
In the Islamic world, it was repeatedly clear that radically religious groups such as in 
Afghanistan or Pakistan, in particular, have gained power in the state which is of such 
proportions that governmental authorities have hardly any control over them. For exam-
ple, religious actors in Pakistan defied state guidelines and kept the mosques open with-
out complying with sensible hygiene concepts. Husnul Amin, a professor and scholar for 
Islam and politics, assessed the situation as follows: “The state has become totally subser-
vient to these clerics. […] It is very difficult for the state to implement what’s best for the 
public good.” (Abi-Habib and ur-Rehman 2020; see also Chap. 3.2.) Similar challenges 
were seen with regard to (ultra-)orthodox Jews in Israel (Stahnke 2021), even if the early 
decision there to vaccinate almost the entire population made it possible to counteract the 
 
58 https://www.vaticannews.va/de/welt/news/2020-05/philippinen-katholiken-wollen-offene-kirchen-
zurueck-corona.html [accessed on 2021-02-28]. Here, however, neither the learning effects which then 
began (for example in July 2020 when, for the first time in its history, a conference of Catholic bishops in 
the Philippines was cancelled due to the COVID-19 crisis; see https://www.katholisch.de/artikel/25714-
06-05-newsticker-corona-und-die-kirche) [accessed on 2021-02-28] nor the increasingly rigorous 
measures of the Duterte government which were implemented in the course of the pandemic may be 
ignored (Stromer 2020). 
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sometimes chaotic (mis-)developments.59 According to estimates, approx. 40 % of the Is-
raelis infected with COVID-19 are members of the group of ultra-orthodox Jews who re-
sisted, sometimes even violently, the restrictions on public life and especially religious 
events and festivities such as weddings. For the most part, the state tolerated such behav-
iour and for a long time even the ultra-orthodox leaders did little to restrain it (Stahnke 
2021). The widespread autonomy which the ultra-orthodox Jews had long since pushed 
through for themselves vis-à-vis the state, proved to be at least ambivalent here. However, 
not only the majority of strictly religious Jewish congregations barely complied with the 
COVID-19 regulations; a significant section of the Arabic Muslim population in Israel 
compared to the rest of the population also exhibited such behaviour and, consequently, 
had disproportionately high infection rates.  
 
3. Religious actors under the conditions of restrictive political systems 
In Hungary, the Fidesz government could not exactly be accused of acting too leniently 
towards those (religious groups) which did not take the danger of the coronavirus seri-
ously enough; on the contrary. Hungary is one of the rather more negative examples of 
handling the pandemic, not because of its leniency, but rather because of the harshness 
with which the government used this emergency for its own purposes. In the fight against 
the pandemic the Orbán regime thus restricted fundamental rights, in some cases mas-
sively and especially for an indefinite period, to an extent which was democratically and 
constitutionally unjustifiable. This allowed the government not only to divert the focus 
from its own shortcomings, but also enabled it to govern permanently by decree, suspend-
ing all elections indefinitely. In addition, the regime increased its own options for moni-
toring its citizens, the opposition and, last but not least, civil society organisations and ob-
structing their radius of action (Magyar 2020). What appeared particularly disconcerting 
by the standards of a constitutional democracy was a new law which allowed people to be 
arrested and punished for spreading ‘false reports’ about the pandemic (Máté-Tóth 2020). 
Where the status quo of findings is often scientifically controversial, such a regulation 
opens the door to politically motivated abuse. Although some individual criticism regard-
ing this escalation of an authoritarian course in Hungary also came from religious actors, 
overall they remained as silent as the rest of the population. The fact that the religious na-
tionalism of the Orbán government (Hidalgo 2020) makes it difficult for religious commu-
nities in particular to oppose the government on political issues – even or especially dur-
ing the exceptional situation of the COVID-19 crisis – could serve as an explanatory pat-
tern here.  
 
59 Based on population figures, Israel had the third highest rate of infection after the Czech Republic and 
the USA (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html) [accessed on 2021-02-27]. 
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Belarus is a further case study for a not particularly exemplary or successful collabora-
tion between religious and state actors in the fight against the pandemic. President Alex-
ander Lukashenko has been playing down the risks of the pandemic there since the begin-
ning of the crisis so that in Belarus there has never been a lockdown to date and even mass 
events have been permitted the entire time (Mauder 2020). Dissidents suspect, however, 
that there is a massive manipulation of the figures behind governmental policies. In real-
ity, the number of deaths from COVID-19 in Belarus must be set up to 15 times higher 
than reflected in the official statistics.60 The problem that religious actors face in this re-
spect is not only that they can only speak out as a critical voice at great personal risk in au-
thoritarian Belarus; to make things even more difficult, after the allegedly rigged presi-
dential election in 2020, which once again confirmed Lukashenko in office, mass protests 
were organised throughout the country, some of which also involved church members 
(especially from the Catholic church). Also opposing COVID-19 policies in this situation 
would have been equivalent to trying to achieve the impossible. Thus it was almost sur-
prising that Lukashenko does not appear to have instrumentalised the pandemic to crack 
down even more rigorously on protesters. 
 
As remarkable as it thus is that the pressure generated by the continuing demonstra-
tions in Belarus finally even changed the attitude of the Orthodox Church in the country, 
with increasing numbers of its members having in the meantime joined the opposition 
movement,61 the explosive political situation in Belarus is currently a great obstacle to a 
successful COVID-19 policy. In its statement in November 2020, the Bishops’ Conference 
in Belarus therefore concentrated on condemning violence, lawlessness, injustice and ine-
quality in the country, calling on everyone to find a peaceful solution for social conflicts 
through dialogue.62 Furthermore, the representatives of the four large religious denomina-
tions in the country (Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims and Jews) formulated an appeal in 
 
60 https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html [accessed on 2021-02-26]. 
61 https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/belarus-proteste-verwandeln-die-kirchen.886.de.html?dram:arti-
cle_id=486044 [accessed on 2021-02-25]. Initially, the Orthodox Church in Belarus (which, incidentally, is 
controlled by Patriarch Cyril of Moscow) reacted to the protest movement against Lukashenko with the 
familiar reflex of stating that a group controlled by the West, which was attacking the ‘Russian-Ortho-
dox’ identity of Belarus, was behind this. 
62 https://www.domradio.de/themen/renovabis/2021-01-10/renovabis-expertin-zur-lage-belarus-und-
zur-rolle-der-kirchen [accessed on 2021-02-26].  
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support of peace63 shortly before the Christmas holidays 2020 which was noticeably di-
rected against Lukashenko’s attempt to play off the different religious communities 
against each other. The pandemic continued to remain a minor topic in this regard.  
 
The case of Russia is additionally different. It demonstrates once again how decisive 
the special political circumstances in a country are for appropriately evaluating the behav-
iour of religious actors at the macro-level during the COVID-19 crisis. Viewed superfi-
cially and without adequate consideration of the contextual conditions, one could cer-
tainly identify some positive aspects in the form of autonomy displayed by numerous rep-
resentatives of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) towards the authoritarian regime of 
Vladimir Putin in the first months of the pandemic. Nevertheless, such behaviour must be 
regarded as a ‘worst case’ as specified in this study. Overall, the situation can be seen as 
quite paradoxical. The noticeable dominance which fundamentalist voices within the ROC 
have long enjoyed, can and must be regarded as the main reason why its members often 
enough ignore ‘worldly’ issues and challenges. The self-perception of the ROC, namely 
that the best way to support the Russian state in its struggle against the supposedly ‘deca-
dent’ societies in the West was on a mental plane, benefited from this. During the COVID-
19 crisis the same position, however, which was ‘oblivious to the world’, prevented the 
ROC from dealing appropriately with the ‘worldly’ problems posed by the virus (Elsner 
2020). Many members of the ROC who were fiercely opposed to the restrictions on reli-
gious practice which were ordered and even defamed these as an “anti-Christian act of the 
state” instead suddenly found themselves in opposition to the state, in a manner they 
would hardly have believed possible before the crisis. Accordingly, during the first 
months of the pandemic, the members of the ROC actively contributed to the relatively 
unhindered spread of the virus, especially in the Russian provinces and finally even 
among the clerics themselves by not complying with hygiene regulations and social dis-
tancing. On the other hand, the fact that the state nevertheless hesitated to acknowledge 
the intransigence of the Orthodox by imposing a general ban on assembly and worship 
shows the (problematic) weight of the ROC within Russia’s political system (Elsner 2020). 
 
A form of antithesis to the close shoulder-to-shoulder relationship between religious 
and political authoritarianism, which is characteristic of Russia and crumbled, at best tem-
porarily, as a result of the COVID-19 epidemic, can in turn be observed in the (largely) 
secular-atheist regime of the People’s Republic of China. However, almost no reliable in-
formation on the role of religious actors during the pandemic in China has been released 
 
63 http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Lukashenko-clamps-down-on-churches-and-opposition-51920.html 
[accessed on 2021-02-25].  
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to the outside world. Although Fox News has meanwhile reported extensively that China 
is obviously using the coronavirus as an excuse to continue to push its ‘state-atheist’ pol-
icy of oppression against the religious communities there (including Christians and Uy-
ghurs, and apparently also continues to ban online masses).64 It currently appears to be 
more the case that the repressive way in which the Chinese state deals with its religious 
minorities has hardly been changed at all by the COVID-19 crisis, neither for good nor for 
bad. 
 
4. Exacerbation of religious tensions and conflicts 
Religious tensions in India have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis. The problem in 
India has always been that politically very contrary collective identities have emerged 
among the different religious groups, especially the Hindus and Muslims, and often turn 
into conflicts or even escalate into violence. For multi-religious India with its huge popu-
lation, now probably almost as large as that of China, the pandemic carried special risks 
right from the very beginning. After the intense outbreak of COVID-19 in March 2020, one 
could observe that many Hindus and Muslims accused each other of being responsible for 
the uncontrolled spread of the virus.65 It has already been mentioned that, at the beginning 
of the crisis, the Muslim missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat shifted to the centre of the 
discussion on the COVID-19 epidemic, because a significant number of initial COVID-19 
cases in India could be attributed to a religious mass event held by that Sunni religious 
community. Consequently, the police sealed off the suburb of Nizamuddin in central 
Delhi, which is mainly inhabited by Muslims, and sprayed the mosque there with disin-
fectant. Anti-Muslim resentment, which is widespread among the predominantly Hindu 
population, further intensified this approach (see also Chap. 3.2, Box 13): the hashtag 
#coronadschihad was then clicked hundreds of thousands of times in social networks 
(Musch-Borowska 2020a). 
 
Especially the radical Hindu nationalist movement Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 
a suborganisation of Prime Minister Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), subse-
quently attracted attention because it defamed the religious leaders of the Tablighi Jamaat 
as scapegoats. Arun Anand, who can be regarded as a kind of ‘chief ideologist’ of the RSS, 
often gave the impression that the Indian government could have kept the COVID-19 epi-
demic under control if the Sunni missionary movement had not held its mass event. The 
 
64 See e.g. https://www.foxnews.com/world/coronavirus-china-update-christian-persecution-vom [ac-
cessed on 2021-02-26] and https://www.foxnews.com/world/how-has-coronavirus-pandemic-affected-
chinas-concentration-camps [accessed on 2021-02-26]. 
65 https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/indien-corona-107.html [accessed on 2021-02-26].  
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fact that the Islamic community in India largely criticised the meeting of the Tablighi Ja-
maat itself and that all meetings in mosques were subsequently banned by the Muslim or-
ganisations was almost forgotten. At the same time, there were also incidents in which 
Hindus violated the nationwide curfew which has since been adopted as well as the na-
tionwide closure of temples, mosques and churches in order to celebrate their religious 
holidays.  
 
As a result therefore, India presents a precarious example of how a political, social and 
medical crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic can result in further escalation of previ-
ously existing lines of conflict which manifest themselves along religious patterns of iden-
tity. It would be a fundamental error here to assume that the causes of the conflicts them-
selves lie in the different religious beliefs. Instead, the path along which religious identi-
ties become vulnerable to political conflicts is far longer and more complex (Hidalgo 
2018). Nevertheless, the events in India show how important it is to take religious-political 
conflicts seriously and, if possible, to defuse them. Otherwise, such conflicts quickly be-
come difficult to manage, especially in a crisis situation.66 
 
Excursus: the special case of Sweden 
To conclude the (‘best’ and ‘worst cases’ at the) macro-level, the controversial case of Swe-
den must be discussed. It is also not unambiguous with regard to the role of religious 
communities in the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, it can be compared to Brazil, 
where there were also characteristics for positive and negative manifestations of the prob-
lem discussed here but, on the other hand, again in an alternative way. The difficulties of 
reaching a clear assessment in the case of Sweden are, however, obvious. Contrary to how 
the situation was presented (or at least suggested) in many media channels in Germany 
and elsewhere, the social-democratic government of Stefan Löfven is not among the actors 
who, in common with, for example, the presidents of the USA, Brazil, Tanzania or Belarus, 
would have denied the fundamental dangerousness of the virus itself. Under the influence 
of Anders Tegnell, Sweden’s state epidemiologist, the country only focused on a different, 
long-term strategy in the fight against the virus, which was, to a greater or lesser extent, 
significantly different from that of all the other countries in Europe or even worldwide. 
Tegnell’s strategy focused not on stopping the new coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (thus enter-
ing into a foreseeable loop of lockdowns and openings), but on keeping the infection rates 
 
66 It is thus a considerable burden for civil peace in India that at least the hardliners within the Hindu na-
tionalist ruling party BJP do not view Hinduism as a religion, but as a superordinate state ideology which 
all Indians should adhere to, even if they are actually Muslims or Christians.  
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at a relatively even low level so as to relieve the burden on intensive care medicine, con-
trol the socio-economic collateral damage caused by the pandemic, and promote the im-
munity of non-risk groups. This strategy primarily built on the motivation of the popula-
tion to tolerate and support minor but differentiated and goal-oriented measures out of an 
understanding for the situation (and beyond state coercion) in the long term. 
 
This is not the right place to judge the advantages and disadvantages of the way Swe-
den has been handling the pandemic, nor are the Authors of this study competent enough 
to do so. What is of interest here is the behaviour of the religious actors, which in turn 
must be viewed in a differentiated manner. The fact that the Catholic church in particular, 
especially Cardinal Anders Arborelius,67 who repeatedly voiced his criticism of the gov-
ernment’s course and even expressed his concern in an open letter, proved to be an im-
portant oppositional voice during the COVID-19 crisis must be regarded as fundamentally 
positive. The latter applies even more because Tegnell himself in several interviews and 
podcasts in June 2020 at least acknowledged the shortcomings in Swedish policy with re-
gard to the protection of risk groups in seniors’ residences and nursing homes,68 i.e. he 
named exactly the issue which Arborelius emphasised. However, that such criticism, 
which was so legitimate and important for the democratic discussion, was voiced almost 
solely by the small minority of Catholics and that the Authors have no information 
whether representatives of the Evangelical-Lutheran majority church of Sweden also be-
came publicly involved is, on the other hand, not really a positive aspect. The risks of tak-
ing Sweden’s path (which is, to date, responsible for a significantly higher number of 
deaths due to COVID-19 when compared in particular with its neighbours Denmark, Fin-
land and Norway) should instead at best have been addressed by all religious actors. 
 
The gravest deficits in Sweden, however, related to a further issue, namely epidemic 
control measures in the poorer suburbs of Stockholm where many migrants live and 
where there were an exceptionally large number of victims. In this regard, the Muslim-So-
mali diaspora was a particularly negative case in this regard, accounting for 40 % of the 
 
67 https://www.domradio.de/themen/weltkirche/2020-07-02/gemischtes-fazit-schwedischer-kardinal-
zum-schwedischen-corona-sonderweg [accessed on 2021-02-24]. For Arborelius, it was always a ques-
tion of balance, which is why he did not forget to mention the generous financial support provided by 
the Swedish government for the victims and those affected by the pandemic. See 
https://www.katholisch.de/artikel/25458-kardinal-arborelius-kritisiert-schwedischen-sonderweg-gegen-
corona [accessed on 2021-02-24].  
68 https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/coronavirus-in-schweden-toedlicher-corona-irrtum-a-
00000000-0002-0001-0000-000171667091 [accessed on 2021-02-25]. See also https://sverigesra-
dio.se/avsnitt/1518764 [accessed on 2021-02-27]. 
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reported COVID-19-related deaths in the Stockholm area by April 2020, despite represent-
ing only a small group of 0.7 % of the city's population. If one follows the research of 
Speckhard et al. (2020), this disproportionately high level of infections is also related to the 
fact that the religious community of Somali Muslims in Stockholm hardly expressed itself 
with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic and the hygiene regulations and social distancing 
that were consequently to be complied with, and in some cases also spread misinfor-
mation. In Sweden, the responsible role played by religious actors in the context of the 
COVID-19 crisis, which this study emphasises and which has also been confirmed using 
numerous positive examples, obviously did not function well enough. 
 
3.2 Meso-level 
With regard to the meso-level, empirical examples are presented below, first for 'best' and 
then for 'worst practices' of religious communities and (inter-)religious/faith-based organi-
sations. In this subchapter about the meso-level, complementary example boxes are used, 
in order to elaborate on and concretise specific examples. 
 
Best practices 
When the COVID-19 pandemic brought the world to a standstill at the beginning of 2020, 
forcing it to apply measures such banning personal contacts and lockdowns, religious 
communities in many parts of the world were also initially paralysed. They were them-
selves affected by the measures and impact of the virus and found themselves confronted 
with numerous changes and challenges in their daily lives. For example, they could no 
longer carry out their religious practices, activities and rituals in the normal way. In many 
countries, even the places of worship were shut. The religious communities thus had to 
reorientate themselves and find creative ways of being available for people under these 
changed circumstances and continuing to carry out their important social responsibilities. 
After an initial phase of shock and reorientation, many of them achieved this. Processes 
for adapting to the new situation were developed fastest wherever religious communities 
and organisations had already gained experience from other health crises and where good 
structures and relations between political and religious actors already existed. For exam-
ple, religious communities in Sub-Saharan African countries were able to draw on their 
experience with the Ebola crisis, quickly switching to crisis mode and remaining capable 
of acting (Marshall 2020; Marshall and Wilkinson 2020; Sonntag and Öhlmann 2020; 
Sonntag et al. 2020). Numerous ‘best practices’ of religious communities and faith-based 
organisations can be identified around the world, of which selected examples are pre-
sented below, structured according to the criteria derived in Chap. 2.4. 
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1. Observing the necessary measures and hygiene concepts as well as disseminating 
correct information 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, many religious communities took the situation very seri-
ously and accepted scientists’ expertise. Accordingly, they were willing to accept 
measures for containing the virus and follow specific hygiene concepts (ACT Alliance et 
al. 2020; CCIH and JLI 2020; Marshall and Wilkinson 2020; Sonntag and Öhlmann 2020; 
Sonntag et al. 2020). To this end, some religious communities and (inter-)religious organi-
sations such as the World Council of Churches69 (WCC 2020), World Vision (2020), Islamic Re-
lief (2020), INEB (2020) or KAICIID (2020) developed enhanced guidelines and specific reg-
ulations for carrying out their religious practices (see Chap. 2.4). For example, the Joint 
Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities (JLI) distributed extensive guidelines in 
collaboration with the United Nations Children’s Fund UNICEF70 and Religions for Peace 
(RfP), categorised in three areas: 1) adapting religious practices and rituals, 2) communi-
cating to end misinformation, discrimination and to install hope, as well as 3) helping peo-
ple who are at risk (JLI et al. s.l.). 
 
With regard to current measures for immunisation, some religious communities are 
leading by example, such as the head of the Catholic Church, Pope Francis, who had him-
self vaccinated in public and spoke out clearly. According to the Pope, everyone must be 
vaccinated for ethical reasons, “because an infection would endanger one's own health, 
one's own life, but also the lives of others.” Anything else would be “suicidal denialism”.71 
The Church of England already published a document at the beginning of December 2020 
on the willingness of churches and religious buildings to provide space for vaccination 
centres: 
 
“It is admirable that so many churches and cathedrals have suggested that they may be 
able to provide space for vaccination centres as part of the national response to COVID-
19. Where this is possible to do it will be a great act of service and witness” (Church of 
England 2020). 
 
In addition, the inclusive, multi-faith movement Faiths4Vaccines72 has brought to-
gether local and national religious leaders and medical professionals to increase vaccine 
confidence and readiness in religious communities and advocate for rapid and equitable 
vaccine distribution. 
 
69 https://www.oikoumene.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
70 https://www.unicef.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
71 https://www.stern.de/news/papst-franziskus-ruft-zur-impfung-gegen-das-coronavirus-auf-
9559756.html [accessed on 2021-01-20]. 
72 https://faiths4vaccines.org/ [28.03.2021]. 
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With regard to challenges such as ‘infodemics’ (see Chap. 4.3), information overload, 
fake news and conspiracy theories, there were some ‘best practices’ by religious communi-
ties and organisations which actively opposed false information, even among their own 
ranks, spreading instead correct, evidence-based information as well as promoting medi-
cal-hygienic education (ACT Alliance et al. 2020; CCIH and JLI 2020; KAICIID 2020; 
Sonntag et al. 2020). Specific examples of this include the extensive information and 
awareness campaign of the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka or the powerfully 
effective media presence of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Papua New Guinea, 
which are explained in greater detail in Boxes 1 and 2 (EXP1; EXP2). 
 
Box 1: The Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka 
The Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement, a renewed Buddhist NGO in Sri Lanka, started an 
awareness campaign for the population during the COVID-19 pandemic. It translated offi-
cial information such as material from the WHO and the government regarding COVID-
19 regulations into the national languages as well as visual forms (pictorials) and distrib-
uted them widely, not just via social media, but also right down to local communities in 
rural areas and isolated villages. The NGO also enabled ‘reverse’ communication, collect-
ing information from these areas and passing it on to the government to ensure that policy 
makers were aware of the needs and circumstances of the local people. Sarvodaya thus 
acted as a link between the population and the government. Furthermore, it provided 
support for both the government and society. For example, it opened its religious training 
centres as quarantine centres and was active in supplying food and health and social wel-
fare services. It thus ensured the care of the elderly, risk groups and orphanages, among 
others. In addition, Sarvodaya worked closely with other civil society organisations to con-
tain the negative effects of the pandemic, as well as with international organisations such 
as the British Asian Trust. This religious movement therefore provided a platform in the 
pandemic to link different social, religious and political groups and actors to one another 
and coordinate assistance. It acted as a bridge between many actors both within and out-
side Sri Lanka (EXP1). 
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Box 2: The Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Papua New Guinea 
In Papua New Guinea, the Evangelical-Lutheran Church proved to be an important, com-
petent supporter of the measures required during the COVID-19 pandemic. To a high de-
gree, it used digital communication and was extremely visible in both religious as well as 
non-religious media, allowing it to reach many people. Technically supported by the 
church’s communication centre, Bishop Dr Jack Urame, for example, as well as further re-
ligious functionaries provided both spiritual relief and comfort as well as medical-hy-
gienic education and assistance via podcasts, radio programmes and audio conferences, 
making contact and encouragement even under these difficult conditions possible. Thus 
the church was able to contribute towards easing the situation as well as to a reflective, en-
lightened and professional approach to the pandemic (EXP2). 
 
2. Fulfilling important tasks (pastoral/charitable/theological) for individuals and  
society, even in times of crisis 
Religious communities, (inter-)religious organisations and FBOs performed important du-
ties for people and society in many ways, even or especially under changed conditions. To 
systematise these reactions, three central dimensions can be identified with a view to ‘best 
practice’ examples: the spiritual/pastoral sector, the social/charitable sector and the vision-
ary/theological sector (based on an JLI (2020); Marshall and Wilkinson (2020)). 
 
In this regard, it must be noted that the actions of religious communities may be very 
different, depending on context and self-perception. Not all of them can and want to take 
on responsibilities in society. Some religions focus more on the private, individual sphere 
and the spiritual sector (e.g. various Asian religions), while others concentrate more on 
community and social work. Religious communities are also active in quite different so-
cial, political and economic contexts. Those which are located in democracies where reli-
gious freedom is guaranteed, can perform and develop other responsibilities than reli-
gious communities which find themselves in political systems in which they are sup-
pressed (EXP1; EXP2). 
 
Against this background, empirical ‘best practice’ examples are presented below for 
the meso-level using the three dimensions named. 
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a) Spiritual/pastoral sector 
After an initial ‘state of shock’, many religious communities and churches became active 
and creative so as to continue to address people's mental and spiritual needs and provide 
pastoral care. Depending on the legal regulations, religious services were sometimes still 
allowed to take place face-to-face and hygiene concepts were developed for this purpose 
(social distancing, compulsory masks and the provision of disinfectant, prenotification of 
attendance, limiting the number of attendees, no singing and similar regulations). How-
ever, in many places religious services were shifted to digital space. Many religious com-
munities streamed their church services, taped them and transmitted them via different 
media such as radio, television or the internet. Furthermore, special religious ceremonies, 
nights of prayer as well as COVID-19 prayers were offered (Bawidamann et al. 2020; 
Sonntag et al. 2020). This also applied for numerous religious festivals which took place 
during this time (e.g. Passover, Easter, Ramadan, Christmas, etc.). Religious communities 
found creative alternative offers which, on the one hand, did not endanger the health of 
people and society but, on the other hand, continued to give a structure and orientation as 
well as providing something familiar in these times of uncertainty. For example, in many 
places Muslim communities broke their fast during Ramadan in a virtual form, e.g. via 
live functions of Facebook, Skype or different forms of video conferences, enabling Mus-
lims worldwide to link to one another (Ouchtou and Knipp 2020). The initiative of the Jew-
ish Experience e. V., a registered association in Germany, can be cited as an example from 
the Jewish community. On the occasion of Purim Mitzvah, when it is customary to give 
gifts of food – Mischloach Manot – they organised activities in which Jews sent each other 
safely packed, kosher food and Purim greetings as special presents.73 
 
Drawing on the religious language of their traditions of faith, religious communities 
were able to spread positive messages, give hope, comfort and support, and strengthen 
empathy and resilience among their believers. This enabled them to make positive contri-
butions to people’s mental health and provide psycho-social support. In this connection, 
personal pastoral call services were set up with a 24-hour hotline, for example, and tele-
phone chains were organised so that, with the help of a snowball system, all of the com-
munity members could be contacted one after the other, stayed in touch with each other 
and gave each other courage and strength. To some extent, new forms were also devel-
oped for the ritual support of the sick and dying. One example of so-called Facetime Dying 




73 http://www.jewishexperience.de/ [accessed on 2021-02-27]. 
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Box 3: ‘FaceTime Dying’ as a final digital good-bye 
The difficult hours of death, which are often accompanied by a religious ritual such as the 
anointment of the sick (formerly ‘extreme unction’), mutual prayers or simply just a calm-
ing touch, are especially difficult to carry out in times of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
required physical distancing. Clerics in the USA, for example, used possibilities to care for 
the sick and dying in the last moments of their lives via FaceTime and Zoom, say prayers, 
give blessings over the telephone and even administer the Christian sacrament of extreme 
unction via FaceTime. For example, Reverend Peter Walsh spoke last rites to a member of 
his congregation infected with COVID-19 via a mobile phone held by a hospital employee 
in a hospital in New Canaan: “I told [him] I loved him, that he was mightily loved by his 
whole community. That he was a great man.” In another hospital in Orange County, Son-
dos Kholaki, a Muslim chaplain, entered a patient’s room in protective clothing and con-
tacted their family by mobile phone so they could say their good-byes (Zauzmer 2020). 
 
b) Social/charitable sector 
Many religions have a long tradition of commitment in the social or charitable sector. Reli-
gious actors take on a large part of welfare state care, especially in countries in the Global 
South – depending on context even as much as 70 % in the health care sector (UNAIDS 
2009). Where such structures were well institutionalised and established, they were able to 
quickly switch to crisis mode and provide numerous support services. This refers espe-
cially to the projects and activities of faith-based organisations (FBOs) in the humanitarian 
sector such as Islamic Relief, Misereor, Caritas Internationalis, World Vision International, Bread 
for the World, etc. But also local church communities launched new initiatives, e.g. in the 
fields of health care, neighbourhood help and distribution of food, clothing, protective 
and hygiene supplies such as disinfectant or masks. Furthermore, they also provided fi-
nancial support for people in need during the pandemic (ACT Alliance et al. 2020; 
Sonntag and Öhlmann 2020; Sonntag et al. 2020). Two ‘best practices’ for the country con-
texts of Thailand and Jordan are described here in more detail in Boxes 4 and 5. 
 
Box 4: Buddhist temples in Thailand provide soup kitchens 
In the COVID-19 pandemic, Buddhist temples in Thailand came to the aid of the needy. 
Almost 1,000 soup kitchens, known in Thai as rong than, were set up in Buddhist temples 
or close to them in Bangkok and all 76 provinces in the kingdom to cook food for low-in-
come earners and others suffering economic hardship. According to Narong Songarom, 
Director of the Office of National Buddhism, 270,000 people were helped from the out-
break of the pandemic until 13 May 2020. Making use of the largest temples across the 
country, 10.9 million Thai baht (US $340,000) were spent on preparing meals. Narong also 
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made it clear that the temples were aware of the necessity of adhering to the strictest hy-
giene standards to prevent any accidental transmission of the coronavirus to people when 
distributing food or waiting in lines. Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha said 
that Wat Rakhang Khositaram, a riverside temple near the Grand Palace in Bangkok, 
could serve as a model: “The temple takes care of more than 1,000 people every day. […] 
A rong than is not only a place to help poor people, it is also a channel for the well-to-do to 
make donations.” (Whitaker 2020) 
 
Box 5: New Islamic case law on zakat levy in Jordan 
One particular contribution of Islamic jurisprudence during the pandemic was the change 
in the parameters for the annual almsgiving known as zakat. The Al Iftaa, a top Islamic 
body responsible for issuing religious edicts in Jordan, stated that it was permissible to 
give donations from one’s latest income (instead of only from savings) and to donate even 
before Ramadan (instead of only during Ramadan). Both measures increased the potential 
for more donations so as to react to increased needs caused by the pandemic. The resolu-
tion stated: “In light of the corona virus pandemic, where a substantial proportion of the 
community is sitting idle and has no money to cover the basic needs of survival, we are of 
the view that the wealthy should hasten to pay the Zakah of their wealth before its due 
time and not to delay it till Ramadan” (Iftaa’ Board 2020) (Sonntag and Öhlmann 2020; 
Sonntag et al. 2020). 
 
c) Visionary/theological sector 
In addition, religious communities play a special role during global (health) crises: to re-
flect theologically on what has happened, analyse the problem and develop viable and 
sustainable concepts, orientation, solutions and visions for the future. During the COVID-
19 pandemic, it took some time until theological, religious, visionary voices were raised. 
Existential issues such as contingency management, guilt, reconciliation or reflections on 
the values of solidarity and empathy with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic were in-
creasingly addressed in various formats such as webinars, roundtables, lectures, dossiers74 
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Furthermore, measures for containing the pandemic were also increasingly theologi-
cally based and religiously justified. This once again gave them a different weight with a 
correspondingly higher level of authority and a strong willingness to observe them. For 
example, the Ulema Council of Afghanistan (the council of religious leaders) used a reli-
gious argument to state that not following the government’s guidelines could lead to a 
loss of life. Thus it was ‘haram’, i.e. forbidden by Islamic law (EXP3). In addition, interna-
tional networks and initiatives (such as JLI, UNICEF, RfP and others) collected religious 
texts, teachings and traditions which could be especially applied to the COVID-19 pan-
demic and forwarded or distributed them to their manifold members and partners (JLI 
2020; UNICEF et al. 2020a, 2020b). Box 6 holds a selection of these materials. 
 
Box 6:  Religious texts, teachings and traditions which can be applied to the COVID-19 
pandemic 
In the Jewish tradition, Talmud principles warn against the danger of transporting dis-
eases from one place to another (Taanit 21b); emphasise the need to stay at home in times 
of plague and maintain social isolation (Bava Kamma 60b, Ketubot 77b); and provide strict 
guidelines on maintaining hygiene, especially on washing hands and feet regularly (Shab-
bat 108b). 
The Christian Bible states that knowledge of and education on diseases can help us to 
learn how to avoid them and that lack of knowledge can lead to death: “My people are de-
stroyed for lack of knowledge” (Hosea 4:6). 
The Venerable Phra Paisal Visalo, a respected monk in the Forest Tradition of Theravada 
Buddhism, teaches: “The mindful hand-washing helps to make us more careful and gives 
us more opportunities to be mindful in our daily lives.” (JLI 2020). 
For more teachings from religious traditions with regard to health and crises, see e.g. 
UNICEF et al. (2020a, 2020b). 
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3. Inclusive and multi-religious approaches 
Inclusiveness and multi- religiosity are important criteria for enabling the activities of reli-
gious communities to develop positive effects, also for society as a whole (see Chap. 2.4). 
Instead of being isolated and unconnected, different religious organisations found ways of 
collaborating. United in their mission to fight together against the coronavirus, multi-reli-
gious initiatives were given a fresh impetus. Supported by digitalisation and new social 
media, they were able to visibly present themselves and network better than in past crises 
(ACT Alliance et al. 2020; JLI 2020; KAICIID 2020; Marshall and Wilkinson 2020). For ex-
ample, the partners of the global, multi-religious initiative Faith and Positive Change for 
Children, Families and Communities (FPCC)75 reacted very quickly to the COVID-19 pan-
demic. This partnership was officially launched by UNICEF, Religions for Peace and the 
knowledge partner Joint Learning Initiative on Local Faith Communities (JLI) in October 2019. 
It includes leading representatives from the world’s religious and spiritual traditions 
(Baháʼí, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Islamists, Jainists, Jews, Sikhs, Zoroastrians and 
indigenous spiritualities) as well as interreligious youth and women’s networks and mem-
bers from international, faith-based organisations. In February 2020, they agreed to imme-
diately shift the focus of their joint work plan to include global, multi-religious responses 
to the global crisis (FPCC s. l.; UNICEF et al. 2020a). One resultant product was, for exam-
ple, the multi-religious Faith-in-Action COVID-19 Initiative, which was launched in April 
2020. This was the kick-off for a global partnership for multi-religious events and the mo-
bilisation of communities to counteract the COVID-19 pandemic. This partnership initia-
tive calls on religious communities throughout the entire world to join forces with govern-
ments, UN bodies and broad civil society organisations. For example, it was a historical 
moment when UNICEF Executive Director Henrietta Fore and 13 of the most senior reli-
gious leaders from RfP signed a joint statement and sent out a global call for action with 
regard to COVID-19 (RfP and UNICEF 2020).76 A further example of collaboration be-
tween various religious communities and faith-based organisations (FBOs) at different 
levels – (trans-)national, regional, local – were the initiatives and activities of the multi-
stakeholder partnership PaRD77 (“International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable 




75 https://www.faith4positivechange.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
76 Final evaluations and assessments of the actual success and reach of these and similar initiatives are 
still pending (at the time of this study was drawn up). 
77 https://www.partner-religion-development.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
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Box 7: The multi-stakeholder partnership PaRD 
The “International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development” (PaRD) is a 
multi-stakeholder partnership which brings together state actors with diverse civil society 
and faith-based organisations. PaRD has different work-streams on the topics of health, 
gender equality, water, environment and climate action as well as sustaining peace. Dur-
ing the coronavirus period, the health work-stream became particularly active. Among 
other things, it promoted the exchange of information and multi-stakeholder dialogues. 
For example, a dossier was drawn up to spread information on the responses of religious 
actors to COVID-19 (Dossier: Religion in times of COVID-19) as well as a podcast for the 
Geneva Peace Week in November 2020 with regard to (financial) challenges of local reli-
gious and faith-based organisation in different regions during this time of crisis. Further-
more, PaRD organised several webinars, virtual conferences and roundtables on current 
topics such as possibilities for funding COVID-19 measures (PaRD Annual Forum ses-
sions on COVID-19), on visions of a just world post-COVID-19, especially with regard to 
religion, sustainable development and gender justice (Visioning a Just World Post-
COVID19) or on immunisation strategies, fake news and possibilities for cooperation be-
tween the WHO and religious communities/organisations (Vaccination, Fake News and 
the role of Religious Actors). Furthermore, PaRD attempted to connect its members, espe-
cially local religious actors, with other relevant actors, e.g. from government authorities 
and multilateral organisations, so as to exchange information and coordinate ongoing ini-
tiatives and COVID-19 strategies. Mutual learning took place and possibilities for collabo-
ration were explored (PaRD 2020, s. l.). 
 
In addition, religious communities collaborated actively at the local level, e.g. on joint in-
formation and awareness campaigns, to distribute essential goods to the needy as well as 
to provide (material) support services, especially for the most vulnerable population 
groups (ACT Alliance et al. 2020; JLI 2020; KAICIID 2020). Here, ‘best practices’ include, 
for example, the Interfaith Fellows of the project Southeast Asia: Advancing Inter-Religious Di-
alogue and Freedom of Religion or Belief (SEA-AIR), which is funded by the EU and imple-
mented by the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers (NRTP)78. During the pan-
demic, the Interfaith Fellows carried out supportive initiatives as reactions to COVID-19 in 
their individual country contexts in South and South-east Asia (e.g. the Philippines, Thai-
land, Indonesia, etc.). For example, they distributed hygiene supplies, masks, disinfectant 
 
78 The Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers (NRTP) acts as a bridge builder between  
grassroots peacemakers and global actors and promotes the positive role of religious and traditional ac-
tors in peacebuilding processes. It unites more than 50 organisations worldwide: https://www.peace-
makersnetwork.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
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and personal care products and carried out fundraising to distribute basic supplies during 
lockdowns. Directly at the grassroots level they transmitted correct information, created 
an awareness of fake news, strengthened values such as solidarity and compassion, and 
organised psychosocial help, especially for children (NRTP s. l.a; SEA-AIR et al. s. l.). 
 
The OMNIA Institute for Contextual Leadership79 Interfaith Peacemaker (IP) teams in Nige-
ria, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are further positive examples for successful interreligious 
collaboration at a local level during the COVID-19 pandemic. These interreligious peace 
activists come from different sectors (e.g. religious leaders or laypeople, traditional lead-
ers, women’s groups, local political actors) and are trained and by the global training and 
advisory programme OMNIA (s. l.). Box 8 describes their work in detail for the country 
contexts of North Nigeria and Sri Lanka. 
 
Box 8:  Interfaith Peacemaker Teams in times of COVID-19 in northern Nigeria and  
Sri Lanka 
In the federal state of Gombe in North Nigeria, the OMNIA Interfaith Peacemaker Teams co-
operated with the Gombe College of Nursing. Together with the students from the health 
sector, they visited numerous villages where they advocated the implementation of the 
necessary COVID-19 measures, e.g. through information campaigns, medical education 
and humanitarian aid. This interreligious peace work thus enabled the rapid spread of 
correct information, the adjustment of religious meetings and practices, the coordination 
of solidarity initiatives as well as material aid for those people most at risk. 
The Interfaith Peacemaker Teams in Sri Lanka, on the other hand, worked with Cargills Food 
City, a large food chain, to jointly produce bags with dry rations, which they then distrib-
uted to needy families. After they realised that the lockdown would last longer or be re-
peated, they searched for a more sustainable solution and promoted the cultivation of 
home gardens, especially in the villages, where many people have a small backyard or a 
piece of land. They cooperated with the Sustainable Harvest International organisation, 
passing on its techniques to achieve a quick harvest on small plots of land (Act Alliance et 
al. 2020; Premawardhana 2020). 
 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, representatives from different religions worldwide 
repeatedly emphasised universal values and ethical principles such as ‘no harm’, solidar-
ity, compassion, the ‘golden rule’ as well as the preservation and protection of human life 
as unifying elements of the different religious traditions (WHO 2020a). 
 
 
79 https://www.omnialeadership.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-13]. 
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When taking specific action, these values were expressed in the fact that religious 
communities in many places not only cared for their own members (in-group), but gener-
ally helped people in need, regardless of their origin, gender or religious affiliation, and 
functioned as advocates for particularly vulnerable population groups (e.g. ethnic and re-
ligious minorities, migrants and refugees, people with special needs, women and chil-
dren). In Kenya, for example, the partners of the RMP (“Religious Minorities Project”) 
such as Islamic Relief Kenya, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, the NGO Muslims for 
Human Rights and Tangaza University College reoriented their activities when the pandemic 
broke out. In their endeavours to deal with the problems which resulted from the COVID-
19 crisis, they reallocated funds to fight the virus. The RMP partner Muslims for Human 
Rights, for example, set up special radio programmes together with diverse religious lead-
ers (e.g. Muslims, Christians, members of African traditional religions) as well as local 
community representatives, government officials and others. The goal was to sensitise the 
public to COVID-19 and to raise awareness. The topics they discussed varied greatly: from 
education to safety measures to correcting misinformation regarding the coronavirus, 
from general promotion of human rights during the pandemic to pointing out inequalities 
and violations of human rights (e.g. collective punishment and arbitrary arrests of margin-
alised communities and minorities, among others) (NRTP s. l.b). 
 
The Interreligious Council of Peru (IRC-Peru), a multi-religious platform consisting of 27 
different religious communities and organisations, represents a further ‘best practice’. 
When reacting to the COVID-19 pandemic, this Council placed special emphasis on sup-
porting asylum seekers, refugees and migrants (especially those who had fled from the 
neighbouring country of Venezuela over the past few years). It managed to provide al-
most 8,000 people (approx. 2,000 families) from this population group “with essential 
emergency response materials, including food, hygiene kits, and rent vouchers” for those 
who were in danger of losing shelter (RfP 2020b). 
 
In addition, there are numerous examples of various religious communities joining 
forces to hold interreligious coronavirus prayers and prayers for peace. For example, on 
14 May 2020, the High Committee for Human Brotherhood80 and Pope Francis invited human-
ity to a day of prayer for the end of the COVID-19 pandemic. The plan was for members 
of all religions and denominations to pray together, fast and perform acts of charity on 
that day, a goal which was achieved in many places.81 Religious communities understood 
that they were all ‘in the same boot’ and helped each other, even as far as sharing their 
 
80 https://www.forhumanfraternity.org/ [accessed on 2021-01-10]. 
81 https://religion.orf.at/v3/stories/3002167/) [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
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places of worship. It was, for instance, a historic moment when the Protestant Martha 
Church in Berlin-Kreuzberg opened its doors to people of a different faith, namely for 
Muslims’ Ramadan prayers.82 Another example of ‘best practice’ is the House of Religions83 
in Bern (Switzerland), which unites eight religious communities and five places of wor-
ship under one roof. When religious celebrations were no longer allowed in churches, 
mosques, temples or synagogues in Switzerland, a large interreligious celebration was 
aired from the House of Religions and broadcast by Swiss radio and television stations.84 
 
The religious communities also assisted each other financially to some extent, whereby 
they were able to profit from transnational networks. This enabled them to provide a 
global response to a global pandemic. For example, the Leipzig Evangelical-Lutheran Mis-
sion85 collected money to support its partners overseas in their work against COVID-19, 
because an important source of income, namely from collections during services, had been 
lost. The Mission also supported its partners within the framework of international coun-
cils in which they participated (EXP2). In Box 9, the Multi-Religious Humanitarian Fund 
(MRHF) is briefly introduced as a ‘best practice’ for a global, multi-religious fund. 
 
Box 9: The ‘Multi-Religious Humanitarian Fund’ (MRHF) for the COVID-19 pandemic 
Religions for Peace (RfP) managed to launch its own, multi-religious humanitarian fund rel-
atively quickly (in April 2020) as a reaction to COVID-19. It supports multi-religious col-
laborations and programmes dealing with COVID-19 and encourages creative interven-
tions to strengthen awareness for safety measures, promote resilience, fight discrimination 
in both word and action, and serve the needs of those persons or communities which are 
most at risk. Interreligious platforms receiving funds must present a track record of col-
laboration and/or the provision of humanitarian services (RfP 2020c, s. l.). The Secretary 
General of RfP, Professor Azza Karam, explained the background of this fund as follows: 
“The world is facing an unprecedented crisis brought about by COVID-19, and religious 
actors are first responders in humanitarian crises. Religions for Peace is determined to 
support the multi-religious humanitarian efforts in these crisis times because we know 





82 https://kath.net/news/71763 [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
83 https://www.haus-der-religionen.ch/ [accessed on 2021-01-14]. 
84 https://www.srf.ch/audio/radiogottesdienst/interreligioese-feier-aus-dem-haus-der-religionen-in-
bern?id=11752608) [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
85 https://www.leipziger-missionswerk.de/ [accessed on 2021-01-15]. 
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Worst practices 
In addition to the ‘best practices’ of religious communities and organisations which have 
been identified at the meso-level, negative scenarios and events repeatedly became appar-
ent during the COVID-19 pandemic, contributing to a deterioration of the situation. In this 
regard, the following ‘worst practices’ are explained by way of example, systematised on 
the basis of the criteria mentioned in Chap. 2.4. 
 
1. Violation of necessary measures, religious super spreader events and the spread of 
conspiracy narratives 
Religious communities and religious organisations were found to be not only part of the 
solution, but in various cases also part of the problem if, for example, they did not take the 
situation seriously, placed their claims to belief and truth above proven scientific 
knowledge or violated the necessary measures and hygiene regulations. For example, so-
called religious super spreader events (see Chap. 3.1) such as the mass events of the 
Sunni-Islamic missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat in Malaysia at the end of February 
2020 or the Shincheonji Church of Jesus in South Korea in the middle of February 2020 made 
the headlines (Berres and Le Ker 2020). In Iran, the epidemic particularly spread from the 
city of Qom, a stronghold of the Shiite clerics. The city’s Fatima Masumeh Shrine initially 
remained open, with large numbers of people continuing to touch and kiss the relics.86 
Further coronavirus hotspots included Pentecostal, evangelical and free churches in Bra-
zil, the USA or other places, which continued to place great value on physical encounters 
and singing (Brüggemann and Lenz 2020). 
 
Depending on the situation and context, there were different reasons for violations of 
COVID-19 regulations on the part of the religious communities. Especially at the begin-
ning of the pandemic, the main reason was still a lack of knowledge and awareness on the 
part of those responsible. Another reason was the financial hardships of the religious com-
munities and clerics. According to one of the experts, for example, the situation of some 
clerics in the Russian countryside is extremely precarious. They are completely dependent 
on the money given by the faithful during the holy liturgy to continue to care for their 
usually large families. Often they saw no other possibility than to continue the liturgy and 
offer rituals (EXP4). 
 
Finally, certain religious beliefs and doctrines could themselves stand in the way of 
fighting the COVID-19 virus which, given that they are anchored in an absolute tran-
scendence (God), wield great authority among their believers. This is true, for example, 
 
86 https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/coronavirus-iran-100.html [accessed on 2021-01-20]. 
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for absolutist-exclusivist claims to the truth of their own religion (vis-à-vis to other reli-
gions as well as other disciplines) or for religious beliefs which are sceptical of or even 
contrary to scientific and technological knowledge. Thus, arguments were brought forth 
that the pandemic was ‘God’s punishment’ in the light of human sinfulness, that infec-
tions were specific, purposeful punishments from God, and that people would have to 
convert to overcome the pandemic. Simply attending religious services and believing in 
God would protect people from being infected with the coronavirus, and nothing bad 
could come from ‘holy things’. These religious beliefs were not necessarily specific to a 
certain religion or denomination. Instead, they could be identified at the edges of all faiths 
(above all among the fundamentalist/radical groups) (Hillenbrand 2021; Hillenbrand and 
Pollack 2021; KAICIID 2020). 
 
Furthermore, a discrepancy between agreements concluded at the religious executive 
level and the reality in local communities was sometimes noticeable. One example of this 
is the Orthodox Church of Russia. While the executives of the church supported the re-
strictions imposed by the state and medical experts, responsibility for specific actions and 
practices lay at the local level. Accordingly, the situation was very different, ranging from 
parishes which shifted all their religious activities to the digital sphere to parishes which 
carried out ‘business as usual’ or even encouraged their congregations to go to church 
more often and kiss the icons as ‘effective’ measures against the virus (EXP4). Many bish-
ops and especially monasteries in the Orthodox-Christian world were extremely reluctant 
to modify their liturgical traditions under epidemic conditions. What was especially prob-
lematic was the practice of holy communion on a common communion spoon, which 
many Orthodox clerics regard as an indispensable traditional practice. A prominent exam-
ple of this was the funeral service for the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Monte-
negro, Bishop Amfilohije, in November 2020, who died of COVID-19. Several thousand of 
the mourners who attended ignored the safety regulations for COVID-19, and shortly 
thereafter Patriarch Irinej of Belgrade also died of the coronavirus (Brüggemann and Lenz 
2020; EXP4). 
 
Similar problems and polarisations can be seen with regard to the latest developments 
concerning COVID-19 vaccinations. Reluctance, opposition and misinformation are 
spreading around the world, including religious communities, whereby the motives for 
such scepticism towards the vaccines are manifold. In accordance with the underlying re-
search interest, the focus of this study lies on religiously motivated reservations. The Mus-
lim world, for instance, is discussing the extent to which the vaccines are religiously pure 
and therefore permissible under religious law; or impure and unlawful, for example, with 
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regard to the possible use of pork products as a stabilizer. Studies for Indonesia show, for 
example, that some Muslims would not be prepared to accept vaccinations with these in-
gredients even if the Muslim authority were to issue guidelines that permitted them 
(Milko 2020; Necsutu 2020; Panagiotidis 2021). 
 
Box 10 describes the case of Pakistan as an example for specific violations of COVID-
19 measures by religious communities. Reservations regarding vaccinations are described 
in Box 11 using examples from within the Christian Orthodox churches. 
 
Box 10: Resistance to closed mosques in Pakistan 
While clerics and governments throughout the entire Muslim world were implementing 
Ramadan under lockdown conditions, closing mosques and telling the faithful to pray at 
home, many powerful imams in Pakistan defied the measures taken by the state. Despite 
specific guidelines for religious communities issued by the Pakistani government, they 
kept mosques open, publicly invoking the faithful to ignore the anti-pandemic measures 
and go to the mosques to pray, arguing that their belief in Allah would protect them from 
the coronavirus. No disease could harm a Muslim who prayed regularly – only unbeliev-
ers would be afraid of the pandemic. Furthermore, some prominent clerics and leaders of 
religious parties signed a letter in which they demanded that the government exempt 
mosques from closing during the holy month [of Ramadan], as otherwise they would call 
down God’s wrath and that of the faithful on themselves. In April, the government gave 
in and signed an agreement which kept mosques open during Ramadan (under certain 
conditions which were then only inadequately observed). Reports spoke of vain attempts 
by the police to prevent mass gatherings in front of and in the mosques (Abi-Habib and 
ur-Rehman 2020; Musch-Borowska 2020b). 
 
Box 11: COVID-19 vaccination hesitancy within Christian Orthodox churches 
Opposition among bishops and congregations to the coronavirus vaccination is found 
within Christian Orthodox churches. In Moldova, for example, the Orthodox Church al-
ready publicly condemned the possible use of a vaccination against COVID-19 in May 
2020, echoing a popular right-wing conspiracy theory. It described this as a “satanic plan”. 
In a press release, one cleric stated: “The global anti-Christian system wants to introduce 
microchips into people’s bodies with whose help they can control them, through 5G tech-
nology.” The statement issued by the Church continued: “[The] vaccination introduces na-
noparticles into the body that react to the waves transmitted by 5G technology and allow 
the system to control humans remotely. [...] The Church also warned Moldovan Prime 
Minister Ion Chicu that if he did not lift restrictions on gatherings in churches sooner than 
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the planned date of June 30 he would be struck off the prayer list. ‘Otherwise we will take 
the canonical and moral right to exclude you from remembrance in the Church’s prayers. 
Do not fight against the Church, for it is Christ who defends it,’ the Church said.” 
(Necsutu 2020). 
In Greece, at the beginning of 2021, the Bishop of Kythera called on people not to be vac-
cinated because the vaccine was produced from the cells of aborted foetuses. In Cyprus, 
Bishop Neophytos Masouras of Morphou stated: “I will not become a genetically modified 
product of the new world order.” The coronavirus vaccination made people lose their 
sense of taste and become ill, like genetically modified tomatoes (Panagiotidis 2021). 
 
2. Religious silence and lack of performance of societal role 
With regard to their important responsibilities for individuals and society, some religious 
communities, especially at the beginning of the pandemic, were paralysed, reluctant or in-
capable of acting. The faithful, who hoped for more support and continuous assistance, 
began to raise their voices. There was a lack of innovative concepts and solutions, espe-
cially with regard to the ethical and visionary orientation (EXP4; Tilman 2020). The case of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, which is described in Box 12, demonstrates how a gap in 
theologically based social and health ethics can turn into a gateway for conspiracy theories 
and magical interpretations. 
 
Box 12: A paralysed Russian Orthodox Church 
A scientific expert for the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) gave the following assessment 
at our roundtable: since the ROC is very diverse, the answers to and interpretations of the 
COVID-19 pandemic varied accordingly. Although the Church generally recognised that 
it was responsible for the spiritual needs of the faithful during this time of crisis, beyond 
the sacred liturgy it had provided few ideas or instruments to respond to their needs. Due 
to the ban on a joint liturgy, which plays a decisive role in Orthodoxy, the Church was 
faced with an existential challenge which left it paralysed, particularly at the beginning of 
the pandemic. Apart from prayer, the Church had little to offer society and did not know 
in what setting it should talk to people about the pandemic. For example, it could not pre-
sent any strategies, visions or theological concepts as to how a society could function sus-
tainably or what ‘building back better’ could look like. Fully developed social, bio- and 
health ethics were lacking. Generally, there was very little theological reflection on social 
or medical-ethical issues. The pandemic was, at best, understood as a challenge for the in-
dividual’s spiritual life and was attributed to human societies having given up God’s sav-
ing patronage. Thus, the response to it should be a reassessment of our human life and 
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our principles as well as strong personal and mutual prayer. Greater visions for coping 
with or overcoming the crisis were not discernible (EXP4). 
Consequently, the lack of serious analysis and exchange with science (mainly with medi-
cine) led to the Russian Orthodox Church’s inadequate ability to act and react during the 
crisis. This created a vacuum which was filled by fundamentalists and magical ap-
proaches in the liturgy. Where religious communities were unable to offer theological in-
terpretations and orientation patterns, a fertile breeding ground for conspiracy theories 
was created (EXP4). 
 
3. Discrimination against religious minorities and exacerbation of religious conflicts 
In some contexts, especially those which were already fragile and characterised by reli-
gious tensions, monoreligious reactions as well as theologically exclusive teachings of the 
religious communities during the COVID-19 pandemic became apparent. For example, 
some propagated a ‘theology of salvation’ for the faithful in their own community (in-
group) and simultaneous punishment for all others, claiming that the virus had been cre-
ated as a punishment for ‘the sinners’. This narrative often went hand-in-hand with an a 
creation of an exclusivist identity (‘we’ versus ‘the others’) as well as with the social con-
struction of out-groups (e.g. other religions or religious minorities) which, in turn, were 
assigned with blame and identified as scapegoats. This contributed to discrimination and 
stigmatisation, polarisation and conflicts, thus endangering social cohesion. Specifically, 
this was manifested, for example, in anti-Semitic or Islamophobic attitudes and patterns of 
behaviour as well as in the denial of equal access for religious minorities to public health 
and social care or to social aid in a specific country. Such developments were identified in 
Iraq, Pakistan, Uganda, India and Turkey, among others. More details on the situation in 
the latter two countries are provided in Boxes 13 and 14 (Brüggemann and Lenz 2020; 
KAICIID 2020; Morthorst 2020; Wilson 2020). 
 
Box 13: Discrimination against religious minorities in India 
The precarious situation of religious minorities in India worsened significantly during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Among other things, Muslims were accused of spreading the coro-
navirus, which resulted in negative propaganda in the social media. Instead of addressing 
the misinformation which was being circulated, for example, prominent politicians from 
the governmental party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) called for a boycott of businesses oper-
ated by Muslims. Thus, Muslims not only had to fear for their livelihood, but were also 
subjected to serious social stigmatisation. This led, for instance, to a refusal to provide 
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them with coronavirus tests and treatment. The propaganda was also linked to acts of vio-
lence against Muslims (e.g. in Kadarakoppa in the state of Karnataka or in Harewali near 
New Delhi). 
In a similar manner, COVID-19 measures represented an additional burden for the Chris-
tian minority. Sanitary workers, half of whom are Christians (a result of the caste-based 
division of labour in the Hindu system) were, for example, forced to work without ade-
quate personal protective equipment. In addition, misinformation in India regarding 
COVID-19 had an effect on the religious practices of minorities, including funerals. For ex-
ample, a mob consisting of local Hindu residents prevented the burial of a Christian doc-
tor in the cemetery set aside for Christians, claiming that the burial of the body would in-
fect the neighbourhood. Due to the threat from the mob, the family had to bury the body 
near a remote crematorium which had been set aside for Hindus (Arockiasamy 2020; 
Nazeer 2020). 
 
Box 14: Antisemitism in Turkey 
The spread of the coronavirus in Turkey was accompanied by the spread of various narra-
tives which attempted to place the blame for this on the Jews. Reports on the responsibil-
ity of the Jews for this global catastrophe and their control over large pharmaceutical cor-
porations were aired and covered in the media, thus reaching a large part of the Turkish 
population. On the pro-government television station ATV, for example, a Turkish ‘ex-
pert’ stated: “Whoever spread the virus, will find the cure. Israel already made a state-
ment that they found a vaccine.” The anchorman followed up: “They found the vaccine... 
Whoever is the source [of the vaccine], they and their accomplices spread the virus, you 
say, right?” The ‘expert’ confirmed: “Absolutely! Israel has already said that they will 
make the vaccination available commercially in the foreseeable future.” Antisemitic com-
ments and hate speech popped up continuously on various social media, especially 
among religious conservatives and pro-Erdogan government factions (Fishman 2020; Wil-
son 2020). 
 
3.3 Micro-level  
The COVID-19 pandemic makes heavy demands on people. They are subject to health 
risks and thus frightened; accordingly, they must accept restrictions and may suffer from 
economic losses. They may also suffer from stress due to social isolation, a lack of feed-
back from the outside world and professional restructuring, and have to deal with addi-
tional burdens which come from caring for their children, home schooling, etc. A further 
problem also causes a high degree of uncertainty: in many countries and individual re-
gions, the measures and strategies connected to the virus threat are changing with the 
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space of just a few weeks. This situation is further complicated by the fact that new and 
sometimes competing research results and expertise are constantly being discussed in 
public and these controversies create even more uncertainty. The individual must show 
great tolerance towards ambiguity, and runs the risk of being thrown into crisis them-
selves. ‘Resilience’ is often spoken of in this context, namely when individuals cope espe-
cially well with the pandemic, manage their fear and deal flexibly with the restrictions. 
 
The following sections discuss how the COVID-19 crisis is dealt with from an individ-
ual perspective and what role in particular is played by religiosity. The methodology used 
in this chapter will thus be somewhat different to that of the two previous levels. The po-
sition taken is that of quantitative attitude and survey research, while quantitative-statisti-
cal methods will be applied. The comprehensive study on “Our Life in Times of the 
COVID-19 Pandemic” (LTCP), carried out by Carolin Hillenbrand at the Cluster of Excel-
lence “Religion and Politics” at the WWU Münster in cooperation with Alexander Yendell 
at the Leipzig Research Centre Global Dynamics, serves as a data basis (Hillenbrand 2020). 
For the analyses carried out in this study, data from 7 July 2020 until 21 January 2021 were 
evaluated. A total of 2,373 people were questioned online. It must be noted that this is not 
a representative survey, because case selection is not based on a random principle. The ob-
jective thereby is not to achieve an overview of the German population which is as repre-
sentative as possible, but to acquire a special insight into different religious groups and 
types as well to identify possible relationships and patterns between certain religious be-
liefs which people have, and their social and political attitudes and behaviour. These can 
possibly be found in general among believers or religious people and can thus be trans-
ferred to other contexts (which, however, must still be empirically examined by means of 
further studies). The added value of these quantitative survey data for this study lies in 
the fact that they represent a highly topical collection of primary data with a specific refer-
ence to the COVID-19 pandemic and which, contrary to other COVID-19 surveys, 
measures the factor of religion in a highly differentiated manner, namely in terms of the 
intensity of religiosity or the significance of religion/faith in a person’s own life as well as 
different religious beliefs (e.g. a more inclusive or exclusive understanding with regard to 
the relationship to other religions or fields such as science), various religious practices 
(such as attending services or the frequency of prayer) as well as diverse images of God87 
and manifold (religious) interpretations of the pandemic (e.g. as God’s punishment, etc.). 
In doing so, we are aiming to zoom in on different forms of belief in the human ‘system’ in 
 
87 With regard to the images of God there is, of course, the restriction that these can only be related to 
such religions/denominations in which there is also a firm belief in God or a conception of God.  
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order to shed some light on the ambivalent role of religion. The following findings de-
scribed must thus be understood as an initial impetus for research so that the patterns and 
connections identified can also be applied or examined in further contexts. Even if this 
study refers to the German context, it is assumed that against the background of the theo-
retical considerations in Chapter 2.3 the findings can be applied to other contexts since, 
following Huber (2013), the focus lies more on which ‘religious glasses’ people wear dur-
ing their lives and to what extent the centrality of religion in the lives of these people and 
its positive and negative connotations have an influence on their perception of the crisis 
and how they deal with it, rather than discussing the specific aspects of their religion. 
Nevertheless, the findings serve as no more, but also no less than important indications 
which make it necessary to take a differentiated view of the influence of religiosity in con-
nection with containment of the pandemic. 
 
Some of the findings of the statistical analyses were also presented to the experts who 
attended the first workshop and discussed with them. It was thus possible to use the find-
ings obtained from this individual survey to identify problems and solutions in the com-
munication with individual religious or non-religious individuals and to develop recom-
mendations for action. 
 
In Chapter 2.4, criteria for ‘best’ and ‘worst practices’ at the individual or micro-level 
were summarised. Among other things, these refer to how the pandemic is dealt with and 
how the crisis is overcome, compliance with regulations, the inclination towards conspir-
acy ideologies and solidarity with those of a different faith or unbelievers. These criteria 
permit the development of a best case scenario which includes, among other things, mem-
bers of society developing a resilience which helps them to overcome the crisis, complying 
with hygiene regulations, having little inclination towards conspiracy ideologies, proving 
to be helpful and supportive during the pandemic, and not building up an authoritarian 
aggression towards other religious communities. It is assumed that religiosity and certain 
religious beliefs play a central role. Following the preliminary theoretical considerations in 
Chapter 2.3, it is presumed that religious forms which have a certain proximity to an au-
thoritarian syndrome, which also includes the conspiracy mentality, are more likely to 
have an adverse effect. In other words, this form leads to more rejection of COVID-19 reg-
ulations, less solidarity and willingness to help and, in the worst case, to prejudices 
against and the derogation of others, as expressed, for example, in Islamophobia and anti-
semitism. On the one hand, therefore, we are dealing with a type of religiosity which, fol-
lowing Adorno (1950) as well as Huber and Yendell (2019), is more profound and goes 
hand-in-hand with solidarity, universalism and tolerance, and another form which is 
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more authoritarian, punitive and religiously dogmatic or exclusivist and tends to corre-
spond with a lack of solidarity and intolerance. It is further assumed that reinterpretation 
of reality is part of the religiosity which tends to be more authoritarian and has a negative 
impact on the assessment of danger with regard to COVID-19 and compliance with the 
regulations. In addition, following research on religious coping, it is also assumed that in-
dividual religiosity has an influence on contingency or crisis management. Some studies 
have demonstrated that religious faith has at least a minor positive impact on people’s 
well-being during crises. Koenig and Larson (2001) cite an optimistic world view, the sig-
nificance of values such as forgiveness, compassion and solidarity, and the strengthening 
of family relationships and social ties as possible reasons for this positive effect. In addi-
tion to this positive religious coping, research has also identified negative religious cop-
ing, i.e. when religious people feel rejected, for example by God (Herbert et al. 2009), 
which then tends to have a negative effect on their health.  
 
The following evaluation and analysis of the empirical findings is based on the criteria 
derived in Chap. 2.4, i.e.:88 
 
1.) To what extent do individual religiosity and practice have an impact on people’s 
moods and how does individual religiosity relate to positive and negative emotions dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic (contingency management); 
 
2.) Which individual factors relate to the conspiracy mentality and which roles do in-
dicators based on religion, such as attending services, the frequency of prayer, certain im-
ages such as a loving, a punitive or a liberating God, play in this respect; 
 
3.) Which individual and special factors based on religion relate to a compliance with 
COVID-19 regulations and solidarity and a willingness to help during the pandemic. 
 
1. Religious coping during the crisis 
Table 1 presents the correlations between different indicators and emotions based on reli-
gion during the pandemic. The question posed with regard to emotions was: “How often 
have you felt the following emotions during the COVID-19 pandemic?” and “I am and 
was able to assess the value of hope during the pandemic.” It is linked to the self-assessed 
 
88 In this subchapter, the following findings are not evaluated on the basis of a strict separation between 
‘best’ and ‘worst practices’ (as is the case at the macro- and meso-level). The different approach, which 
employs quantitative statistical methods, means that it makes more sense (and avoids duplications) if 
positive and negative connections in each model are presented together or compared. 
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strength of religiosity, frequency of prayer, frequency of attending church services and 
various images of God, measured by how often persons experience love, security, 
strength, guidance or life assistance, liberation from an evil power, fear and guild in rela-
tion to God, deities, or something divine. On the one hand, calculation of the correlations 
makes it possible to determine how strong a correlation between two indicators is and, 
simultaneously, the significance test indicates whether the correlation measured is purely 
coincidental or statistically significant. The values always lie between 0 (no correlation) 
and 1 (perfect correlation). The preceding sign indicates the direction of the correlation, 
i.e. whether it is positive or negative. First, the following can be stated: the correlation be-
tween indicators based on religion and emotions during the pandemic is – if it exists at all 
– more likely to be weak. There is one exception to this, namely the perspective of hope 
which, generally speaking, has a (medium-) strong positive correlation with the religious 
factors. 
 
The following picture emerges in detail: 
 
1) Strength of religiosity: the more religious people estimate themselves to be, the 
more probable it is that they feel the love and care of others, that they can grasp the value 
of hope during the pandemic and the more optimistic, but also helpless they feel. How-
ever, the correlations are only very weak. 
 
2) Frequency of prayer: frequency of prayer is also a rather weak indicator. The more 
often people pray, the more they tend to feel hopeful and optimistic, but also rather help-
less, or vice versa the helpless are those who pray more often. 
 
3) Attendance of religious services: the more often the respondents attend religious 
services, the more they feel the love and care of others and the more hopeful and optimis-
tic they are. With the exception of the perspective of hope, the correlations are only weak. 
 
4) Images of God: if the respondents feel love with regard to God they tend to have 
somewhat more energy for new things; they feel the love and care of others more, they are 
more optimistic and hopeful, feel lonely somewhat less often, but at the same time also 
somewhat helpless. Furthermore, the respondents who feel secure in God's love tend to 
have more energy for new things; they also feel the love and care of others more often and 
they tend to be more optimistic and hopeful, less lonely, but they also tend to feel some-
what helpless. Those who feel that God accompanies them in their life feel the love and 
care of others somewhat more often, tend to be somewhat more optimistic and hopeful, 
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but also feel helpless somewhat more often. Those who feel strength in their experience of 
God tend to have somewhat more energy for new things, feel love and care more often; 
not surprisingly, they are more optimistic and hopeful and lonely less often. Those who, 
in relation to God, have experienced deliverance from an evil power more often, also feel 
less often lonely, helpless and anxious more often. Those who, in relation to God, feel 
punished, tend to feel the love and comfort of others somewhat less often; they tend to 
feel lonely, helpless and anxious more often. The feeling of fear in relation to God corre-
lates negatively with the feeling of love and care as well as optimism, and positively with 
loneliness, helplessness and anxiety. 
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Table 1: Religiosity in connection with emotions during the COVID-19  
pandemic (correlations) 
Indicators based on 
religion 














Strength of  
religiosity b 
n.s. .066*** .038* n.s. .048*** n.s. .235*** 
Frequency of 
prayerc 
n.s. n.s. .042* n.s. .061*** n.s. .209*** 
Attendance of 
church servicesd 




Love .059*** .134*** .109*** -.041* .040* n.s. .302*** 
 Security .052** .133*** .118*** -.045** .037*** n.s. .319*** 












n.s. n.s. n.s. .068*** .133*** .084*** n.s. 
 Punish-
ment 
n.s. -.048* -.042* .136*** .138*** .145*** n.s. 
 Fear n.s. -.047* -.046* .141*** .146*** .190*** n.s. 
 Guilt n.s. n.s. n.s. .084*** .131*** .107*** .09*** 
Source: LTCP, own calculations, correlations Kendall tau-b; a question: “How often have you felt the following emotions 
during the COVID-19 pandemic?” (answer scale between 1=never and 5=always) b“All in all: How religious would you say 
you are?” (not at all religious, not very religious, religious to a medium degree, very religious, highly religious); c“How 
often do you pray?” (never, rarely, several times a year, one to three times per month, once a week, more than once a 
week, once a day, several times a day); d“How often do you take part in masses or other religious ceremonies? (never, 
occasionally, sometimes, often, always); e“How often do you experience ... in relation to God, deities or something di-
vine?” (never, occasionally, sometimes, often, very often) f“I am and was able to grasp the value of hope during the pan-
demic.”; ***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; n.s.=not significant. 
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As expected, negative references in an experience of something divine such as punish-
ment, fear, guilt and deliverance from an evil power are more likely to correlate with neg-
ative emotions during the pandemic, while positive images of God which are character-
ised by love, strength, security and life assistance are more likely to correlate with positive 
emotions. The feeling of helplessness correlates very weakly with positive images of God, 
which could be an indication of reverse causality. It could also be the case that the feeling 
of helplessness experienced by some people drives them to find something which is more 
positive in God.  
 
It is worth noting that the direction of cause-and-effect is very difficult to determine, 
because emotions may also be determined by attitudes and perspectives on life and the 
crisis, and these in turn also shape a certain image of God which the respondents experi-
enced at the time of the pandemic. It is quite probable that there is a psychodynamic be-
tween the affective dimension of personality and the individual image of God. However, 
it must be stated that a positive perspective of God (i.e. loving, caring) is, overall, some-
what more beneficial in terms of emotions during the pandemic than a negative perspec-
tive (i.e. judging, punitive). This fact should be taken into consideration because it could 
be significant for individual communications within religious communities.  
 
2. Causes for the conspiracy mindset, taking religious-based factors into special consid-
eration 
Even before COVID-19 and certainly after the election of Donald Trump, the significance 
of conspiracy theories in the context of a lack of trust in democracy and even anti-demo-
cratic, right-wing populist and right-wing extremist behaviour became apparent world-
wide. The problem of conspiracy theories also became apparent in the context of COVID-
19. 
 
The following section discusses the causes in relation to the inclination towards con-
spiracy myths.89 In this context, the focus once again lies especially on the influence of in-
dividual religiosity. Contrary to the question regarding the relationship between religion-
based factors and emotions during the pandemic, this discussion is not restricted to just 
individual relationships, but at the same time also examines several factors in two ‘multi-
variate’ models, since it is assumed that the conspiracy mentality depends on quite a few 
 
89 The theoretical basis for these investigations and the selection of relevant factors which influence the 
conspiracy mentality were, for example, Goreis & Voracek (2019); Imhoff & Bruder (2014); Lahrach & 
Furnham (2017); Mancosu et al. (2017); Newheiser et al. (2011); Schließler et al. (2020); Schlipphak et al. 
(2020); Seidel et al. (2018); Swami et al. (2016). 
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indicators. Thus, the study differentiates between a dependent variable, i.e. the inclination 
towards a conspiracy, and several independent variables or influential characteristics 
which relate to a conspiracy mentality. Two issues are examined in relation to the inclina-
tion to conspiracy: on the one hand, which factors influence a ‘general conspiracy mental-
ity’ are of interest; in a second model, which factors influence acceptance of a COVID-19-
related conspiracy are also of interest.  
 
The ‘general conspiracy mentality’ is also interesting, because as a characteristic it is 
included in further statistical analyses, namely where solidarity and compliance with 
COVID-19 regulations are concerned. The conspiracy mentality measured here consists of 
an index of three statements: “Most people do not recognise the extent to which our life is 
determined by conspiracies which are concocted in secret.” / “There are secret organisa-
tions which have great influence on political decisions.” / “Politicians and other leaders 
are merely puppets of the powers behind them.” The respondents could give their an-
swers on a scale of 1 (do not agree at all) to 5 (agree fully). The independent variables and 
influential characteristics included in the analysis were: age, gender, level of education, 
personal health risk with regard to COVID-19, self-assessed strength of religiosity, service 
attendance, frequency of prayer, experience of love, punishment and liberation in the ex-
perience of God or something divine, as well as “exclusivist religious beliefs”, which were 
covered in the two items: “The only acceptable religion is my religion.” and “When sci-
ence and religion contradict each other, religion is right.” 
 
First, a note on the explanatory power of the entire model. The selected indicators 
make it possible to explain quite a lot (R²=0.346). Table 2 lists the standardised regression 
weights (beta) of the individual explanatory factors. They enable the strength of the differ-
ent effects to be compared. Their values range from 0 to 1, and the preceding sign indi-
cates whether there is a positive or a negative correlation. The strongest factor for explain-
ing the conspiracy mentality is the view that if religion and science contradict each other, 
religion is right. Someone who considers religious interpretations to be more important 
than scientific explanations is more inclined, therefore, to a conspiracy mentality. The 
level of education is also significant. The better educated the respondents are, the less in-
clined they are to a conspiracy mentality. A further important factor is the health risk, 
which correlates negatively with the conspiracy mentality. It would appear that being at 
high risk forces people to be rational and renounce conspiracy myths. This could also be 
the case because people whose health is at risk are confronted with the rationality of the 
health system and would even like to clearly distinguish themselves from conspiracy ide-
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ologies. The religion-based indicators are particularly interesting. The strength of religios-
ity correlates negatively with the conspiracy mentality. The more religious the respond-
ents estimate themselves to be, the less likely they are to believe in conspiracy myths. The 
situation is similar with regard to attending religious services. The more often people at-
tend a religious service, the less inclined they are towards conspiracy myths. A deep faith 
apparently does not go hand-in-hand with the conspiracy mentality, because these are 
people who tend not to be inclined to reinterpret reality. However, frequency of prayer 
correlates slightly positively with the conspiracy mentality. This could be based on a gen-
erally higher level of fear of conspiracy ideologies. It is not surprising that the experience 
of being delivered by God from evil powers correlates positively with the conspiracy men-
tality, which could be an indication of adverse psychological dynamics. The experience of 
punishment, but also love, in relation to the experience of God correlates slightly posi-
tively with the conspiracy mentality. One important explanatory factor is the attitude that 
one’s own religion is the only acceptable one. Individuals who believe this have a very 
high probability of inclining towards a conspiracy mentality. An exclusivist image of one’s 
own religion apparently fits excellently with conspiracy myths, which in turn fits a divi-
sion of the world into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and ‘we’ and the ‘others’. 
 
The second model deals with a statement which relates to the pandemic: “There are 
evil, hidden forces behind the COVID-19 pandemic.” It is of little surprise that the results 
are fairly similar to the model on ‘general conspiracy mentality’. The general conspiracy 
mentality correlates comparably strongly with the statement: “There are evil, hidden 
forces behind the COVID-19 pandemic,” which again is of no surprise (Kendall tau-
b=.474***). It can first be said that this model also has a high explanatory power (R²=0.397). 
The explanatory factors are very similar to those of the first model. One’s own health risk 
in relation to COVID-19 has a negative influence on agreement with the statement that 
there are evil, hidden forces behind COVID-19. Otherwise, age correlates positively, edu-
cation negatively, political self-assessment slightly positively, i.e. the more right-wing a 
person is, the more likely it is that they will agree with this statement. Indicators based on 
religion are again very interesting. Here, too, it is apparent that the exclusivist attitude 
that one’s own religion is the only acceptable one has an adverse influence. Attendance of 
religious services, on the other hand, has a rather immunising character; the frequency of 
prayer, however, a rather intensifying one, as does the experience of liberation from evil 
forces by God. The experience of love and punishment in relation to God does not have 
any significant effects. 
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Table 2: Causes of the conspiracy mindset (linear regression analysis) 
Indicators Conspiracy mindseta There are evil, hidden forces 
behind the pandemicb  
Age .101** .106*** 
Sex (reference: male) n.s. n.s. 
Educationc -.180*** -.138*** 
Left-rightd .064** .084*** 
Health riske -.167*** -.192*** 
Strength of religiosity f -.164*** -.100** 
Own religion is the only  
acceptable oneg 
.138*** .198*** 
Religion before scienceh .211*** .170*** 
Attendance of church servicesi -.189*** -.168*** 
Frequency of prayerj .093*** .135*** 
Image of God as lovek .092*** n.s. 
Image of God as punishmentk .077*** n.s. 
Image of God as liberationk .147*** .247*** 
N 2181 2183 
R² .346*** .397*** 
Source: LTCP, own calculations; aIndex from the statements: “Most people do not recognise the extent to which our life 
is determined by conspiracies which are concocted in secret.” / “There are secret organisations which have great influ-
ence on political decisions.” / “Politicians and other leaders are merely puppets of the powers behind them.” (Scale of 
1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); b“There are evil, hidden forces behind the COVID-19 pandemic.” (Scale of 1=do 
not agree at all to 6=fully agree); cIn the following order: no school-leaving qualification, primary/secondary modern 
school certificate without vocational training, secondary modern school certificate and vocational training, GCSE; sec-
ondary school certificate or equal qualification without vocational training, GCSE, secondary school or equal qualifica-
tion and vocational training, advanced technical college certificate/A-levels without vocational training, advanced tech-
nical college certificate/A-levels and vocational training, advanced technical college certificate, university degree, PhD; 
d“We speak of “left” and “right” in politics. How would you generally describe your own political position: where do you 
see yourself on this scale?” (Scale of 1=left to 10=right“); e“How high do you estimate your personal health risk to be 
with regard to COVID-19 (taking possible pre-existing conditions or similar considerations into account)?” (Scale of 
1=not personally affected to 5=strongly affected); f”All in all: how religious would you say you are?” (not at all religious, 
less religious, religious to a medium degree, fairly religious, very religious); g “The only acceptable religion is my reli-
gion.” (Scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); h “When science and religion contradict each other, religion is 
right.” (Scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); i“How often do you attend mass or other religious ceremonies?” 
(never, occasionally, sometimes, often, always); j “How often do you pray?” (never, seldom, several times a year, one to 
three times a month, once a week, more than once a week, once a day, several times a day); k “In relation to God, dei-
ties or something divine, how often do you experience...” the following were queried individually in each case: love, pun-
ishment, liberation (never, rarely, sometimes, often, very often); p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05; weighted regression (beta) 
 
 
3. Religious Actors as Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? – Best and Worst Practices 
89      ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy The Role of Religious Actors in the COVID-19 Pandemic 
Both models emphasise the significance of religion-based factors in relation to the be-
lief in conspiracy myths. In particular, it is a drawback when people believe that their reli-
gion is the only acceptable one and religious explanations are more significant than scien-
tific ones. Attending religious services tends to make people immune. The more often they 
attend services, the less inclined they are to believe in conspiracy myths.  
 
In this connection, it is also problematic if people believe that the pandemic is God’s 
punishment for the sins of mankind. The survey also included a statement for respond-
ents on their position on this: “This pandemic is, in particular, a divine punishment in the 
light of human sinfulness.” (Answers: scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree). A re-
gression model which includes the conspiracy mentality as an influential characteristic 
and the same indicators as the previous model shows that whether or not people agree 
with this statement depends in particular on an image of God as punishment, religious ex-
clusivism, the conspiracy mentality, the experience of being liberated by God from an evil 
power, and a person’s age (Table A1 in the Appendix).  
 
But how does agreeing with the statement that the pandemic is God’s punishment 
given human sinfulness relate to other indicators which, at least in democracies, are dan-
gerous for the system and could even lead to intergroup conflicts? Will the belief in God’s 
punishment prove to be an indication of the valorisation of one’s own group and the deni-
gration of others? This statement first correlates with the belief that Bill Gates was respon-
sible for the pandemic and that evil, hidden powers are behind the pandemic (see Table 
3). What is problematic is that people who believe in God’s punishment are not inclined to 
regard democracy as the best form of government, regard their own religion as the only 
acceptable one and are inclined to be anti-Semitic and Islamophobic. 
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Table 3: Connection between faith in the pandemic as God’s punishment and a 
conspiracy mindset, support for democracy, religious exclusivism,  
antisemitism and Islamophobia 
Indicators Items Kendall tau-ba 
COVID-19 conspiracy There are evil, hidden forces behind 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 
.346*** 





Democracy is the best form of govern-
ment for handling crises such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
-.121*** 
Religious exclusivism The only acceptable religion is my reli-
gion. 
.287*** 
Antisemitism Jewish influence is still far too great 
even today. 
.214*** 
Islamophobia Muslims should be forbidden to immi-
grate to Germany. 
.202*** 
Source: LTCP 2021, own calculations; n=2373, aCorrelation with: “This pandemic is, in particular, a divine punishment in 
the light of human sinfulness.” (Scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05. 
 
It is not only the belief in God’s punishment which correlates with the denigration of 
Muslims and Jews, but also the conspiracy mentality and the index formed from the an-
swers to the three conspiracy items, which do not relate to COVID-19 (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Connection between conspiracy mindset, Islamophobia and antisemitism 
Statement Conspiracy mindset 
Muslims should be forbidden to immigrate to 
Germany. 
.287*** 
Jewish influence is still far too great even to-
day. 
.214*** 
Source: LTCP 2021, own calculations, (Scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); p<.001; **=p<.01; *=p<.05. 
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The findings illustrate that certain doctrines and the belief in conspiracy myths, which 
may be described as part of an authoritarian syndrome, are not only problematic because 
they result in too little objectivity with regard to COVID-19 and non-compliance with the 
COVID-19 regulations, but also because they go hand-in-hand with antidemocratic atti-
tudes and Islamophobia and antisemitism. Interreligious conflicts are, therefore, inevitable 
here. 
 
3. Influential factors with regard to attitudes towards COVID-19 regulations and help-
fulness / solidarity during the pandemic 
This section examines the influence of different indicators on attitudes towards the 
COVID-19 regulations as well as the helpfulness and solidarity during the pandemic. 
Once again, linear regression analyses were calculated. The same indicators as before 
were used in the analysis, i.e. the sociodemographic indicators such as age, gender, educa-
tion, as well as political self-assessment on a left-right scale, the individual health risk in 
relation to COVID-19, the conspiracy mentality and indicators based on religion such as 
self-assessed intensity of religiosity, religious exclusivism (one’s own religion is the only 
true religion and always right, even if it conflicts with science), the number of times a per-
son attends services, frequency of prayer, and the experience of love, punishment and lib-
eration with regard to God. The regression analyses are provided in the Appendix (Table 
A2). 
 
Model 1 deals with the influence of these indicators on the question of the extent to 
which respondents find it all right to violate COVID-19 regulations. The findings may be 
summarised as follows: The strongest influential factor is the conspiracy mentality. People 
who are inclined towards this are far more likely to accept violations of COVID-19 regula-
tions. The second strongest factor is one’s personal health risk in relation to COVID-19. 
The higher the respondents estimate their health risk to be, the more they are of the opin-
ion that violations of regulations are not acceptable under any circumstances. The other 
factors only have a weak influence. They can be summarised as follows: someone who has 
experienced God as punitive, who does not believe that religion is always right in a con-
flict between religion and science, who does not believe that God would liberate them 
from an evil power, and who believes that their religion is the only true one does not ac-
cept violations of regulations. Women tend to be somewhat less willing than men to ac-
cept violations of regulations. Surprisingly, the level of education correlates negatively, 
but again this is only very weak.  
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Model 2 analyses the influence on the question whether people are complying with le-
gal regulations more often during the pandemic than they did before. This depends in 
particular on the conspiracy mentality. The more pronounced this is, the less people are 
complying with legal regulations. As expected, one’s own health risk plays a role in the 
second factor. A further factor is religious exclusivism, which has a negative effect on 
compliance with regulations. Experiencing God as punitive leads to more compliance 
with regulations. Women and people with a lower level of education comply more with 
legal regulations; however, the education factor is of minor significance. 
 
Model 3 analyses the influential factors in relation to the frequency with which re-
spondents violate COVID-19 regulations. In particular, these factors depend on the degree 
of the conspiracy mentality, which correlates positively with violation of regulations and, 
as expected, negatively with the health risk. The intensity of religiosity also plays a role: 
the more pronounced this is, the less a person violates regulations. Religious exclusivism 
and the experience of liberation from an evil power by God correlate positively, i.e. both 
are adverse in relation to compliance with regulations. 
 
Model 4 considers the question regarding greater solidarity/willingness to help during 
the pandemic. These correlate especially with a loving God, a higher age, higher health 
risk and rejection of the statement that one’s own religion is the only acceptable one. Fur-
thermore, left-wing people are more supportive than right-wing. However, this correla-
tion is also only weakly pronounced. It must be noted that this model has little explana-
tory power because the value for the explained variance is very low (R²=0.020). This is 
probably because the dependent variable “More solidarity/willingness to help in times of 
COVID-19” is extremely skewed, i.e. only very few respondents indicated that they were 
less supportive and willing to help. This could be due to statistical distortions: the phe-
nomenon of social desirability, for example, is typical for quantitative survey research. 
 
Model 5 analyses influences on a willingness to help during the past few weeks. This 
also depends on a loving image of God as well as a person’s age, but also on the frequency 
of attending religious services. The older a person is and the more often they attend 
church services, the higher the probability that the respondent is willing to help. Here, 
too, the model offers little explanatory potential (R²=0.038). 
 
The calculation result in the following overall view: as expected, the conspiracy men-
tality is a decisive factor in relation to compliance with regulations. The less pronounced 
this is, the more people will comply with regulations. It is not surprising that compliance 
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with regulations depends on the individual person’s health risk. Religious exclusivism is 
particularly noticeable with regard to indicators based on religion. It is a drawback when 
people believe that their religion is the only true one. This correlates significantly with vi-
olations of regulations. The willingness to help during the COVID-19 pandemic is not ex-
plained well in our models. However, the most significant factor here is the experience of 
love in relation to God. A loving image of God thus has a positive effect. 
 
It was to be expected that financial donations (see Model 6) were particularly depend-
ent on age and level of education. Admittedly, the frequency of attending religious ser-
vices also plays a role here. This stands to reason, since people normally donate during re-
ligious services. 
 
Overall, it must be noted that, at the individual level, a person’s religious values and 
attitudes can play a significant role in times of pandemics, whether with regard to their 
personal crisis or contingency management, their patterns of behaviour towards others or 
their responsiveness to emerging conspiracy narratives. “Religion matters” remains an 
important finding, even if its role is ambivalent. This is why it is so important to obtain, on 
the one hand, a more in-depth insight into the sometimes divergent effects of diverse 
forms of faith and practices (and this study has shown the need for further research here) 
and, on the other hand, to strengthen the positive potential and counteract dangers as 
early as possible. Religious inclusivism, experiences with God which are characterised by 
love and benevolence, as well as social religious practices such as attendance of religious 
services and thus the social embedding of the faithful in a religious community (which, in 
the best case, is as open and plural in itself) are on the positive side. Especially in uncer-
tain times of crisis, this can give people hope, support and a sense of belonging and create 
a social identity, in turn ensuring that no vacuum is left behind which conspiracy theories 
then promise to fill. In contrast, negative tendencies are recognisable in strongly delimit-
ing exclusivist religious beliefs regarding the superiority of one’s own religion, claiming it 
is the only true one, as well as with regard to punitive, judgemental references to God and 
a purely private practice of piety. 
 
The discussions at the second workshop with the invited experts were based on these 
findings. Topics covered included what, in the experts' opinion, was problematic for (reli-
gious) individuals during times of crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and which pre-
conditions were the most important for the faithful to follow the ‘best practice’ criteria. 
The experts believed that ‘worst case’ scenarios arose especially from poverty. It was more 
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difficult for people below the poverty line to comply with regulations. Furthermore, mem-
bers of religious communities had particular problems with trusting in the government’s 
measures if their religious community had previously been or was currently being sup-
pressed by the state. Thus several experts agreed that recognition of their religious com-
munity by the state is fundamental for religious people. A lack of education was also re-
garded as problematic, because this can lead to a lack of knowledge of the dangers of 
COVID-19. But also a lack of religious education, for example regarding the rituals of dif-
ferent religious communities, could lead to prejudices and conflicts. What was seen prob-
lematic was a situation in which education of the population was carried out by religious 
fanatics and extremists who abused this social function for the purpose of spreading prop-
aganda. 
 
The resource named most often was trust. Apart from interpersonal trust, trust in the 
government was regarded as especially important. Furthermore, good collaboration be-
tween the state and religious communities was mentioned as a trust-building measure. 
The correlation with the online events necessary to achieve social distancing was described 
as providing an opportunity for members of religious communities to network world-
wide. The promotion by religious communities of a sense of unity and a willingness to 
help was also cited as important. Communication would then also be transmitted from the 
religious communities to society, for example when members of religious communities 
helped the poor. To educate the members of a religious community on the dangers of 
COVID-19 and the necessity of hygiene measures, one religious community, for example, 
carried out virtual meetings with doctors from the community. Such individuals are held 
in high regard within the community, enabling important persuasive efforts to be under-
taken in connection with the necessity of hygiene regulations. To deal with conspiracy 
narratives and fake news in connection with COVID-19, some experts believed that it was 
important for religious leaders to discuss fake news with members of their religious com-
munity. In addition, one religious figure of authority stated that it was important to con-
front members of the religious community with pictures of sick people so as to achieve a 
stronger feeling of concern and thus more supportive courses of action. 
 
  
3. Religious Actors as Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? – Best and Worst Practices 
95      ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy The Role of Religious Actors in the COVID-19 Pandemic 
3.4 Summary of findings 
In the empirical part of this study, the authors systematically classified and analysed the 
almost unmanageable volume of information they received and reviewed from numerous 
countries and regions on the role of religious groups and actors during the global COVID-
19 pandemic. A differentiated perspective was taken to enable a balanced assessment of 
relevant examples and their comparison under different aspects so as to then learn from 
the diverse and, to some extent, divergent experiences of the past year. 
 
In the light of the findings now gained on the three levels (which the Authors at-
tempted to keep separate during analysis, despite some duplications and without denying 
that, in practice, they overlap permanently) the first overarching result which can be noted 
is: if one considers the ‘best cases’ it is noticeable that they are inclined to be similar in ten-
dency and substance and thus provide a relatively coherent picture. The exception to this 
are those cases in which religious actors have, in different ways, acted as a critical correc-
tive measure to a specific state strategy or non-strategy in the fight against COVID-19. On 
the other hand, the ‘worst cases’ are more complex and heterogeneous, i.e. they can hardly 
be uniformly classified, which is not really surprising when one considers the variety of 
problem areas dealt with. Instead, it can certainly be judged as an insight that constructive 
collaboration between religious and political-state actors in the pandemic can be outlined 
along the line of reasonably clear categories, while at the levels where things fail a case-
by-case analysis with meticulous consideration for contextual conditions and variables 
may possibly be the only option. 
 
Thus, all things considered, the criteria determined for ‘best’ and ‘worst cases’ at the 
macro-, meso- and micro-level have proven to be successful as a benchmark for a system-
atic perspective, even though the more ‘large-scale’ the object of investigation was, the 
easier they possibly were to apply and prove. That is to say, use of the theoretically de-
rived criteria certainly made it easier and intersubjectively more comprehensible to work 
at the macro- and meso-level than at the micro-level, where the high degree of individual-
ity of each person and the diversity of their psychological, social, economic and religious 
characteristics and preconditions make a truly coherent profile with robust assessments 
even more difficult. Nevertheless, it was especially at the micro-level that precisely those 
ambivalent patterns of attitude and behaviour which were previously included at the 
macro- and meso-levels in the description of actions carried out by religious actors could 
be isolated and, up to a certain degree, connected to (divergent) religious convictions. And 
even if, within the scope of this study, there is a long way to go to causally relate the levels 
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which have been differentiated to one another, the findings at the micro-level help to illus-
trate the double-edged role of religious actors at the macro- and meso-levels and make 
them accessible for (at least hypothetical) explanations. 
 
If the relatively uniform bundle of ‘best cases’ as well as the rather more complex field 
of ‘worst cases’ are broken down in more detail, it is first possible to confirm the view 
(which is only superficial at first glance) that, especially in the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
constructive collaboration of all the actors involved (as well as, in particular, between rep-
resentatives from politics, science and religion) is of particular importance. It becomes all 
the more problematic, however, when groups of actors from politics and religion, for ex-
ample, join forces to defend themselves against scientific competence. In other words, alli-
ances between political and religious actors which serve to undermine scientific expertise 
or deny its relevance and importance are already questionable in ‘normal’ times. In a crisis 
such as the COVID-19 pandemic they are extremely dangerous in every respect. This is 
confirmed by the shoulder-to-shoulder relationship which governments have entered into 
with religious actors in certain countries (especially in the USA or Brazil) for precisely this 
purpose of determinedly refusing to fight the pandemic based on the – admittedly varia-
ble – state of research. If politics and religion mutually assure each other in this manner, 
instead of exercising doubt and caution against the background of their own genuine 
competences, they are acting irresponsibly together. However, religious groups have also 
caused grave problems in this respect, because their political power has meanwhile as-
sumed such proportions that they can hardly be controlled by the state or local state struc-
tures which are possibly only weakly developed (e.g. in Pakistan or Afghanistan). 
 
Based on empirical data, successive learning effects were observed among most reli-
gious actors. If, at the beginning of the crisis, almost all religious communities obviously 
found it difficult to assess the challenges of the COVID-19 virus and, in this connection, to 
understand their own role for the occurrence of infection (not to mention reacting suitably 
or setting up self-initiative groups), the faithful and representatives of most religions – 
whether Jewish, Christian or Muslims, whether Hindus, Buddhists or other religious 
groups – recognised and internalised the signs of the times. One problem for the success-
ful containment of the virus, which was heavily reliant on the cooperation of the diverse 
religious communities, remained first and foremost the radical, fundamentalist branches 
of different religions and denominations, which are often fundamentally opposed to sci-
entific knowledge and methods (Altemeyer 2003; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992 and 
2004). In their self-perception it is often such groups which are generally inclined to place 
the authority of their own religion above all other sectors such as science and politics, as 
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was previously addressed in Chapter 3.3 at the individual level. There is also what ap-
pears to be a precarious group dynamic at the meso- and macro-levels. In their (often re-
cent) historical development, such fundamentalist groups have to date developed only 
few approaches and resources to strike a balance between dogmas of faith and scientific 
knowledge, reason and emotion by means of differentiated theological education (Roy 
2011). In such a difficult situation as the COVID-19 crisis, this makes them a factor which 
is hard to calculate and even less possible to control. 
 
An above-average affinity to conspiracy theories also became evident for the same 
groups, even if that insight (or hypothesis?) would need to be underpinned by further 
studies. In the same context, an authoritarian portrait of a punitive God (and simultane-
ous scepticism towards state authorities), exclusive claims of truth as well as an unwilling-
ness to self-relativise, fatalism and apocalyptic tendencies also proved to be obstacles to a 
determined fight against the pandemic, governed by rules and including all of the rele-
vant groups. In contrast, the image of a loving God who stands, above all, for love of one’s 
neighbour, is used as a basis for such resources for helpfulness and solidarity. Their re-
trievability is ultimately indispensable for motivating religious actors positively in the cri-
sis. 
 
Despite all the ambivalence which, with regard to the role of religious actors, focuses – 
at least to a certain degree – on specific membership of a group (or could, at least, be fo-
cused on this for a while), the personal characteristics of both believers and non-believers 
must not be neglected. Naturally, membership of a specific religious group does not deter-
mine the individual or even collective course of action in any way. What applies beyond 
the crisis in order to understand the actions and attitudes of religious actors is not negated 
by the crisis. Thus, only the increasing or decreasing probabilities, tendencies and regular-
ities which can be established for individuals and groups should be reproduced and inter-
preted. In the end, however, it is always one’s own personality, subjective risk assessment 
and private relationship with faith which plays the decisive role in determining how the 
faithful of a certain denomination, those of a different faith or unbelievers will behave in a 
difficult crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The explanatory power of the variable ‘re-
ligion’ should not, therefore, be overestimated in this respect. However, this study shows 
that the role played by personality means that religion or religiosity must be viewed in a 
differentiated manner in order to prevent all members of a religious community from be-
ing placed under a general suspicion. An exclusivist faith and an overall negative experi-
ence of God are particular hindrances in the context of conspiracy myths, but also in the 
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context of solidarity and compliance with hygiene regulations, while attendance of reli-
gious services, for example, as well as a loving image of God can have a positive effect. 
The positive feedback which people experience in their religious practice is more likely to 
correlate with what has been described as a ‘best case’. 
 
Furthermore, a basic insight is that the idea of inclusion or its antipode – the funda-
mental problem of discrimination against religious minorities – has once again become 
strikingly more important in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, not because the COVID-
19 pandemic could or should serve as a genuine cause for discriminatory behaviour to-
wards religious individuals and groups (as is the case, after all, for many other problems), 
but because the crisis has, also in this respect, become a catalyst and amplifier of problems 
which already exist in this sector. Even in normal times, an authoritarian self-image of 
one`s own faith, which is based on exclusive claims to the truth and often combined with 
corresponding complaints of marginalisation and ostracism by other religious communi-
ties, is fraught with risks, and this negative potential increases even more in times of cri-
sis. Conversely, multi-religious discourse, mutual rapprochement, but also (if necessary) 
mediation between the various groups of actors is the conditio sine qua non of [the indis-
pensable condition for] a goal-oriented COVID-19 policy, which does not further exacer-
bate any conflicts which may already exist between the religions, but defuses them. And 
even if this study confirms once again that collaboration with one religious community 
may be easier than with another, the objective must always be to involve all of them as 
positively as possible.  
 
The very complex and, to some extent, time-consuming and cost-intensive (COVID-
19) political dialogue with religious actors can nevertheless draw strength from what is 
possibly the most important finding of this study, namely the complementarity of the 
range of responsibilities of religious groups, on the one hand, and of representatives of na-
tional and international politics and science on the other. Such a cooperation promises a 
balance between cognition and emotion, knowledge and feeling, and thus the two deci-
sive forces required during the COVID-19 crisis to implement and carry out such drastic 
measures which, on the one hand, bring individuals and societies to their limit and, last 
but not least, suspend the core of freedom, at least temporarily, and, on the other hand, 
must simply be endured. 
 
Models have shown that religious attitudes, forces and resources for this extremely 
difficult path are suitable, at least in their tendency, for providing adequate intellectual 
and emotional orientation. This makes them predestined, at least up to a certain degree, to 
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act as a bulwark against conspiracy theories. Not for nothing do the latter bear a resem-
blance to ‘substitute religions’. The necessity of addressing conspiracy narratives and 
myths in a primarily emotional, emphatic and sociopsychological manner rather than a 
purely matter-of-fact, rational one already theoretically ascribes a role to religion in this 
respect, but empirical data has yet to prove that religion is equal to this task. 
 
Overall, the general empirical overview of the role of religious actors during the 
COVID-19 pandemic provided in this study also highlights the need for further research. 
This is a complex subject area which should be focused on further by means of differenti-
ated analyses such as nationally and regionally based studies or case studies of individual 
religious communities. At the time this study was drawn up, research on the COVID-19 
pandemic, focussing specifically on the religious phenomenon, had only just begun. This 
report can, therefore, serve as a basis and an incentive for further research. 
 
As a final conclusion, however, the empirical-analytical part which this study was able 
to achieve emphasises the following once again: Religion matters – especially in the fight 
against COVID-19. For where international and national collaboration between politics, 
science and religion, has clearly not been effective, the number of infected people and vic-
tims has been the highest. Although the role of religious actors may often have been more 
indirectly of significance, that still does not make it any less important. 
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4. Recommendations for Action for Political and Religious Actors  
This chapter presents possible fields of action and recommendations for action in relation 
to the role or involvement of religious actors during global health crises such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The overall objective which guides the Authors' recommendations 
for action is to overcome the crisis and alleviate its negative effects. To achieve this, rec-
ommendations for action – based on theoretically and empirically well-founded analyses 
and cumulative expertise – are given for two target groups: on the one hand, for political 
actors (politicians, decision makers, governments, diplomats, etc.) and, on the other hand, 
for religious actors (religious leaders, religious communities, FBOs, etc.). 
 
In accordance with the objective on which this study is based, areas of action are again 
initially identified in a general and comprehensive way so that they can be widely applied 
in different national and religious contexts, whereby the internal diversity and pluralisa-
tion of religious (and in this case also political) actors and contexts cannot be emphasised 
often enough. Thus this chapter deals with a broad set of recommendations for action 
which, depending on the social, religious and political context, must be adjusted and spec-
ified. Drawing on this ‘pool’ of recommendations, it must be determined in each individ-
ual case which ones can best be implemented how and when, before selecting and specify-
ing them accordingly.  
 
Three main areas in which actions may be carried out are presented hereinafter and, in 
a second step, potential challenges with regard to their implementation as well as pro-
posed solutions to address these challenges are set out for each area. Figure 4 provides an 
overview of the structuring of the areas of action (including challenges), which forms the 
basis of Chapter 4 and will be explained in more detail thereafter. 
 
Fields of Action 
1. Involvement, dialogue & net-
working 
2. Religious actors’ tasks & com-
petencies in times of crises as well 
as the prerequisites & resources 
required for these 
3. Information processes,  
conspiracy theories and  
vaccination hesitancy 
Challenges 
1) Identification & selection of 
religious actors 
2) Qualities of relationships 
3) Actual implementation of 
agreements in the multi-level 
structure 
1) Financing & the provision of 
resources 
2) Dangers of religious commit-
ment 
1) ‘Infodemics’ and parallel me-
dia worlds 
2) Nexus of religion & conspiracy 
theories as well as vaccination 
hesitancy 
Fig. 4: Overview of fields of action and challenges 
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4.1 Involvement, dialogue and networking 
Religious actors represent an integral element of civil societies in countries around the 
world and are regarded as central actors in a foreign cultural and educational policy. 
Thus, political decision-makers should involve religious actors, especially in a crisis situa-
tion such as the COVID-19 pandemic, as soon as possible and strengthen dialogue and 
collaboration with and among them so that forces can be joined and global health crises 
can be mastered together. This can be achieved, for example, through roundtables or spe-
cific networks and platforms. Generally, it must be taken into consideration that in times 
of crisis (and especially when it is necessary to ban personal contact) it is more difficult to 
build up new relationships and dialogue structures. It would be better to fall back on ex-
isting structures, mechanisms and institutions. For this reason, cooperation should take 
place not only ad hoc and selectively, but continuously and by means of systematic plans 
and steps to involve and network with all partners. This could be carried out using insti-
tutionalised dialogue and advisory forums and mechanisms of consultation, deliberation 
and decision-making processes. Accordingly, religious representatives should be involved 
beyond acute crisis management, so that they can assist in drawing up, for example, plans 
for reconstruction, visions and changes for the period after the pandemic as well as in en-
suring a permanent and effective health care system, especially in local contexts at a com-
munity level and for the most vulnerable population groups. To this end, interfaith councils 
or similar bodies would appear to make sense, as they have already been established in 
some countries. For that it is advisable to take a state’s political structures into considera-
tion and, if necessary, set up counterparts at a decentralised level (regional, local, etc.). 
Special offices for religion in the foreign policy sector (such as the Division for Religion and 
Foreign Policy at the German Federal Foreign Office, the American Office of Religion and 
Global Affairs, which existed from 2009 until 2017, and others) can provide positive contri-
butions for constructive collaboration. In addition, networking and coordinating these 
bodies at a global or transnational level can be an important component. 
 
Furthermore, a central issue in the context of global health crises is that religious rep-
resentatives are linked not only with political, but also with other relevant actors and ex-
perts, e.g. from the fields of health and science, but also from civil society. For example, 
medical, academic, political, social and religious actors could be brought together in the 
form of a commission of experts or a task force to jointly discuss necessary measures, find 
innovative solutions and better coordinate their own initiatives. The advantage is that sen-
sitisation, education, an exchange of information and mutual learning can take place sim-
ultaneously. If religious actors know and learn to better understand the reasons and inter-
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relationships behind the pandemic it will be easier for them to understand and accept re-
strictions on their religious freedom and practice which may, under certain circumstances, 
become necessary. Based on a shared level of knowledge and mutually defined objectives, 
religious actors can become creative themselves and take on responsibility for suitable 
measures in the field of religious actions to avert the negative consequences of the pan-
demic. The principle of ownership, i.e. that religious communities must react not only to 
given measures which affect them directly, but also pro-actively assist in defining them, 
enabling them to make them their own, promises a higher degree of acceptance and will-
ingness to implement them. Under this condition, one can hope for a so-called ‘trickle-
down’ effect, in which the religious actors involved act as multipliers in society and the 
agreements can be communicated right down to the grassroots and the communities. 
 
Challenges and solutions 
Several central challenges and internal problem areas, which could result from the proce-
dure described above, are focused on below. They are concretized in the required brevity 
and possible solutions are pointed out. 
 
1. Identifying and selecting religious actors 
First, one of the main challenges is to identify and select those religious actors with whom 
it is important, possible and promising to collaborate and secure their cooperation. Which 
religious communities in a country/region/city should be taken into consideration? Who 
are good representatives and contacts? 
 
Identifying the actors who take part in dialogue processes is, naturally, dependent on 
context. This requires a precise knowledge of the ‘religious map’ of a country. As this is 
generally dynamic, it is imperative that it be continuously analysed.90 Knowledge of the 
prevailing state-religion relations and existing lines of cooperation vs. conflict is also help-
ful. Furthermore, the diversity within religions and religious groups must always be taken 
into consideration as well as their different dynamics and positions. In general, the princi-
ples of equality and representativity must be observed when selecting actors so that no re-
ligious community feels discriminated. This means that not just a few or the majority reli-
gions should be involved, but especially representatives from religious minorities as well 
as often groups which are often underrepresented, such as women or young people. The 
criterion of representativity refers to the fact that religious representatives from different 
 
90 Act Alliance et al. (2020), for example, can provide relevant information and criteria for identifying 
and selecting relevant religious actors. 
4. Recommendations for Action for Political and Religious Actors  
103       ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy The Role of Religious Actors in the COVID-19 Pandemic 
geographic areas of a country as well as from different levels (e.g. local, regional, national, 
global) must be taken into consideration. 
 
Overall, a good balance must be found. On the one hand, collaboration should focus 
on more moderate, liberal religious groups which can mobilise the broad centre of their 
groups so as to make better use of the positive potential of collaboration. On the other 
hand, however, it should not just be ‘preaching to the converted‘ but also undertake to in-
clude the somewhat more problematic groups.91 This can, of course, only be done under 
certain preconditions: collaboration based on reciprocity must be desired by both parties; 
binding rules of cooperation must be established; consequences must be drawn if bounda-
ries are crossed. This must be weighed up for each individual case. 
 
For example, for Germany this could mean that collaboration could be extended be-
yond the previously established large (Catholic and Protestant) churches, namely, to in-
clude religious minorities and especially the increasing groups of Muslims and evangeli-
cal and free churches. Concerning the latter two groups, an additional challenge to their 
integration is that they are yet more heterogeneous and less institutionalised. Therefore, it 
is even more important to identify strategically important actors and authorities who, on 
the one hand, can act as good multipliers for their own religious communities, but on the 
other hand are also willing and able to collaborate with state or political actors. These 
manifold religious actors should be brought together with political decision makers and 
health experts and an appropriate advisory body established, which can be accessed 
quickly and efficiently in times of crisis. 
 
2. Qualities of relationships 
The success of collaborations between political and religious actors stands and falls not 
only with their institutional framework and composition, but also with the quality of the 
relationships and the attitudes of those involved. On the one hand, experience shows the 
danger of instrumentalization, e.g. when where religious actors felt that they were not be-
ing taken seriously, but instead misused for political objectives or politicised. On the other 
hand, hindrances such as the intention to proselytise (missionary work/evangelism), con-
tradictions between scientific findings and religious dogma as well as religious identity 
conflicts can make collaborations with religious actors more difficult. 
 
91 In the interviews with the experts, they reported from their experience that approx. 80 % of the re-
sources should be used for strengthening the religious centre, and approx. 20 % for the prevention of 
religiously more extremist groups. 
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Relationship qualities such as a dialogue on an equal footing, mutual respect, includ-
ing acceptance of differences, transparency, an honest interest in others and the common 
cause as well as a basic understanding of each world and value concepts are decisive to 
meet these challenges.92 How can this specifically be achieved? First, the continuity of rela-
tionships is essential, ensuring that religious actors are not only brought on board when 
they are urgently needed. Instead, a serious collaboration with them should be politically 
and structurally desired and correspondingly communicated and displayed. The time fac-
tor is extremely important here, especially where the building up and maintaining of mu-
tual trust are concerned. Trust is the essential basis for dialogue and trust-building 
measures should include time for encounters. Thus, it must be ensured that phases for re-
ciprocal building of trust are always included and, if necessary, investments are made in 
workshops on team building or ‘non-violent communication’ (NVC). 
 
Furthermore, religious literacy on the part of political actors is necessary to achieve 
these relationship qualities. Such religious competence includes a minimum of under-
standing for the basic principles of faith, the history, traditions, practices as well as con-
temporary manifestations of religions in each country and which forms of interaction and 
communication are appropriate in each case. This enables contact to be made through 
framing, which corresponds to the framework of understanding and existing structures. 
Religious literacy on the part of the political actors can, for example, be achieved by means 
of appropriate training and workshops and by integrating appropriate contents in the for-
mation of political functionaries and diplomats. 
 
On the other hand, a certain political literacy on the part of the participating religious 
actors must also exist, which again can be established or enhanced by means of appropri-
ate (further) education programmes. In addition, an interreligious literacy is also im-
portant here, for example to counteract hindrances such as the attempt to proselytise or 
the dynamics of religious conflicts. Resources for intercultural training, communications 
workshops or programmes to foster inclusive identity are well invested and can create es-
sential preconditions for successful collaboration at a later stage. The establishment of pos-
itive, friendly intergroup contacts represents a key factor for reducing prejudices. 
 
 
92 These initially basic qualities of relationships should be specified, defined and clearly communicated 
or agreed upon when applying them in the respective context or specific case (e.g. what does a ‘dia-
logue on an equal footing’ mean for the actor, when or in which situations do they feel ‘instrumental-
ised’, etc.). 
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Another strategy which has proven to be successful in this context is to first focus on 
what is common to all, i.e. to start with shared interests and goal perspectives as unifying 
elements (e.g. “We are working together against our common ‘enemy’, COVID-19, and 
have a mutual interest in ensuring that as few people as possible come to harm or die.”). 
Theological differences and questions of truth should, however, take up less space. Fur-
thermore, it would be especially advantageous to secure the cooperation of people with a 
double function or ‘multiple identities’ for the partnership, i.e. those who are already a 
member of a religious community and, at the same time, have a high level of expertise in 
the relevant (health) issues thanks to their profession (e.g. doctors, virologists, scientists). 
They can speak in ‘several languages’ (religiously, scientifically, politically, …), which is 
very helpful for committee work. Such people must be identified and mobilised. 
 
3. Actual implementation of agreements in the multi-level structure 
Finally, there remains the challenge that mutual agreements must be worth more than the 
paper on which they are written. That is to say, they should not remain mere lip service, 
but also be practically applied. There is also the danger that, within the framework of a 
political and religious multi-level structure, dialogue is only carried out at the macro-level 
and has only an insufficient impact at the other levels (meso and micro). 
 
A systematic approach and continuous review, reflexion and evaluation of the out-
comes are essential for ensuring that collaboration between political and religious actors 
shows visible and long-term effects. To this end, creating a formal, written framework as 
early as possible can be a useful initial step. For example, minutes or agreements should 
be signed. There are already very good examples of such frameworks of engagement 
which can be used as orientation.93 What essential points should such a framework of en-
gagement include? 
 
1. commonalities and areas of mutual interest should be identified 
2. mutual objectives, principles and values should be defined for the collaboration 
3. the roles and responsibilities of each partner should be defined 
4. specific measures and operational activities for achieving the objectives should be 
spelled out 
5. the rules of the game and boundaries of collaboration should be clearly stated 
6. possible dangers arising from this collaboration should be pointed out and specific 
strategies for preventing or solving them should be suggested 
 
 
93 Examples include DFID (2012); UNAIDS (2009); UNFPA (2009); UNHCR (2014). 
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When creating such a framework, the process is as important as the end product. Ac-
tors from different genders, age groups and regions should consult with each other and 
reach a decision, whereby it is important to take the multi-level structure of religion ex-
plicitly into account and, as far as possible, include all levels. Past experiences show that 
often too little attention is paid to the local level. Thus the new COVID-19 Global Risk Com-
munication and Community Engagement Strategy  (RCCE) published by the WHO (2020b) ex-
plicitly included the criteria “people-centred” and “community-led”. To this end, representa-
tives from the local community level could be integrated in the (national) advisory body. 
In addition, drafts could be made publicly accessible (online) as a basis for discussion so 
that individual believers are given the possibility to participate and contribute their ideas 
and suggestions. Furthermore, the subsequent communication strategy is decisive for de-
termining success. Documents must be visualised, presented comprehensively for all lev-
els of education and distributed as widely as possible so that they can be published, dis-
cussed and implemented in local communities. 
 
A stronger involvement at the local level must always go hand-in-hand with corre-
sponding capacity building. For example, appropriate training sessions could enable local 
religious actors to implement the strategies for action agreed upon (e.g. how religious 
practices can be modified in accordance with hygiene regulations or how individuals can 
be motivated to change their behaviour). An internal analysis of conflict is recommended 
here, i.e. that religious communities themselves identify the opportunities and risks in im-
plementing the agreed framework of engagement in their own local communities (e.g. 
where there is a hostile atmosphere from the grassroots or a lack of willingness to imple-
ment the framework, and for what reasons, and how this could specifically be counter-
acted). 
 
Depending on the political structure of the state, collaboration between politics and 
religion should also be institutionally embedded at further (regional/community) govern-
ment levels. For example, practice-oriented establishment of relationships and structures 
of dialogue at the community level between government representatives, experts, reli-
gious community representatives and umbrella associations would make sense. Listening 
to one another, engaging in dialogue and answering questions locally could reduce con-
cerns and strengthen mutual trust, especially in those places where resistance and critical 
voices are to be expected. A sufficient basis of trust is the key to good communication, en-
suring that information is accurately circulated and legal measures are followed. Depend-
ing on the context, feasible and not too time-consuming and costly options for such cross-
level dialogues could be explored. 
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The recommendations for action with regard to the first sector “Involvement, dialogue 
and networking” have been summarised for a) political and b) religious actors as a ‘check-
list’ in Table 5. 
 
Table 5:  Recommendations for action for political and religious actors  
(Checklist No. 1) 
To manage global (health) crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and 
mitigate their negative impacts… 
a) political actors should b) religious actors should 
1) institutionalise dialogue and cooperative 
structures with religious actors (e.g. interfaith 
councils, roundtables), if necessary at different 
levels 
2) connect religious actors with other relevant 
actors from science, health, civil society (e.g. 
commissions of experts, task forces) 
3) establish a common, official framework of en-
gagement and evaluate its implementation 
(think: multi-level structure) 
4) carry out capacity building measures for reli-
gious actors to implement agreements 
5) develop religious literacy 
6) show trust, respect and open-mindedness (to-
wards religious world and value concepts) 
1) participate actively and sincerely in politi-
cal dialogue and cooperative initiatives 
2) constructively collaborate with the actors 
of other religions and experts (to achieve 
mutual objectives) 
3) ensure communication and participation 
processes with all religious levels, up to 
the local basis (‘trickle-down effect’) 
4) promote the factual implementation of 
guidelines and measures 
5) develop political and interreligious literacy 
6) show trust, respect and open-mindedness 
(towards scientific and political expertise) 
 
4.2  Religious actors’ tasks and competencies in times of crises as well as the pre-
requisites and resources required for these 
It is important for the next field of action that both political as well as religious actors rec-
ognise and understand that religious leaders, communities and organisations can and 
should take on important responsibilities for society, especially in times of crisis such as 
pandemics. For the political side, this implies a balancing act when managing crises and 
developing legal framework conditions. On the one hand, certain cornerstones and 
boundaries must be set to contain the pandemic (e.g. the necessary hygiene regulations 
and social distancing). On the other hand, sufficient scope for creativity must be left to en-
able religious actors to continue carrying out their responsibilities. “Man does not live by 
bread alone” – people should continue to be given the opportunity to satisfy their spiritual 
needs, even in lockdown. This makes it decisive that sufficient (financial) resources are al-
located to religious actors so that they can fulfil their responsibilities. 
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On the part of religious actors, this means continuously committing and engaging 
themselves so that they accept their important role, even if this makes it necessary to carry 
out certain adjustments, modifications and creative strategies. When recommendations for 
these responsibilities are given hereinafter, it is again important to take into account the 
contextuality and heterogeneity of religious communities (e.g. different self-perceptions 
and political, social and economic framework conditions in which they act; see Chap. 3.2). 
 
With regard to the spiritual or pastoral sector (a) religious communities must be able to 
deal with the tension caused by the fact that, on the one hand, they must abide by the 
rules for fighting the pandemic and cannot, therefore, carry out their religious practices as 
usual, but, on the other hand, should still provide pastoral care and thus must find new 
ways of reaching people and giving them comfort, hope and support in uncertain times. 
This applies especially for the rituals carried out when important life events occur (birth, 
sickness, death) as well as for religious festivals which continue to structure the calendar 
year in many societies and give people orientation, stability and something familiar. A 
contribution to mental health and spiritual support shall be made, e.g. through messages 
of courage and hope and to cope with stress and fears. 
 
With regard to the social or charitable dimension (b) religious communities should raise 
their voices in health crises, especially for society’s vulnerable groups such as children, 
women and minorities, including religious minorities. They should regard themselves as 
important actors in the social services sector and help wherever they are needed. This is 
especially the case where a poor (welfare) state causes supply gaps. Furthermore, reli-
gious communities should see themselves as important advocates with respect to issues of 
social justice, e.g. where disparities, gender equality and sustainable development are con-
cerned, whereby they should always keep their eye on the intersectionality of the various 
fields. 
 
Furthermore, governments should understand that, in times of crisis, they have genu-
ine visionary and theological responsibilities (c). To this end, they can draw on their long his-
tory and experience, e.g. with other epidemics, and learn from them. Specifically, religious 
arguments, for example, could be presented to give even more weight to hygiene regula-
tions and motivate people to comply with them. The language used should be as simple 
as possible and reach people at every level of education. Religious actors and theologians 
could publish articles, offer digital seminars and workshops, network with others, espe-
cially at an international level, and promote possibilities for inclusive participation. On the 
one hand, they should do so within the framework of reasonable modes of reasoning and 
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argumentation as well as scientifically sound findings; on the other hand, however, they 
should once again include a deeper, more spiritual dimension as a supplement or counter-
weight to very technical, ‘rationalising’ discourses. In this respect, they should especially 
contribute to the following existential issues in health crises: 
 
▪ issues on how to deal with grief (e.g. forms of individual and collective bereave-
ment (management) or supporting the grieving under more stringent (lock-
down) conditions) 
▪ issues which deal with “why”? (e.g. injustices, dealing with the experience of 
suffering and death) 
▪ issues regarding responsibility, solidarity and a willingness to help 
▪ issues which deal with guilt (e.g. dealing with guilty feelings or accusations 
when having infected others) and possibilities for reconciliation 
▪ theological considerations on health and medical ethics, interpretations of the 
pandemic, the role of God or the faithful in the pandemic 
▪ a reflexion on the relationship between religion and science or religion and poli-
tics 
▪ issues regarding individual and collective strategies for coping, for a dignified 
life in isolation or quarantine94 
▪ visions for a future society/‘building back better’ (e.g. what can and should a soci-
ety or the world be like after the pandemic? What kinds of sustainable models 
and solutions are there?) 
▪ constructively critical questioning of one’s own role (of religious communi-
ties/churches, etc.) and positive vs. negative contributions to fight the pandemic 
and to a peaceful, sustainable coexistence 
  
 
94 For example, lessons can, under certain circumstances, be learned from monasteries and facilities for 
spiritual exercises or meditation on how one can lead a meaningful life in isolation or ‘quarantine’, thus 
maintaining or even improving one’s own psychological and mental health, and which strategies and 
practices for coping can be practiced to achieve this (e.g. meditation, prayer). 
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Challenges and solutions 
 
1. Financing and the provision of resources 
Religious actors are continuously deploring the lack of sufficient provision of resources 
and financing, especially in times of crisis when, for example, other financial strategies 
such as donations in religious services no longer work. However, these resources are es-
sential preconditions for ensuring that they can continue to fulfil their responsibilities. 
 
Thus political and religious actors should mutually develop effective strategies and 
models for the stable and adequate financing of religious communities which are best 
suited to the context of each country and robust, particularly in times of crisis. On the one 
hand, this can be achieved through collaborative models with the state, i.e. the state pro-
vides a certain financial support in exchange for services provided to society by religious 
communities (instead of the state).95 On the other hand, special state aids (such as those 
that are granted, for example, in the economic or cultural sectors) could also apply for the 
religious sector. Public funding programmes could also be set up, for which religious ac-
tors, among others, could apply with their projects for crisis management, and with the 
help of which the above mentioned dialogue events and capacity building measures, for ex-
ample, could be financed. At the European level, religious actors could possibly be inte-
grated more strongly in existing funding programmes for civil societies and NGOs (such 
as the ‘Eastern Partnership’ (EaP) of the EU). Furthermore, the global pandemic has once 
again drastically exposed the need for global funds and networks, enabling a redistribu-
tion and allocation of funds to those places where they are required the most. Existing ini-
tiatives such as the new Multi-Religious Humanitarian Fund (MRHF) could be promoted for 
this purpose or further funding programmes supplemented. 
 
What has, in the context of global collaboration for development, turned out to be in-
creasingly essential in general are flexibility and the localisation of financing, ensuring 
that adjustments to the current situation are possible especially at the local level of reli-
gious communities and that financial resources are available as directly as possible for 
each of the faith-based organisations or local actors.96 It is also necessary to make public 
 
95 One example of this is the German model of church tax which, even if there are no collections in reli-
gious services, guarantees a stable provision of financial resources (for the two large Christian churches 
in Germany). 
96 “Localising humanitarian response is a process of recognising, respecting and strengthening the lead-
ership by local authorities and the capacity of local civil society in humanitarian action, in order to better 
address the needs of affected populations and to prepare national actors for future humanitarian re-
sponses.” (OECD 2017) 
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funds more flexible, e.g. for religious and church charities and FBOs, so that they can ad-
just financial support for their partners according to individual needs and, for example, 
target this to specific COVID-19 needs. 
 
2. The dangers of religious commitment 
In times of health crises, the commitment of religious communities can also bring with it 
certain dangers. For example, this could lead to violations of regulations and super 
spreader events. Furthermore, religious leaders can express their own claims of truth, thus 
casting doubt on scientific findings (e.g. through the belief that just kissing holy objects or 
attending religious services would protect people from being infected with the corona-
virus). In addition, the restriction of or ban on contacts (social distancing) and social media 
bubbles can lead, for example, to the formation of religious subgroups, polarisation and 
tensions, to religious conflicts and fundamentalism. 
 
How can these dangers be dealt with best? First, it is necessary to identify and analyse 
them within the context of each country. For example, it should be investigated as com-
prehensively and differentially as possible what – in relation to each health crisis – which 
religious groups believe and why, and how they react and their reasons for doing so. De-
pending on the religious map and political context, this can differ greatly. For example, 
evangelical groups may tend to exacerbate the crisis in one country, while helping to com-
bat it and avert its negative consequences in other countries. Building on the understand-
ing of the respective problem and interests, strategies can then be developed and pursued 
to counteract these dangers whereby, on the one hand, particularly positive forces should 
be strengthened and win recognition (e.g. by means of financial incentives); on the other 
hand, clear boundaries should be set for negative forces, compliance monitored and, if 
necessary, sanctions imposed for violations. 
 
Special attention should be paid here to initiatives in the interreligious sector, which 
must be identified and promoted with regard to social cohesion and prevention of reli-
gious conflicts.97 In this respect, linking different strategies and policies with one another 
would appear to be particularly effective, for example for the general fight against extrem-
ism or the promotion of peace, as well as to create synergy effects and here, too, bundle 
forces in times of crisis. 
 
 
97 Examples include initiatives such as Religions for Peace (RfP), Coexister (see Chap. 4.3), the Interna-
tional Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development (PaRD), the Joint Learning Initiative on Faith 
and Local Communities (JLI), the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers (NRTP), and others. 
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Without doubt, religious communities themselves also play a significant role in avert-
ing the dangers named. Internally, they must address the different trends – up to and in-
cluding fundamentalism. Instead of looking away, remaining silent or not even remaining 
in the conversation – which can aggravate the front lines and advance polarisation, these 
phenomena should be explicitly addressed, both theologically and inner-religiously (e.g. 
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, discussing arguments as to how far it can (not) 
be interpreted as a punishment by God or whether the attendance of religious services 
(does not) protect people from the virus, etc.). A dialogue should be actively pursued (if 
this is still possible) and bridge-building measures should be followed. To this end, under-
standing and clearly explaining that fundamentalist tendencies are often not the original 
old traditions, but newer phenomena, which must be critically reflected on and set in rela-
tion to the original traditions, has proven to be helpful (see Chap. 1.1 and 2.3). Religious 
communities can play an active role in the early community integration as a means of pre-
venting radicalisation as well as of establishing resilience and feelings of belonging and 
identity so as to strengthen social cohesion. 
 
To ensure that religious communities make a positive contribution during global cri-
ses and save as many people’s lives as possible, they should understand and carry out 
their social responsibility not only for their own religious group (in-group), but also, if 
possible, inclusively and interreligiously. For example, they should deliberately include 
socially marginalised and disadvantaged groups, fight existing stigmas and strengthen in-
terreligious education in their own ranks. Only if religious communities work together 
with each other as well as with other secular and political actors can the negative conse-
quences of global health crises be averted. Such crises are not the time to argue about the-
ological differences; instead, cooperation for a higher common objective or against the 
common ‘enemy’ COVID-19 is called for. 
 
In this context, initiatives such as the House of One98 (which is being built in Berlin) or 
the House of Religions in Bern, Switzerland, are recommendable and worthy of support. 
Here, different religions are united under one roof and a good balance is created between 
the following: On the one hand, each religion has its own area where its congregation can 
pray and practice its faith. On the other hand, a common space in the middle is available 
for mutual understanding and encounters. This architecture can also be thought of as the 
‘architecture’ of a multi-religious society. A peaceful, active coexistence of the different re-
ligious communities can succeed and bear positive fruit if people can freely live out their 
 
98 https://house-of-one.org/de [accessed on 2021-01-20]. 
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own religion and faith, but do not remain side by side (passive cohabitation); instead ad-
ditional spaces for interaction, encounters and togetherness are needed. In this regard, the 
international youth movement Coexister99 goes a step further and engages for an active co-
existence and togetherness between people of diverse beliefs, convictions and world 
views, not only between different religious ones, but especially between religious and sec-
ular ones, where often the strongest prejudices tend to exist. For example, by the means of 
solidarity and dialogue events, Coexister strengthens intergroup friendships, social cohe-
sion and peace. Such initiatives are ground-breaking for our modern society and must, 
therefore, be strengthened. 
 
Once again, Table 6 includes a checklist with the recommendations for action for 
a) political and b) religious actors with regard to the second field “Religious actors’ tasks 
and competencies in times of crises as well as the prerequisites and resources required for 
these”. 
 
Table 6:  Recommendations for action for political and religious actors  
(Checklist No. 2) 
To control global (health) crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and 
mitigate their negative impacts… 
a) political actors should b) religious actors should 
1) recognise the important societal role of reli-
gious actors 
2) create smart framework conditions: a bal-
ance between the boundaries required to 
avert the health crisis as well as free scope 
for action & creativity 
3) guarantee the provision of resources for and 
stable financing of religious communities 
4) carry out management and executive actions 
if necessary (especially strengthen positive 
religious areas & actors, dialogue efforts, cre-
ate transparency) 
1) carry out their important societal role,  
especially in times of crisis,  




2) act inclusively and interreligiously 
3) identify the problems and radicalisation 
trends which contribute to a more intensi-






99 https://www.coexister.de [30.03.2021]. 
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4.3 Information processes, conspiracy theories and vaccination hesitancy 
Since the significance of communication, information, conspiracy theories and vaccination 
hesitancy, has become very clear, especially in the COVID-19 pandemic, it will be given its 
own field of action. The chances of succeeding in containing global health crises is namely 
highly dependent on the information and communication processes which take place, es-
pecially in a networked, globalised and increasingly digitalised world in which countless 
pieces of information (including contradictory ones) are spread widely and extremely 
quickly. Thus consistent, clear and correct communication as well as the averting of circu-
lating misinformation and conspiracy theories are key factors for ensuring that the neces-
sary measures for managing the crisis receive widespread support and implementation. 
 
This is particularly true in view of the COVID vaccination campaigns that have been 
gathering pace around the globe, especially since the beginning of 2021. Since the wide-
spread immunisation of the population with the aid of vaccines is the (possibly only) way 
to contain the Corona virus in the long term, the willingness of people to be vaccinated 
has proved to be a decisive factor in overcoming the pandemic. 
 
Information and communication processes as well as vaccination campaigns should 
especially target improved coordination of existing initiatives and actors. Here again, the 
different levels (macro-, meso-, micro-, incl. the international level) must be taken into ac-
count and linked to one another. What is happening at which level should be clearly com-
municated; examples of ‘best practice’ can be spread and applied through the exchange of 
information and experiences. 
 
In this area, it is also important to emphasise once again that information and commu-
nication processes can vary depending on the social and political context. For example, 
countries which allow less freedom of expression and of the press are subject to special re-
strictions, and in less digitalised, rural contexts other paths of information (beyond the 
digital formats) must be found. 
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Challenges and solutions 
 
1. ‘Infodemics’ and parallel media worlds 
Special challenges arise in relation to the information and communication processes re-
quired, especially in health crises in a (digitally) networked world. The term ‘infodem-
ics’100 is a blend of ‘information’ and ‘epidemic’ and typically refers to a rapid and far-
reaching spread of both accurate and inaccurate information about something, such as 
disease. As facts, rumours and fears mix and disperse (e.g. via the internet, social media, 
etc.), it becomes difficult to learn essential information about an issue. This leads to an un-
clear situation with regard to information, manifold fake news, parallel media worlds as 
well as to a flood of information which overtaxes the individual and their cognitive abili-
ties, respectively. With regard to the specifically religious sector, an uncoordinated paral-
lelism and, to some extent, competition between secular and religious sources of infor-
mation increase the dangers of the distribution of information which is of questionable 
truth as well as the formation of religious ‘bubbles’, which include religious interpreta-
tions of the pandemic and arguments contradicting scientific findings. 
 
The following recommendations for action can be formulated to counter these dan-
gers. In view of the flood of information, the plurality of information must be structured 
and made manageable (without undermining its advantages or restricting rights of free-
dom). It is important that only a few central, trustworthy sources of information are desig-
nated (at a national and, in the best case, also an international level) and made known and 
accessible to as many citizens as possible. How this can be achieved or implemented in 
practical terms is, of course, dependent on the country context and existing media struc-
ture. Thus the extent to which the state itself is involved in conspiracy theories and which 
sources are the most trustworthy, and trusted by people at a local level, must be analysed 
in each case. In some contexts, for example, this may be international authorities such as 
the WHO, in others more national or local media services. 
 
The creation or designation of a central website involving all relevant, pertinent news 
agencies (e.g. in a country) and whose agenda is to carry out permanent fact-checking and 
the correct and comprehensible transfer of knowledge to combat misinformation as well 
as to deal with conspiracy theories in a factual manner would also be recommendable.101 
 
100 Merriam-Webster (s. l.) Online definition. https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/words-
were-watching-infodemic-meaning [accessed on 2021-05-19]. 
101 A positive example of this is the Norwegian website https://www.faktisk.no/ (EXP5) [accessed on 
2021-01-28]. 
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Such a relevant and widely recognised source of information would also be advantageous 
at the global level. It could be used, among other things, to provide information on the 
causes, actors and dynamics of fake news, as well as on how best to deal with and coun-
teract fake news. Generally, simple, clear and visual infographics would be useful in this 
context. Furthermore, a hotline or a 24/7 chat function could be set up, allowing people to 
pose their questions on the health crisis and receive answers at any time. Emerging con-
spiracy narratives must be revealed as quickly as possible, and critical inquiries and 
doubts must be taken seriously and dealt with accordingly. The deeper people are stuck in 
their conspiracy mentality, the more difficult it is to reach them. For example, to convince 
people of the seriousness of the situation and the need for the measures which are decided 
upon, it could be helpful if they felt a direct concern (not only at a cognitive, but especially 
also at an emotional level). They could be confronted with negative pictures and scenarios 
of people suffering and dying from COVID-19, or with personal stories, e.g. of people 
who initially played down or denied how dangerous COVID-19 is, but then suffered from 
it themselves. In order to change people’s attitudes and behaviour, they must come ‘into 
contact’ with the danger as directly as possible. 
 
Furthermore, stronger collaboration between religious and public media should take 
place, e.g. through training or workshops, to achieve a better link between religious and 
scientifically-based arguments. Key figures include, for example, religious actors who are 
held in high regard by the (faithful) population. Their potential for trust and the extent of 
their influence (e.g. in vaccination campaigns) should be used to empower them to com-
municate on various public media platforms (TV, radio, etc.) and allow their voice to be-
come clearly visible and well heard. 
 
In turn, religious actors who appear in public should be aware of their responsibility 
to spread correct and non-discriminatory information, to put a stop to questionable theo-
logical teachings and to use the media to overcome existing reservations, prejudices or 
fears against medical treatment, hygiene regulations or vaccinations. Using diverse media 
channels, they should provide spiritual support, mobilise people to act more responsibly 
and promote social values and attitudes. 
 
In addition to media cooperation between religious and secular actors, better coordi-
nation of the different religious sources of information in a country would also be useful 
to prevent the formation of religious subgroups and circulation of misleading or contra-
dictory information. One recommendation would be to set up a joint, trustworthy infor-
mation platform which involves all the religious actors in a country and would have a 
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high reputation among as many of the faithful as possible. It could be used to collect and 
systematise information on the role of religious communities in the health crisis, and ex-
amples of ‘best’ and ‘worst practice’ (incl. criteria) could be identified at different levels, 
enabling people to learn from these manifold experiences. Since religious actors generally 
have already had manifold experience with other health crises (e.g. Ebola, HIV/AIDS, ma-
laria) they could also exchange their information and ‘lessons learned’ in this respect as 
well. What is important here is a ‘multilingualism’ in the metaphorical sense: to cover the 
languages of the different religious milieus (e.g. liberal vs. conservative) as well as the dif-
ferent levels of education. Easily readable and understandable infographics could also be 
very helpful here, too. Good approaches for this at the international level include, for ex-
ample, the JLI initiative as well as the online resource repository of the Berkley Center (see 
Chap. 1.3). 
 
2. Nexus of religion and conspiracy theories as well as vaccination hesitancy 
One essential danger becomes apparent when religious beliefs are mixed with general 
conspiracy theories and then lead to particularly high-profile resistance against measures 
for fighting the pandemic as well as necessary vaccination campaigns.  
 
Political and religious actors must become aware of the central, but at the same time 
ambivalent role of religion with regard to conspiracy theories and act accordingly. For ex-
ample, they should, on the one hand, strengthen those forms of faith, images of God and 
beliefs which protect people from believing in a conspiracy theory (as an ‘substitute reli-
gion’). Conspiracy ideologies can indeed fill a spiritual vacuum, especially in contexts 
which offer few perspectives of meaning and social community experiences. Inclusive reli-
gious beliefs, in which not only one’s own religion but also other religions and sectors 
(such as science or politics) can find their place, appear to be especially beneficial for pre-
venting conspiracy theories, as do beliefs based on a loving and compassionate image of 
God (characterised by love, security, strength and accompaniment/guidance through 
life).102 Furthermore, social integration in a religious community and social religious prac-
tices such as attending religious service can protect believers against conspiracy theories, 
on the condition that the religious community is characterised by openness, is composed 
quite heterogeneously (e.g. with regard to different age groups, social classes and origins) 
and does not strive to form an isolated subgroup vis-à-vis the majority society. On the 
other hand, to overcome pandemics it is important that both political as well as religious 
 
102 More in-depth research on the nexus of conspiracy theories and certain religious, transcendental and 
spiritual concepts (beyond the concepts of God) could follow this study. 
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actors actively confront the forms of belief which fuel conspiracy myths and use argu-
ments to contradict them. This applies, for example, to the teachings of a punitive, judge-
mental image of God as well as religious exclusivism, i.e. when one’s own religion is re-
garded as the only acceptable or true religion and it is conceded the right to stand above 
scientific findings. 
 
It must be understood that certain socio-psychological tendencies and phenomena are 
usually behind such exclusivist beliefs and the belief in conspiracy theories: thinking in 
black-and-white, dividing the world into good and bad, a lack of tolerance for ambiguity, 
an authoritarian personality as well as an ‘I’ weakness. The individual can only elevate 
themself by degrading others. They need a strong (external) hand. Emotions such as fear 
and distrust are often behind this. Thus strategies for solutions on a purely discursive, ra-
tional or cognitive level are not enough; psychological as well as emotional care and sup-
port are also required. This includes, for example, measures (if possible before crises oc-
cur) to form a healthy identity, strengthen personality, reduce fear and promote empa-
thy103, resilience and social trust. They must be specified and tested, depending on context 
and need. 
 
Thus the nexus of religion and conspiracy theories leads to the recommendation for 
political actors to support those religious groups and structures which contribute to the 
prevention of conspiracy ideologies in a society, but also to be vigilant against those who, 
in turn, launch dangerous conspiracy narratives and, in this regard, to display political 
skill and undertake efforts to carry out dialogues. To this end, it is, for example, important 
to create transparency and to have knowledge of what is currently being preached and 
taught in which religious communities, especially in times of crisis. This, then, is about 
knowledge of one’s own religious landscape, i.e. not shutting one’s eyes, but acting effec-
tively. Religious leaders should also (be able to) be held accountable. In this connection, 
appropriate training of religious leaders and preachers, which does not undermine scien-
tifically proven and generally accepted methods, but instead takes them as a basis (e.g. at 
theological faculties in public universities/colleges) is, for example, especially worthy of 
support. A good religious education is important for learning how to deal with reason and 
science and how to reconcile faith with them. It should be taught as early as possible that 
 
103 “We can show empathy when we ourselves have experienced what it is like to receive empathy.” 
(EXP5) 
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both religious doctrines as well as research findings stand in an ultimate contingency, un-
availability and uncertainty. Dealing constructively with the ambiguities and complexity 
life brings with it must be learned.104 
 
Despite the lack of evaluated data on vaccination hesitancy with a specific view to reli-
gious actors (at the time of writing this study), the recommendations for action just given 
with regard to circulating conspiracy theories can (at least for the time being) be applied 
to them. Empirically, some parallels or overlaps between vaccination opposition and con-
spiracy mentality have been found so far (e.g., belief in corona conspiracy theories is usu-
ally accompanied by a lower willingness to get vaccinated - even though the group of vac-
cination sceptics is again very heterogeneous and broader and should be followed by 
more detailed investigations in the course of further developments, especially in connec-
tion with the religious factor). As recommendations for action, however, it can be stated 
on the basis of previous empirical examples that religious communities could lead by ex-
ample and use their religious trust potential. They could, for example, publicly call for 
vaccination, religious leaders could let themselves being vaccinated with public attention, 
and religious buildings could be made available as vaccination centres. 
 
For the side of the political actors, it is again important to involve the religious actors 
as early as possible in all vaccination and mobilisation processes so that they do not work 
against but with each other. For example, webinars, dialogue and Q&A formats could be 
used to address concerns and doubts and build mutual trust. Religious inquiries should 
be taken seriously, and the answers given to them should be communicated as far as pos-
sible to the local level (e.g., through the mobilisation of religious multipliers, the develop-
ment and expansion of networks, multi-religious information campaigns, etc.). In particu-
lar, the potential, energy and (digital) reach of young people could be used here. 
 
Table 7 summarises the recommendations for action with regard to the third sector 
“Information processes, conspiracy theories, vaccination hesitancy” as a checklist for 




104 “The lack of certainty does not undermine the validity of the evidence.” (EXP3) 
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Table 7:  Recommendations for action for political and religious actors  
(Checklist No. 3) 
To manage global (health) crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and 
mitigate their negative impacts… 
a) political actors should b) religious actors should 
1) designate central, trustworthy sources of in-
formation 
2) give religious actors a voice in the public me-
dia and collaborate more strongly with reli-
gious media 
3) actively combat emerging misinformation/ 
fake news 
4) promote social, psychological, pastoral and 
emotional measures with regard to conspir-
acy theorists 
5) partnership/mobilisation of religious multi-
pliers for joint vaccination campaigns 
1) collaborate with public media and combine 
medial spiritual guidance with medical edu-
cation 
2) create joint information platforms with 
other religious actors to ensure clear, coor-
dinated communication 
3) counter religious conspiracy theories by: 
a) promoting inclusive religious beliefs and 
the image of a compassionate God 
b) embedding religious practices in com-
munities which are pluralistic in nature 
4) promoting religious education to link faith 
with reason or science 
5) support vaccination campaigns (leading by 
example: publicly vaccinations of religious 
leaders, provision of religious buildings as 
vaccination centres, etc.). 
 
Summary 
At the end of the fourth chapter, the recommendations for action outlined here can be con-
densed to the following three rules of thumb: 
▪ Communication, cooperation and coordination between religious and political 
actors must be promoted to establish trusting relationships and achieve mutual 
objectives. 
▪ The important role of religious actors with regard to mental and spiritual well-
being, social security and sustainable visions of the future are to be promoted 
and the corresponding prerequisites and frameworks are to be created. 
▪ Permanent fact-checking and a correct and comprehensible transfer of 
knowledge are necessary to combat misinformation and conspiracy theories. 
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5. Conclusion and Outlook 
To conclude this study, which has summarised and analysed the thoughts and actions of 
religious actors during the COVID-19 pandemic in a basically casuistic manner, but never-
theless with the help of a systematised approach (Chapters 2 and 3) in order to derive pre-
liminary recommendations for action (Chapter 4), three actually quite simple, overarching 
insights should be clarified once again. First, in connection with the global COVID-19 pan-
demic, the topic of religion and faith is, in a number of ways, a relevant factor which de-
termines the success or failure of the fight against the virus possibly more than is gener-
ally transparent along the lines of media coverage. Second, to assess the contribution 
made by religious actors from a positive or negative point of view in the course of 
COVID-19 measures, it is essential to differentiate this factor and take a closer look at it on 
several levels. Third and finally, however, despite all the meanings, influences and conse-
quences attributed to religious actors in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, it must 
always be pointed out that the topic of religion as a whole is very complex and can, there-
fore, only be grasped by taking into account the internal and external heterogeneity of re-
ligious actors and attitudes as well as interactions with further variables of human behav-
iour. 
 
From the individual cases collected along the way it is, therefore, only possible to de-
rive generalisable results to a very limited extent. Instead, the findings often represent 
tendencies which require further examination, especially since the subject of this investi-
gation involves extremely dynamic processes which could not be adequately represented 
using the general stocktaking approach presented here. A final evaluation was made even 
more difficult since the COVID-19 crisis is still ongoing and all the statements made here 
are subject to the proviso that many (contradictory) details are not yet known, let alone 
processed. Furthermore, a differentiated view of the type of religiosity instead of mere 
membership of a certain religious community is also required in order to avoid placing in-
dividual denominations under a ‘general suspicion’ of having acted either particularly 
positively or negatively (and of continuing to do so in future). To avoid stereotypes and 
prejudices in this respect, a stronger focus has been placed on individual religiosity as, in 
case of doubt, it is characteristic for the motivation of human action. From this fundamen-
tal perspective as well as through the ‘learning by example’ which has been attempted 
here, the study was able to substantiate the view that which of the well-known ambivalent 
potentials of religion further develops during the pandemic is very much dependent on 
the specific type of belief or action of religious actors. 
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Against this background, the COVID-19 crisis has, from the perspective of the studies 
available, also proven to not only be a situation which has resulted in completely new 
kinds of challenges, but also a catalyst which, to some extent, blatantly exacerbates exist-
ing problems. With regard to religion, the latter has, therefore, proven to be an (addi-
tional) factor of uncertainty, especially where (for example, in India) interreligious group 
conflicts have already proved to be a significant obstacle to solidarity-based, community-
oriented action, where (for example in Pakistan) religious communities have long pre-
sented themselves as protagonists of political and social events which are largely uncon-
trollable by the state, or where (for example, in Brazil, the USA and Russia) fundamental-
ist groups as well as those sceptical of science have gained influence and weight in the 
past. In contrast, the existing structures and communication paths between state, civil so-
ciety and religious actors have proven by and large to be reliable, especially during the 
crisis. Constructive collaboration between state and religious actors pays off, especially 
during a crisis, while, in turn, shortcomings in this sector result in grave consequences at 
precisely such moments. As a (basic) insight derived from the crisis it should, therefore, be 
emphasised at the macro- and meso-level that cooperation with religious actors in the 
field of foreign policy as well as inter- and transnational cultural policy is a hitherto un-
derestimated field in which it should, in any case, be worth intensifying efforts in the ser-
vice of security, environmental, development and health policy objectives. 
 
Due to the preliminary nature and limited representativeness of this study as well as 
the methodological approach, there is a considerable need for further research on the basis 
of these findings. At the macro-level, this primarily concerns the carrying out of relevant 
area studies on the COVID-19 pandemic to further differentiate and precisely define the 
role of specific religious communities in individual countries. At the meso-level, for exam-
ple, further qualitative interviews with (leading) representatives of diverse religious com-
munities would be useful to deepen the insights of the results available so far in a compar-
ative way. Finally, at the micro-level, the limitations of this quantitative study lead to the 
desideratum that too little is still known about the influence of personality traits on the 
subjective perception and handling of the crisis by religious actors. Certain forms of faith 
and images of God are often influenced by other underlying characteristics which have an 
effect on individual religiosity in an interdependent way. Ultimately, cultural contexts 
and prevailing forms of faith in non-Western societies, which organise the personal and 
collective experience of God in fundamentally alternative ways than is the case for reli-
gious practices in the Christian-West European environment, should be examined in far 
more detail than was possible in this study. Furthermore, for a better understanding of the 
religious dimension of the rampant COVID-19 conspiracy myths, the role of parafaith, 
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which the study has, at best, only marginally highlighted, should be specified in more de-
tail.  
 
What this comprehensive study was able to achieve overall was a theory-based empir-
ical analysis of the role of religious actors in the COVID-19 pandemic, including a con-
structive-critical evaluation of the positions, attitudes and behaviours in different country 
and religious contexts which were presented in an overview. In conclusion, it is hoped 
that the recommendations for action derived from this study will contribute to ensuring 
that the interplay between political and religious actors, which is important for successful 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Factors which influence violations of COVID-19 regulations and belief in 
  God’s punishment (linear regression analysis) 





Health riskd n.s. 
Conspiracy mindsete .114*** 
Strength of religiosity f n.s. 
Own religion is the only accepta-
ble oneg 
.143*** 
Religion before scienceh .117*** 
Attendance of church servicesi n.s. 
Frequency of prayerj n.s. 
Image of God as lovek n.s. 
Image of God as punishmentk .248*** 
Image of God as liberationk .044* 
N 2175 
R² .225*** 
Source: LZCP 2021, own calculations; a“This pandemic is, in particular, a divine punishment in the light of human sinful-
ness.” (Answers: Scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); b in the following order: no school-leaving qualification, 
primary/secondary modern school certificate without vocational training, secondary modern school certificate and vo-
cational training, GCSE; secondary school certificate or equal qualification without vocational training, GCSE, secondary 
school or equal qualification and vocational training, advanced technical college certificate/A-levels without vocational 
training, advanced technical college certificate/A-levels and vocational training, advanced technical college certificate, 
university degree, PhD; c “We speak of “left” and “right” in politics. How would you generally describe your own political 
position: Where do you see yourself on this scale?” (Scale of 1=left to 10=right); d “How high do you estimate your per-
sonal health risk to be with regard to COVID-19 (taking possible pre-existing conditions or similar considerations into 
account)?” (Scale of 1=not personally affected to 5=strongly affected); e Index from the statements: “Most people do 
not recognise the extent to which our lives are determined by conspiracy which is concocted in secret.”; “There are se-
cret organisations which have an enormous influence on political decisions.”; “Politicians and other leaders are merely 
the puppets of the powers behind them.” (Scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree). f “All in all: how religious 
would you say you are?” (not at all religious, less religious, religious to a medium degree, fairly religious, very religious); 
g “The only acceptable religion is my religion.” (Scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); h “When science and reli-
gion contradict each other, religion is right.” (Scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); i “How often do you attend 
mass or other religious ceremonies?” (never, occasionally, sometimes, often, always); j “How often do you pray?” 
(never, seldom, several times a year, one to three times a month, once a week, more than once a week, once a day, sev-
eral times a day); k “In relation to God, deities or something divine, how often do you experience...” the following were 
queried individually in each case: love, punishment, liberation (never, rarely, sometimes, often, very often); p<.001; 
**=p<.01 *=p<.05; n.s. = not significant; standardised regression coefficients (beta) 
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Table A2: Factors influencing attitudes towards COVID-19 regulations and help / solidarity during the pandemic  
  (linear regression analysis) 
Source: LZCP 2021, own calculations; the questions were: a “For each of the following points, could you please tell me whether this is not all right under any circumstances?” Here: 
“Violate public regulations with regard to COVID-19 (restricted contact, quarantine, etc.)” (Scale of 1=always all right to 5=not all right under any circumstances); bin the following 
order: no school-leaving qualification, primary/secondary modern school certificate without vocational training, secondary modern school certificate and vocational training, GCSE; 
secondary school certificate or equal qualification without vocational training, GCSE, secondary school or equal qualification and vocational training, advanced technical college certifi-
cate/A-levels without vocational training, advanced technical college certificate/A-levels and vocational training, advanced technical college certificate, university degree, PhD; c“We 
speak of “left” and “right” in politics. How would you generally describe your own political position: Where do you see yourself on this scale?” (Scale of 1=left to 10=right); d“How high 
 Model 1: Intoler-
ance towards viola-
tion of COVID-19 
regulationsa 
Model 2: Because of 
COVID-19 I comply 
more with legal  
regulationsl 
Model 3: I violate 
COVID-19  
regulationsm 
Model 4: More 
solidarity/willing-




ness to help dur-
ing the past 
weekso 
Model 6:  
Donationp 
Age .053** n.s. n.s. n.s. .054** .311*** 
Sex (reference: male) .039* -.049* n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Educationb -.080*** -.054* n.s. .053* n.s. .117*** 
Left-rightc n.s. n.s. n.s. -.065** n.s. n.s. 
Health riskd .257*** .201*** -.207*** .075*** n.s. -.052* 
Conspiracy mindsete -345*** -.228*** .264*** n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Strength of  religiosity f .083** n.s. -.044* n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Own religion is the only acceptable 
oneg 
-.094*** -.101*** .087*** n.s. n.s. .074*** 
Religion before scienceh -.076** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Attendance of church servicesi n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .067* .145*** 
Frequency of prayerj -.070*** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .147*** 
Image of God as lovek n.s. n.s. n.s. .105** .136*** n.s. 
Image of God as punishment .047* .072** n.s. n.s. n.s. -.045* 
Image of God as liberation -.060* n.s. .082*** n.s. n.s. n.s. 
N 2181 2176 2178 2178 2181 2178 
R² .317 .130 .193 .020 .038 .221 
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do you estimate your personal health risk to be with regard to COVID-19 (taking possible pre-existing conditions or similar considerations into account)?” (Scale of 1=not personally 
affected to 5=strongly affected); eIndex from the statements: “Most people do not recognise the extent to which our lives are determined by conspiracy which is concocted in secret.”; 
“There are secret organisations which have an enormous influence on political decisions.”; “Politicians and other leaders are merely the puppets of the powers behind them.” (Scale of 
1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree);); f“All in all: how religious would you say you are?” (not at all religious, less religious, religious to a medium degree, fairly religious, very reli-
gious); g“The only acceptable religion is my religion.” (Scale of 1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); h“When science and religion contradict each other, religion is right.” (Scale of 
1=do not agree at all to 5=fully agree); i“How often do you attend mass or other religious ceremonies?” (never, occasionally, sometimes, often, always); j“How often do you pray?” 
(never, seldom, several times a year, one to three times a month, once a week, more than once a week, once a day, several times a day); k“In relation to God, deities or something 
divine, how often do you experience...” the following were queried individually in each case: love, punishment, liberation (never, rarely, sometimes, often, very often); l”In times of 
COVID-19… I comply less with legal regulations/I comply more with legal regulations.” (Scale of 1=less to 5=more); m“How often have you violated official COVID-19 regulations in the 
past weeks (restricted contact, quarantine, etc.)?” (not at all, very occasionally, once a week, several times a week, daily); n“In times of COVID-19, I show less solidarity and willingness 
to help/I show more solidarity and willingness to help.” (Scale of 1=less to 5=more); o“How often have you helped other people during the past weeks (e.g. gone shopping for them, 
etc.)?” (not at all, very occasionally, once a week, several times a week, daily); p“How much have you donated for social causes during the past weeks (monetary donation, donation in 
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The Role of Religious Actors in the  
COVID-19 Pandemic 
A theory-based empirical analysis with policy 
recommendations for action 
The subject of religion and the behaviour of reli-
gious actors in the COVID-19 crisis appear at first 
glance to constitute either just marginal issues or 
factors which tend to be negative. On the other 
hand, there is far less public discussion on the 
key role played by religious communities as civil 
society partners of governments or the WHO, as 
agencies providing charitable and pastoral assis-
tance, and as a resource for hope and contingen-
cy management so as to successfully cope with 
the pandemic. 
This study analyses the ambivalent role of actors 
in the COVID-19 pandemic within the framework 
of a theory-based empirical analysis, presents the 
most important developments, learning effects 
and problem areas yet to be addressed and 
finally, based on this, draws up policy recommen-
dations for action. 
